Cheung, Yang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-89). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Related Works --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1 --- Pricing Mechanisms --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Current Situation --- p.4 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Proposed Pricing Mechanisms --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Congestion Pricing --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Bandwidth Allocation Mechanism --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2 --- Revenue Distribution Mechanisms --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Current Situation --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Novel Revenue Distribution Mechanisms --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Problems in Revenue Collecting Stage --- p.16 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.17 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Desirable Characteristics of Internet Pricing Mechanism --- p.19 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Existing Solution --- p.21 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Applying Insurance into Internet Pricing --- p.22 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Internet Pricing Model --- p.25 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- System Model --- p.25 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Decisions Time Scales --- p.27 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Micro Time Scale Pricing --- p.28 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Macro Time Scale Pricing --- p.29 / Chapter 3.3 --- Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.30 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- The Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.32 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Properties of the Actuarially Fair Coinsurance Function --- p.34 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- How Much Insurance Should a User Buy? --- p.35 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Numerical Examples --- p.37 / Chapter 3.4 --- Premium Coinsurance Function --- p.40 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Problems of Allowing Pull Insurance --- p.41 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- The Premium Coinsurance Function --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Properties of the premium coinsurance function --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.4 --- Numerical Example --- p.46 / Chapter 4 --- Problems in Revenue Distributing Stage --- p.48 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.50 / Chapter 4.2 --- System Models --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Topology Model --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Traffic Model --- p.54 / Chapter 4.3 --- Settlement Model and Definition of Fair Price --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Bilateral Settlement --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Shapley Settlement --- p.58 / Chapter 4.4 --- Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value: The Symmetric Case --- p.61 / Chapter 4.5 --- Properties of the Fair Prices in the Symmetric Case --- p.65 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- Sensitivity to traffic pattern α --- p.65 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- Sensitivity to network topology parame- ters p and d --- p.67 / Chapter 4.6 --- Fair Price Achieving the Shapley Value: The Asym- metric Case --- p.70 / Chapter 4.7 --- Distributed and Local Approximation of the Fair Price --- p.71 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusions --- p.74 / Chapter A --- Mathematical Proofs --- p.77 / Chapter A.l --- Mathematical Proof for Chapter 3 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.1 --- Proof of Theorem 3.3.2 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.2 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.5 --- p.77 / Chapter A.1.3 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.6 --- p.78 / Chapter A.1.4 --- Proof of Proposition 3.3.7 --- p.78 / Chapter A.1.5 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.1 --- p.79 / Chapter A.1.6 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.3 --- p.79 / Chapter A.1.7 --- Proof of Proposition 3.4.5 --- p.80 / Chapter A.2 --- Mathematical Proof for Chapter 4 --- p.81 / Chapter A.2.1 --- Proof of Theorem 4.4.2 --- p.81 / Chapter A.2.2 --- Proof of Theorem (4.6.1) --- p.83 / Chapter A.2.3 --- Terms Description of Equation (4.1) --- p.84 / Bibliography --- p.85

Lam Kong. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-85). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Related Work and Background --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Competition-free Unlimited Capacity Model´ؤOne-hop Case --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- Competition-free Unlimited Capacity Model一Two-hop Case --- p.11 / Chapter 3 --- Extensions to Competition-free Unlimited Capacity Model --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1 --- Optimal Pricing for the One-hop Case under Various Utility Distributions --- p.13 / Chapter 3.2 --- Optimal Pricing for Competition-free Multi-hop Wireless Mesh Networks --- p.16 / Chapter 3.3 --- The Issue on Network Scaling --- p.22 / Chapter 4 --- Competition-free Limited Capacity Model --- p.28 / Chapter 4.1 --- One-hop Case --- p.28 / Chapter 4.2 --- Multi-hop Case --- p.36 / Chapter 5 --- Unlimited Capacity Model with Price Competition --- p.42 / Chapter 5.1 --- Renewed Game Model for Networks with Price Competition --- p.43 / Chapter 5.2 --- Pricing Equilibriums in Different Network Topologies --- p.46 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Case A: Two Access Points Competing in a One-hop Network --- p.47 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Case B: Two Access Points Competing in a Two-hop Network --- p.51 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Case C: Two Resellers Competing in a Two-hop Network --- p.54 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- Case D: Extending Case A into a Multi-hop Network --- p.60 / Chapter 5.2.5 --- Case E: Extending Case C into a Multi-hop Network. --- p.66 / Chapter 5.2.6 --- The Unified Pricing Equilibrium --- p.68 / Chapter 5.2.7 --- Case F: The Characterizing Multi-hop Network --- p.75 / Chapter 5.3 --- Revisiting the Network Scaling Issue --- p.80 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.82 / Bibliography --- p.84 / Chapter A --- Proof of the PBE for Competition-free Multi-hop Wireless Mesh Networks --- p.86 / Chapter B --- Proof of the Unified Pricing Equilibrium --- p.92

