Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (p. [189]-198). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Aberdeen University, 2009. / Title from web page (viewed on Dec. 1, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Communication right is a form of copyright to regulate the communication of works, performances, and phonograms on an interactive on-demand basis by wire or wireless means. China has introduced its 2006 Network Regulations to protect communication right from the Internet Service Provider (ISP)’s infringement, with regard to ISP’s each functional role as content provider and non-content provider of access provider, host provider, and information location tool provider. This thesis will examine whether the Chinese protection of the communication right concerning ISP’s infringement is adequate to permit effective action against any infringement of the right, according to the WIPO Internet Treaties-standard. The method employed in this dissertation is to analyse the protection of the communication right with respect to five closely interrelated key issues that require elucidation in sequence, which are the framework of the right, the reproduction during the communication, the technical protection, the rules of limitations and exceptions, and the enforcement of the right. During each analysis, the relevant provisions of both the WIPO Internet Treaties and Chinese Copyright Law will be analysed. Afterwards, a comparison between the relevant provisions will be made to examine whether the Chinese protection satisfies the minimum standard of the WIPO Internet Treaties. As the WIPO Internet Treaties do not define the extent of the concrete protection at a national level, a further analysis, which is based upon the study of the Chinese legal practice, will be made to examine whether the Chinese protection is adequate to permit effective action against ISP’s act of infringement of the right. After the analysis and comparison, this thesis will assert that the protection of the communication right concerning ISP’s infringement under Chinese Copyright Law still remains inadequate, due to the legislative disadvantages within the three-level copyright system. This thesis will identify those disadvantages, with respect to ISP’s different functional roles, and make a concrete proposal for legislative reform.

The current Internet is a hierarchical architecture comprising heterogeneous entities of privately owned infrastructures, where higher tier Internet service providers (ISPs) supply connectivity to the lower tier ISPs and charge them for the transit service. One of the most challenging problems service providers facing today is how to increase the profitability while maintaining good service qualities as the network scales up. For the higher tier ISPs, the main concern is how to increase the profit by attracting more lower tier ISPs (or traffic), while the lower tier ISPs concern about the connectivity, quality of service as well as the cost of the transit service. In this thesis, we seek to understand the interaction between different hierarchies of ISPs. Note that the lower tier ISPs can transmit traffic to each other, either by purchasing the service from higher tier ISPs, or by setting "private peering links" between themselves. Higher tier ISPs, on the other hand, cannot charge the transit service at will since there is competition among higher tier ISPs. We model the interaction of these ISPs via a game theoretic approach. Under this competitive framework, we study the issues of (a) impact of private peering relationship among the lower tier ISPs, (b) resource allocation of the higher tier ISPs so that resource monopoly can be avoided, (c) under a competitive market, how can the higher tier ISPs perform revenue maximization, and (d) conditions wherein higher tier ISPs are willing to perform network upgrade when we scale up the network size. We divide the above investigation into single higher tier ISP and multiple higher tier ISPs scenarios. In each scenario, firstly, a generalized model is presented to characterize the behaviors of the lower tier and higher tier ISPs, in which their economic interests are reflected. We study how a lower tier ISP can distributively determine its optimal routing strategy. Furthermore, we show how a higher tier ISP is able to utilize the available information to infer its optimal pricing strategy, under which a revenue maximization is achieved. Two distributed algorithms are proposed to help them to provide a fair and efficient bandwidth allocation to lower tier ISPs. Last but not least, we investigate the above issues in a many-ISPs-regime, i.e. we scale up the network size. Our mathematical framework provides insights on the interaction among ISPs and show these ISPs can still gain profits as they upgrade the network infrastructures. Extensive simulations are carried out to quantify and support our theoretical claims. / Lee Cheuk Man. / "February 2008." / Adviser: John C. S. Lui. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: B, page: 4849. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 104-109). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Title from title screen (viewed on Oct. 5, 2006) "Submitted to Department of Manufacturing Engineering and Engineering Management in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of enterprise technology and management." Includes bibliographical references.

