Spelling suggestions: "subject:"[een] GAME THEORY"" "subject:"[enn] GAME THEORY""
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Antitrust punishments in experimental duopoly marketsDavis, Owen B. January 2008 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wyoming, 2008. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on August 5, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 47).
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Design-build vs design-bid-build a procurement method selection framework /Stauffer, Griffin K. January 2006 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.S. in Civil Engineering)--Purdue University, 2006. / "August 2006." Description based on title screen as viewed on June 9, 2010. DTIC Descriptor(s): Decision Making, Construction, Game Theory, Procurement, Models, Facilities, Standards, Selection. DTIC Identifier(s): Construction Projects, Utility Theory, Thresholds, Frameworks, Procurement Criteria, Project Delivery, Procurement Methods, DB (Design-Build), DBB (Design-Bid-Build) Includes bibliographical references (leaves 31-32). Also available in print.
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Regulating China's state enterprises environmental policy as a bargaining game /Wiesmann, Jurgen, January 1999 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-113).
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Naẓarīyat al-mubārayāt wa-dawruhā fī taḥlīl al-ṣirāʻāt al-dawlīyah maʻa al-taṭbīq ʻalá al-ṣirāʻ al-ʻArabī al-IsrāʼīlīHāshim, Ḥāmid Aḥmad Mūsá. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Jāmiʻat al-Qāhirah, 1983. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-231).
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Model of kleptoparasitism in the Onthophagus taurus when to enter and leave a dung pat /Allmond, Heather Ann. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2010. / Directed by Jan Rychtar; submitted to the Dept. of Mathematics and Statistics. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Jul. 5, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 54-57).
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Investigating UCT and RAVE steps towards a more robust method /Tom, David. January 2010 (has links)
Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Alberta, 2010. / Title from PDF file main screen (viewed on July 29, 2010). A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, Department of Computing Science, University of Alberta. Includes bibliographical references.
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Analysis of resource-sharing decisions in dyadic collaborative knowledge creation a game-theoretic approach /Namuduri, Savitha January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2005. / Title from title screen. Dr. Subhashish (Sub) Samaddar, committee chair; William Bogner, Arun Rai, Thomas Whalen, committee members. Electronic text (174 p. : ill. (some col.)) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed June 29, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 164-173).
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Συγκριτική μελέτη μοντέλων διαπραγμάτευσης / Comparisational study for negotiation modelsΜελιγκώνης, Αθανάσιος 11 July 2013 (has links)
Σκοπός της παρούσας διπλωματικής εργασίας είναι να αναλύσει τον τρόπο με
τον οποίο η θεωρία παιγνίων συνεισφέρει στην λήψη αποφάσεων σε
διαπραγματεύσεις. Στα πρώτα κεφάλαια της παρούσας εργασίας αναλύονται
οι εισαγωγικές έννοιες της θεωρίας παιγνίων. Εκτός από της εισαγωγικές
έννοιες αναφέρονται οι κατηγορίες των παιγνίων και γίνεται μια προσπάθεια
ταξινόμησής τους βάσει κάποιων συγκεκριμένων χαρακτηριστικών. Στη
συνέχεια αναφερόμαστε στις διαπραγματεύσεις ως μια πιο εξειδικευμένη
μορφή θεωρίας παιγνίων. Έπειτα παραθέτουμε ορισμένα μοντέλα της
θεωρίας των διαπραγματεύσεων και τέλος με τη χρήση των μοντέλων αυτών
αναφερόμαστε σε πραγματικές περιπτώσεις διαπραγματεύσεων σε
συγχωνεύσεις κι εξαγορές εταιρειών. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how
which game theory contribute to decision making
negotiations. The first chapters of this study analyzed
the introductory concepts of game theory. Apart from the introductory
concepts mentioned categories of games and is an attempt
classification on the basis of some specific characteristics. at
Then refer to the negotiations as a more specialized
form of game theory. Then we present some models of
Theory of negotiations and end the use of these models
refer to real situations in negotiations
mergers and acquisitions.
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A quantitative real options method for aviation technology decision-making in the presence of uncertaintyJustin, Cedric Y. 07 January 2016 (has links)
The developments of new technologies for commercial aviation involve significant risk for technologists as these programs are often driven by fixed assumptions regarding future airline needs, while being subject to many uncertainties at the technical and market levels. To prioritize these developments, technologists must assess their economic viability even though standard methods used for capital budgeting are not well suited to handle the overwhelming uncertainty surrounding such developments.
This research proposes a framework featuring real options to overcome this challenge. It is motivated by three observations: disregarding the value of managerial flexibility undervalues long-term research and development (R&D) programs; windows of opportunities emerge and disappear and manufacturers can derive significant value by exploiting their upside potential; integrating competitive aspects early in the design ensures that development programs are robust with respect to moves by the competition.
Real options analyses have been proposed to address some of these points but the adoption has been slow, hindered by constraining frameworks. A panel of academics and practitioners has identified a set of requirements, known as the Georgetown Challenge, that real options analyses must meet to get more traction amongst practitioners in the industry. In a bid to meet some of these requirements, this research proposes a novel methodology, cross-fertilizing techniques from financial engineering, actuarial sciences, and statistics to evaluate and study the timing of technology developments under uncertainty. It aims at substantiating decision making for R&D while having a wider domain of application and an improved ability to handle a complex reality compared to more traditional approaches.
