This dissertation examines competition in the retail gasoline industry. The first chapter highlights the importance of gasoline in modern society, introduces my work, and places it in the context of the existing academic literature.The second chapter details the institutional structure and profitability of the industry. The vast majority of retail gasoline stations are not directly owned and operated by major oil companies. Instead, most stations are set up under other contractual relationships: lessee-dealer, open-dealer, jobber-owned-and-operated, and independent. Gasoline retailers make relatively low profits, as is the case in many other retail industries, and are substantially less profitable than major oil companies. Gas stations also make less money when retail prices are climbing than when they are falling. As prices rise, total station profits are near zero or negative. When retail prices are constant or falling, retailers can make positive profits.The third chapter describes the entry of big-box stores into the retail gasoline industry over the last decade. The growth of such large retailers, in all markets, has led to a great deal of controversy as smaller competitors with long-term ties to the local community have become less common. I estimate the price impact that big-box stores have on traditional gasoline retailers using cross-sectional data in two geographically diverse cities. I also examine changes in pricing following the entry of The Home Depot into a local retail gasoline market. The results show that big-box stores place statistically and economically significant downward pressure on the prices of nearby gas stations, offering a measure of the impact of the entry of a big-box store.Chapter 4 examines the nature of price competition in markets where some competing retailers sell the same brand. The price effect of having more retailers selling the same brand is theoretically unclear. High brand diversity could give individual retailers market power, thereby leading to higher prices. Low brand diversity, though, could act to facilitate collusive behavior, leading to higher prices. I find that prices are higher in markets with high brand diversity.The final chapter of the dissertation summarizes the general findings.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Harvard University, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 457-466).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 111-116). Also available in electronic version.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 101-107).

Title from title page of source document. Dissertation no. 3316. Includes bibliographical references (p. 159-183).

In order to test the theory of the firm and alternative theories of firm behaviour, primary data was collected from 310 managers of UK-based firms. This primary data was then combined with secondary data collated from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database and the FTSEISS Corporate Governance Index. This data was then used to construct a number of binary probit models to test the validity of competing theories of the firm. Finally, the data was used to test an original hypothesis, that the level of corporate governance within a firm's management structure is the factor that determines if the managers of the firm will aim for a maximum level of profits. The hypothesis offered here is that it is not, as previously suggested, the percentage of shares held by any one individual, the overall ownership structure, the size of the firm or indeed any firm, market or industry-specific variable that determines if a firm will aim to maximize profits. The relevant factor that determines if a firm will aim to maximize profits is the level of corporate governance within the firm's management structure. Regardless of any other variable, a firm with a high degree of corporate governance is more likely to aim to profit maximize than a firm with a low level of corporate governance.

No description available.

This thesis is concentrated broadly in the field of mathematical industrial economics and more specifically upon what is known in the literature as principal-agent relationships. It focuses on investigating the nature of optimal contracts between, say, owners of the firm and the manager appointed by them to run the affairs of the firm or yet again between the owners and the workers employed in the firm. Chapter 1 introduces by first establishing the background of the analysis and then summarising the results of the thesis. The background consists mainly of implicit contract models, both of the symmetric and asymmetric information kind, and models of moral-hazard. The results of the thesis are contained in four chapters following the introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned primarily with the use made of principal agent models in the asymmetric-information implicit contract literature. This literature attempts to explain involuntary unemployment by showing that the inefficiency generated by the asymmetry in information between the principal (firm) and the workers (agent) manifests itself in employment lower than the efficient level. We show instead that results are altered in quite striking ways depending not only on the eventual asymmetry of information but also the asymmetry prevailing, say, when the agent takes his action, but before production occurs. Chapter 4 makes the case in favour of using the first-order approach in solving principal-agent models by proposing a weakening of the sufficient conditions which make this approach valid. Such weakening extends the range of cases - given by particular configurations of utility and density functions - for which the analytical convenience of the first-order approach may be utilised. Chapter 5 uses moral-hazard models and the first-order approach to answer the specific question "Should owner-managed firms with limited liability be taxed a higher rate than similar firms with unlimited liability?". The answer is "Yes, but only under certain conditions". Chapter 6 summarises and draws together the various strands of the arguments presented in the thesis.

The research examines linkages between firm strategy and market structure and also between firm strategy and firm performance. To evaluate these linkages, the research focuses on the initial price strategy of market pioneer firms, changes in market concentration, and subsequent firm achievements in the area of market share and profitability. Drawing from previous research in the areas of marketing strategy, corporate strategy and industrial organization, arguments are developed supporting the notion of different structural and performance outcomes resulting from different pioneer firm price strategies. These strategies are penetration pricing and price skimming. A sample of pioneer firms/pioneered industries was obtained from published sources and examined for significant differences between the penetration price group and the price skimming group. Price strategy was found to have a significant impact on changes in market concentration as well as pioneer firm market share and profitability.

I extend the Katz and Shapiro (1985) oligopoly model with network effects to encompass products with differing technological levels. I focus on a version of the model in which firms can invest in order to improve the probability that they advance their technology from a low level to a high level. I find that better available technology, lower adoption costs, and stronger network effects increase the rate of technological advancement and social welfare. Incompatible networks have lower total surplus but higher adoption rates. The investment competition dissipates to some degree the potential producer rents from successful advancement, particularly in the incompatible network case where increased competition can result in lower total welfare. A policy imposing a technology standard (via a high type technology requirement) yields the highest adoption rates, but negatively affects overall welfare. Analysis of the optimal tax/subsidy policy shows that taxes are optimal in most cases, since the private incentive to advance technology outweighs the social incentive. Negotiations in the real world can rarely be represented by a simple bargaining session between two parties. Agent bargaining, when one player represents another party in a bargaining situation for some form of compensation, is one such complicating circumstance from the real world. I explore the effects that this third entity has on the outcome of negotiations. I conduct a laboratory experiment emulating a simple example of agent bargaining. I test a hypothesis formulated using sequential-Nash-bargaining and also propose behavioral explanations for the observed behavior. I find that sequential-Nash-bargaining does a poor job of explaining our observations, and that using a weighted minimization of the differences between each of the three parties as a focal point provides a promising alternative.