by Chiang Tung-Keung, Wu Po-Wan, Andy. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-78). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.vi / LIST OF TABLES --- p.vii / ADKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.viii / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / The Wave of Internet --- p.1 / A Platform for Worldwide Communications --- p.1 / Fierce Competition of ISP Industry in Hong Kong --- p.2 / Chapter II. --- OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY --- p.4 / Chapter III. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.5 / Structure of Study --- p.5 / Literature Review and Interviews --- p.6 / Model Analysis --- p.7 / Chapter IV. --- THE INTERNET --- p.8 / Definition --- p.8 / A Brief History --- p.8 / Who Manages the Internet --- p.10 / Utilities of the Internet --- p.11 / Remote Access --- p.11 / Interpersonal Communications --- p.11 / Information Gathering --- p.12 / Commercial Operations --- p.12 / Others --- p.13 / How to Connect to the Internet - the Topology --- p.13 / How Information is Moved Over the Internet --- p.14 / Packet Switched Network --- p.15 / The Internet Protocol (“IP´ح) --- p.15 / Chapter V. --- The ISP INDUSTRY IN HONG KONG --- p.18 / Definition --- p.18 / Services of ISP --- p.18 / Internet Access --- p.18 / Value-added Services --- p.19 / WEB hosting --- p.19 / Facilities management (Server hosting) --- p.19 / System design and integration --- p.20 / WEB page design --- p.20 / Operation of ISP --- p.20 / ISP Access to the Internet Backbone --- p.20 / Common Ways of Access to ISP --- p.22 / Leased line Internet connections --- p.23 / Dialup IP connections --- p.24 / Cyber Map of Hong Kong --- p.24 / "Hong Kong Internet eXchange (""HKIX"")" --- p.25 / The Value Chain - Role of ISP --- p.27 / Cost Structure of ISP --- p.28 / Capital Cost --- p.28 / Operating Cost --- p.29 / Chapter VI. --- ISP - INDUSTRY LEVEL --- p.31 / The Past and Present of the ISP Industry in Hong Kong --- p.31 / The History --- p.31 / The Technology --- p.34 / The Government --- p.35 / The Five Forces --- p.37 / Entry barrier --- p.37 / Internal rivalry --- p.39 / Substitutes --- p.41 / Supplier power --- p.42 / Buyer power --- p.43 / The Demand --- p.44 / Competition and Profitability --- p.45 / Future Projection of the ISP Industry in Hong Kong --- p.46 / The Technology --- p.46 / The Government --- p.47 / The Five Forces --- p.48 / Entry barrier --- p.48 / Internal rivalry --- p.49 / Substitutes --- p.50 / Supplier power --- p.50 / Buyer power --- p.52 / The Demand --- p.52 / Competition and Profitability --- p.52 / Chapter VII. --- HONG KONG ISP - FIRM LEVEL --- p.54 / Value-added Analysis --- p.54 / Cost Structure --- p.55 / Cost Drivers --- p.55 / Economies of scale --- p.55 / Learning curve --- p.56 / Economies of scope --- p.57 / Benefit Drivers --- p.57 / Ease of connection --- p.57 / Traffic speed --- p.58 / Customer services --- p.59 / Hyperlinks and contents --- p.59 / Internet based services --- p.59 / Extensive sales network --- p.60 / Seller's reputation --- p.60 / Large installed base --- p.61 / Tailor-made services --- p.61 / Strategies --- p.62 / Wholesaling of Bandwidth --- p.62 / Focusing on Household Market --- p.63 / Focusing on Corporate Customers --- p.67 / Concentrating on Value-added Services --- p.68 / Integration and Alliances --- p.70 / Chapter VIII. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.73 / APPENDIX --- p.74 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.77

Wang, Jingjing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 58-62). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in Chinese.