M.Ing. / The development of Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) technologies offers a novel platform for IP-based service resale via Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) that provide high network coverage and lower infrastructure cost. In this IP-based service resale business, the Access Point (AP) providers sets their pricing policies as IP-based service resellers to maximize their profits, while the resale-users (end users of the WMNs) who are price- and quality-of-service (QoS)- sensitive, respond to AP providers’ pricing policies by controlling their usage. This research exploits the efficiency of dynamic pricing by integrating pricing into best effort based WMNs as an economic control tool to optimize the profit of the AP providers and improve the utilization of their limited uplink bandwidth by taking into consideration the resale-users’ price- and QoS- sensitivity. Two cases are presented in this thesis: a monopoly, where a single AP provider aims to maximize its profit while guaranteeing its resale-users with a minimum allocated bandwidth; and a duopoly, where two AP providers compete to maximize their individual profits based on the resale-users’ price- and delay- sensitivity. For both cases, the limited uplink bandwidth of the AP providers is considered as a bottleneck of the WMN. We propose two dynamic pricing models for these two cases respectively and investigate how pricing depends on the assumptions that we make about the market. Indeed, the pricing model proposed for the monopoly is a preliminary study for the duopoly pricing model. In formulating and analyzing these two pricing models, we see how prices are driven by the profit-maximizing aim of one AP provider and the competition between two AP providers.

Wang, Qian. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-74). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- A Review of Pricing in Internet Industry --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Static Pricing --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Flat-rate Pricing --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Usage-based Pricing --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Paris Metro Pricing --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Dynamic Pricing --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Smart-market Pricing --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Responsive Pricing --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Edge Pricing --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3 --- Comparisons --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.17 / Chapter 3 --- Uplink Pricing --- p.18 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.18 / Chapter 3.2 --- Model Description --- p.26 / Chapter 3.3 --- Uplink Pricing in a Competitive Market --- p.36 / Chapter 3.4 --- The Cooperative Strategy with Uplink Pricing --- p.40 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- The Cooperative Case --- p.41 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- The Threat Strategy --- p.45 / Chapter 3.5 --- Further Discussion --- p.47 / Chapter 3.5.1 --- Accounting Cost --- p.47 / Chapter 3.5.2 --- Peer-to-Peer Locality --- p.48 / Chapter 3.6 --- Related Works --- p.48 / Chapter 3.7 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.49 / Chapter 4 --- Viability of Paris Metro Pricing --- p.51 / Chapter 4.1 --- The Model --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2 --- Flat-rate Pricing versus Paris Metro Pricing --- p.54 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- One-channel Flat-rate Pricing --- p.55 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Two-Channel Identical Pricing --- p.56 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Flat-rate Pricing versus Two-Channel Iden-tical Pricing --- p.57 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Flat-rate Pricing versus Paris Metro Pricing --- p.59 / Chapter 4.3 --- Case Studies --- p.60 / Chapter 4.4 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.62 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.63 / A Equation Derivation --- p.65 / Chapter A. --- l Proof for Lemma 3.3.2 --- p.65 / Bibliography --- p.71