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Constitutional democracy requires a constitutionalisation of Human Rights and the empowerment of judiciaries to enforce and protect such rights. In Ghana, these requirements have been put in place by the 1992 Constitution. Human Rights have been constitutionalised and the courts granted specific powers of Judicial Review to enforce the values of these rights by policing the actions of the legislature and the executive branches of Government. In response, the Judiciary has done a great deal through the power of Judicial Review to protect Human Rights in the country. It has developed a corpus of Human Rights jurisprudence which individuals and institutions can rely on for rights claims and protection. However, its role is not without blemish. This work seeks to discover the successes as well as the failures of the Judiciary of Ghana in enforcing Human Rights. As a theoretical prelude to the entire work, I claim that the main juridical basis to legitimate Judicial Review lies in the courts duty to enforce a higher body of law grounded in rights. On the basis of this claim, the work argues that while the Judiciary did play a constructive role in the promotion, enforcement and sustenance of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms in the country, it has not adopted a consistent approach in giving all Human Rights equal weight. A generous reception has been given to Civil and Political Rights, while Social-Economic Rights have not been sympathetically considered. This has generated a gap in Ghana’s Human Rights jurisprudence, and negated the values upheld by the postwar global Human Rights constituency - of which Ghana is a member. To avert the creation of Judicial determinism which will hold back the realisation of Socio-Economic Rights in Ghana, this work urges the Judiciary to accord equal respect to all Rights by adopting a purposive approach in deciding all rights claims. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2008-07-15 12:10:00.75

The main objective of this thesis is to provide description, analysis and criticism on the existing international instruments for the promotion of respect and protection of human rights, as well as a suggestion to the international community through the United Nations mechanism to adopt an additional legal instrument as a complementary procedure. This, in turn, should serve as an extra-pressure upon the State governments to bring their internal legal system in the same line as the international standards for the protection of human rights. It is being argued in this work that the current international procedures available to individual alleging their human rights have been abused by State are no longer sufficient and therefore another procedure should be introduced and put into place. The chapter "The Case of Indonesia" serves as a good (or bad?) example of State abusive conduct and remain "untouchable" under international mechanisms. Despite gross and systematic violations of human rights Indonesian government is still immune due to executive-heavy legislation system, restricted judicial review as a result of a corrupt judiciary and impunity of government and other public agencies. The study fvstly concentrates on the procedures available at international level for dealing with individual complaint alleging human rights violations. Different procedures both under Charter and treaty provisions are analysed in the attempt to describe their advantages and disadvantages. Two Charter-based procedures dealt with in the discussion cover the communication procedure under the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) which includes the "1503" procedure. Treaty-based procedures are given special attention in this thesis which include the procedure before the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee against Torture (CAT) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The discussion further presents a critical appraisal of those procedures in which the limitations and weaknesses of the procedures are analysed followed by the suggestion to adopt an additional procedure to complement the current mechanisms available to individual seeking remedies for human rights violations. The limitations of the procedures featured largely by the fact that the decisions resulted from those procedures are legally non-binding. And this all what an individual can receive after being allowed to bring hisher petition before the Committee. Before one is permitted to communicate with one of the Committee hetshe must first meet all the conditions of admissibility. The condition "exhaustion of all domestic remedies" can virtually be seen as a hindrance for individual to communicate with the Committee. Jn order to support this argument several decisions on several individual complaints handed down by the HRC are presented in this study. Finally, the study introduces a complementary procedure called International Judicial Review by which the State Constitutions and legislation can be examined whether or not they are in conformity with international human rights standards and norms. If found inconsistent the Constitutions or legislation must be declared invalid. The power to review is given to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the "principal judicial organ of The United Nations". And as a World Court the decision made by the ICJ has legally binding power.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2002. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Bibliography: p. [240]-269.

Thesis (J.S.D.)--Stanford University, 2008. / "September 2008." Includes bibliographical references (p. 196-200).

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Defense and Security))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Strindberg, Anders ; Simeral, Robert. "March 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 23, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Judicial Review, Balancing Civil Liberties, Global War on Terror, Political Spaces, Strategic. Includes bibliographical references (p. 99-106). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xvii, 398 p.: ill. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Richard Gunther, Dept. of Political Science. Includes bibliographical references (p. 364-398).

Thesis (M.A.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed on 27 Mar. 2006) "For Master of arts in arbitration and dispute resolution." Includes bibliographical references.

Can courts really build democracy in a state emerging from undemocratic rule? If so, how they do this, and what are their limits in this regard? This thesis seeks to explore the development since 1945 of a global model of democracy-building for post-authoritarian states, which accords a central position to courts. In essence, constitutional courts and regional human rights courts have come to be viewed as integral to the achievement of, or even constitutive of, a functioning democratic state. The roles courts play in supporting a democratisation process are onerous, and differ starkly from the roles of such courts in long-established democracies of the Global North. Courts in the new democracies of the post-war world have been freighted with weighty expectations to ‘deliver’ on the promises of a new democratic order, while navigating their own place within that developing order–or, in the case of regional human rights courts, inserting themselves into the democratisation process from without. At both the domestic and regional levels, from within and without the state, they are somehow expected to ‘judge’ democratisation. They are required to assess what is needed to support the democratisation process at any given point, especially in light of key deficiencies of the newly democratic order, and to judge when the democratisation context requires a different approach than may be appropriate in a mature democracy, such as the US or Ireland. However, the grand claims made for these courts as democracy-builders in existing scholarship have never been subjected to systematic analysis, nor have the overlapping roles of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts been considered in tandem. This thesis addresses a very significant research gap by drawing together a scattered and fragmented scholarship on the roles of courts in new democracies, integrating discussion of regional human rights courts, providing an innovative conceptual framework for how courts at each level act and interact as democracy-builders, and tracing connections between different normative arguments concerning the roles courts should play. As the first attempt at a wholesale exploration of the effectiveness and viability of the existing global court-centric model for democratisation, this thesis examines what we think courts do as democracy-builders, what they actually do, and what they should do. In doing so, it argues for a significant re-evaluation of how we conceive of, and employ, courts as democracy-builders.