Our study on interdomain traffic engineering focuses on AS Path Prepending (ASPP), a popular way for inbound traffic engineering. In order to improve the current situation that ISPs often practise this approach in a trial-and-error basis, we propose a greedy algorithm to help ISPs perform this approach systematically and efficiently. Then we demonstrate two fundamental issues of decentralized selfish traffic engineering, routing instability and global network performance degradation, based on an abstract model where ISPs perform traffic engineering for their individual load balance. We also present a real-world pathologic case of prepending instability from our measurement study. Some simple guidelines are given for ISPs to avoid such routing instability. / Our work on peering strategy is to help ISPs understand the economic implications of various traffic patterns and make proper decisions to optimize their business. We first conduct an economic analysis for an overlay streaming network to gain some insights on the free ride phenomenon. We further improve the analysis by taking the response of subscribers into consideration and formulate the dynamic market as a multi-leader-follower game to capture the Nash Equilibrium of the routing tussle among the major players of the Internet marketplace. Based on this framework together with a gravity traffic model, we present some important observations on the implications of overlays on ISPs' peering strategy. / Over the past several years, numerous types of "overlay" networks change the interdomain traffic pattern and ISPs lose the routing control of some interdomain traffic flows due to the application layer routing. As a result, some ISPs may provide unintended transit service for other local ISPs. It upsets the traditional business model and makes ISPs' peering strategies more complicated. / The Internet has quickly evolved into a vast global network owned and operated by thousands of interconnected Internet Service Providers. Each of these ISPs, as one autonomous system, has its individual economic interests. ISPs can achieve their objectives through peering strategy and interdomain traffic engineering. These two issues are important for ISPs' business and have significant implications on the Internet architecture. / Wang, Hui. / "September 2007." / Adviser: Dah Ming Chiu. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: B, page: 4865. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 163-170). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Cheung, Yang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-89). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Related Works --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- Pricing Mechanisms --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Current Situation --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Proposed Pricing Mechanisms --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Congestion Pricing --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Bandwidth Allocation Mechanism --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2 --- Revenue Distribution Mechanisms --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Current Situation --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Novel Revenue Distribution Mechanisms --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Problems in Revenue Collecting Stage --- p.16 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Desirable Characteristics of Internet Pricing Mechanism --- p.19 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Existing Solution --- p.21 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Applying Insurance into Internet Pricing --- p.22 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Internet Pricing Model --- p.25 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- System Model --- p.25 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Decisions Time Scales --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Micro Time Scale Pricing --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Macro Time Scale Pricing --- p.29 / Chapter 3.3 --- Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.30 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- The Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.32 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Properties of the Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.34 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- How Much Insurance Should a User Buy? --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Numerical Examples --- p.37 / Chapter 3.4 --- Premium Coinsurance Function --- p.40 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Problems of Allowing Pull Insurance --- p.41 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- The Premium Coinsurance Function --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Properties of the premium coinsurance function --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.4 --- Numerical Example --- p.46 / Chapter 4 --- Problems in Revenue Distributing Stage --- p.48 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.50 / Chapter 4.2 --- System Models --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Topology Model --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Traffic Model --- p.54 / Chapter 4.3 --- Settlement Model and Definition of Fair Price --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Bilateral Settlement --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Shapley Settlement --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4 --- Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value: The Symmetric Case --- p.61 / Chapter 4.5 --- Properties of the Fair Prices in the Symmetric Case --- p.65 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Sensitivity to traffic pattern α --- p.65 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- Sensitivity to network topology parame- ters p and d --- p.67 / Chapter 4.6 --- Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value: The Asym- metric Case --- p.70 / Chapter 4.7 --- Distributed and Local Approximation of the Fair Price --- p.71 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusions --- p.74 / Chapter A --- Mathematical Proofs --- p.77 / Chapter A.l --- Mathematical Proof for Chapter 3 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.1 --- Proof of Theorem 3.3.2 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.2 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.5 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.3 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.6 --- p.78 / Chapter A.1.4 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.7 --- p.78 / Chapter A.1.5 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 --- p.79 / Chapter A.1.6 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 --- p.79 / Chapter A.1.7 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.5 --- p.80 / Chapter A.2 --- Mathematical Proof for Chapter 4 --- p.81 / Chapter A.2.1 --- Proof of Theorem 4.4.2 --- p.81 / Chapter A.2.2 --- Proof of Theorem (4.6.1) --- p.83 / Chapter A.2.3 --- Terms Description of Equation (4.1) --- p.84 / Bibliography --- p.85