The method named FLexible AViation Investment Analysis (FLAVIA) uses first Monte Carlo techniques to simulate the evolution of uncertainties driving the value of technology developments. A non-parametric Esscher transform is then applied to perform a change of probability measure to express these evolutions under the equivalent martingale measure. A bootstrap technique is suggested next to construct new non-weighted evolutions of the technology development value under the new measure. A regression-based technique is finally used to analyze the technology development program and to discover trigger boundaries which help define when the technology development program should be launched.
Verification of the method is performed on several canonical examples and indicates good accuracy and competitive execution time. It is applied next to the analysis of a performance improvement package (PIP) development using the Integrated Cost And Revenue Estimation method (i-CARE) developed as part of this research. The PIP can be retrofitted to currently operating turbofan engines in order to mitigate the impact of the aging process on their operating costs. The PIP is subject to market uncertainties, such as the evolution of jet-fuel prices and the possible taxation of carbon emissions. The profitability of the PIP development is investigated and the value of managerial flexibility and timing flexibility are highlighted.The developments of new technologies for commercial aviation involve significant risk for technologists as these programs are often driven by fixed assumptions regarding future airline needs, while being subject to many uncertainties at the technical and market levels. To prioritize these developments, technologists must assess their economic viability even though standard methods used for capital budgeting are not well suited to handle the overwhelming uncertainty surrounding such developments.
This research proposes a framework featuring real options to overcome this challenge. It is motivated by three observations: disregarding the value of managerial flexibility undervalues long-term research and development (R&D) programs; windows of opportunities emerge and disappear and manufacturers can derive significant value by exploiting their upside potential; integrating competitive aspects early in the design ensures that development programs are robust with respect to moves by the competition.
Real options analyses have been proposed to address some of these points but the adoption has been slow, hindered by constraining frameworks. A panel of academics and practitioners has identified a set of requirements, known as the Georgetown Challenge, that real options analyses must meet to get more traction amongst practitioners in the industry. In a bid to meet some of these requirements, this research proposes a novel methodology, cross-fertilizing techniques from financial engineering, actuarial sciences, and statistics to evaluate and study the timing of technology developments under uncertainty. It aims at substantiating decision making for R&D while having a wider domain of application and an improved ability to handle a complex reality compared to more traditional approaches.
The method named FLexible AViation Investment Analysis (FLAVIA) uses first Monte Carlo techniques to simulate the evolution of uncertainties driving the value of technology developments. A non-parametric Esscher transform is then applied to perform a change of probability measure to express these evolutions under the equivalent martingale measure. A bootstrap technique is suggested next to construct new non-weighted evolutions of the technology development value under the new measure. A regression-based technique is finally used to analyze the technology development program and to discover trigger boundaries which help define when the technology development program should be launched.
Verification of the method is performed on several canonical examples and indicates good accuracy and competitive execution time. It is applied next to the analysis of a performance improvement package (PIP) development using the Integrated Cost And Revenue Estimation method (i-CARE) developed as part of this research. The PIP can be retrofitted to currently operating turbofan engines in order to mitigate the impact of the aging process on their operating costs. The PIP is subject to market uncertainties, such as the evolution of jet-fuel prices and the possible taxation of carbon emissions. The profitability of the PIP development is investigated and the value of managerial flexibility and timing flexibility are highlighted.
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Advance reservations and information sharing in queues with strategic customersSimhon, Eran 05 November 2016 (has links)
In many branches of the economy, including transportation, lodging, and more recently cloud computing, users can reserve resources in advance. Although advance reservations are gaining popularity, little is known about the strategic behavior of customers facing the decision whether to reserve a resource in advance or not.
Making an advance reservation can reduce the waiting time or the probability of not getting service, but it is usually associated with an additional cost. To evaluate this trade-off, we develop a game-theoretic framework, called advance reservation games, that helps in reasoning about the strategic behavior of customers in systems that allow advance reservations. Using this framework, we analyze several advance reservation models, in the context of slotted loss queues and waiting queues. The analysis of the economic equilibria, from the provider perspective, yields several key insights, including: (i) If customers have no a-priori information about the availability of servers, then only customers granted service should be charged a reservation fee; (ii) Informing customers about the exact number of available servers is less profitable than only informing them that servers are available; (iii) In many cases, the reservation fee that leads to the equilibrium with maximum possible profit leads to other equilibria, including one resulting with no profit; (iv) If the game repeats many times and customers update their strategy after observing actions of other customers at previous stage, then the system converges to an equilibrium where no one makes an advance reservation, if such an equilibrium exists. Else, the system cycles and yields positive profit to the provider
Finally, we study the impact of information sharing in M/M/1 queues with strategic customers. We analyze the intuitive policy of sharing the queue length with customers when it is small and hiding it when it is large. We prove that, from the provider perspective, such a policy is never optimal. That is, either always sharing the queue length or always hiding it maximizes the average number of customers joining the queue.
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