This study explored the process of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review in Ethiopia and determined the role of the courts. It examined the different suggestions made by different authors and officials regarding the respective role and function of the courts and the House of Federation in interpreting the constitution and exercising the power of constitutional review. It also seeked to inquire the counter-majoritarian problem which focused on the relationship between judicial review and democracy. The thesis also inquired into the legitimacy of the Ethiopian approach to constitutional review. In this regard it seeked to determine whether the approach represents and adequate response to the counter-majoritarian problem. It also seeked to determine whether Ethiopia has adopted an institution that is well suited, competent and impartial to discharge the task of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review.

This thesis examines three interrelated issues. The first concerns a question about the status of administrative law, namely whether administrative officials have authority to determine what the law requires under a democratic constitution. Historically, this question has not been adequately addressed in public law scholarship because neither Diceyan constitutional theory nor common law doctrine has been traditionally receptive to administrative law. In this thesis, I argue that there are good reasons for people to respect the legal authority of administrative officials and their decisions. Those reasons are rooted in respect for the democratic process by which administrative officials are empowered, and respect for the various forms of expertise that administrative officials possess. The second issue concerns the doctrinal aspect of administrative law. If there are good reasons for believing that administrative officials have legitimate legal authority, then those same reasons suggest that judges should respect administrative legal decisions. In order to better understand how the relevant reasons for respecting administrative decisions alter the practice of judicial review, I compare and contrast the traditional doctrine of jurisdictional review with the doctrine of curial deference. This comparison shows that the doctrine of curial deference provides a superior account of the legitimate legal authority of administrative officials, and that this account makes a practical difference for the practice of judicial review. The third issue concerns whether the doctrine of curial deference can be reconciled with the rule of law. Assuming that there are good reasons for respecting administrative decisions, how can judges both respect an administrative decision while ensuring that it is consistent with the rule of law? I argue that judges can both respect administrative decisions and maintain the rule of law by requiring administrative officials to justify their decisions adequately in light of public reasons which are both patent and latent in existing legal materials.

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This thesis examines three interrelated issues. The first concerns a question about the status of administrative law, namely whether administrative officials have authority to determine what the law requires under a democratic constitution. Historically, this question has not been adequately addressed in public law scholarship because neither Diceyan constitutional theory nor common law doctrine has been traditionally receptive to administrative law. In this thesis, I argue that there are good reasons for people to respect the legal authority of administrative officials and their decisions. Those reasons are rooted in respect for the democratic process by which administrative officials are empowered, and respect for the various forms of expertise that administrative officials possess. The second issue concerns the doctrinal aspect of administrative law. If there are good reasons for believing that administrative officials have legitimate legal authority, then those same reasons suggest that judges should respect administrative legal decisions. In order to better understand how the relevant reasons for respecting administrative decisions alter the practice of judicial review, I compare and contrast the traditional doctrine of jurisdictional review with the doctrine of curial deference. This comparison shows that the doctrine of curial deference provides a superior account of the legitimate legal authority of administrative officials, and that this account makes a practical difference for the practice of judicial review. The third issue concerns whether the doctrine of curial deference can be reconciled with the rule of law. Assuming that there are good reasons for respecting administrative decisions, how can judges both respect an administrative decision while ensuring that it is consistent with the rule of law? I argue that judges can both respect administrative decisions and maintain the rule of law by requiring administrative officials to justify their decisions adequately in light of public reasons which are both patent and latent in existing legal materials.

This study explored the process of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review in Ethiopia and determined the role of the courts. It examined the different suggestions made by different authors and officials regarding the respective role and function of the courts and the House of Federation in interpreting the constitution and exercising the power of constitutional review. It also seeked to inquire the counter-majoritarian problem which focused on the relationship between judicial review and democracy. The thesis also inquired into the legitimacy of the Ethiopian approach to constitutional review. In this regard it seeked to determine whether the approach represents and adequate response to the counter-majoritarian problem. It also seeked to determine whether Ethiopia has adopted an institution that is well suited, competent and impartial to discharge the task of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review.

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Andrew Altman, committee chair; Christie Hartley, Peter Lindsay, committee members. Electronic text (88 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed May 2, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 80-88).

Magister Legum - LLM / This study explored the process of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review in Ethiopia and determined the role of the courts. It examined the different suggestions made by different authors and officials regarding the respective role and function of the courts and the House of Federation in interpreting the constitution and exercising the power of constitutional review. It also seeked to inquire the counter-majoritarian problem which focused on the relationship between judicial review and democracy. The thesis also inquired into the legitimacy of the Ethiopian approach to constitutional review. In this regard it seeked to determine whether the approach represents and adequate response to the counter-majoritarian problem. It also seeked to determine whether Ethiopia has adopted an institution that is well suited, competent and impartial to discharge the task of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review. / South Africa

The thesis approaches the question of distributive justice through an analysis of legal rights, focusing in particular on constitutional rights. In Part I (Chapters 1, 2, 3) conceptual issues of the meaning of rights are considered. The concept of a right is analyzed generally as (1) a claim to something; (2) which is logically correlated with a duty; and (3) which is justified, in the case of constitutional rights, by reference to constitutional grounds. The more specific Hohfeldian analysis of legal rights is then coordinated with the general account. Analyzing rights as justified claims leads to the question of what counts as constitutional justification which is in turn intimately tied to a correct account of judicial review. In Part II (Chapters 4,5) a definitive account of judicial review is attempted. After examining the logical base of legal reasoning and concluding that it is essentially dialectical, the major normative theories of judicial review are considered. In particular natural law, legal realism, reasoned elaboration, and legal positivism are considered and all are rejected in part. An attempt is then made to incorporate significant elements of each in a general theory using the coherence methodology of Ronald Dworkin. Finally the results are applied to a paradigm of the sort of judicial reasoning that seems to capture the elements picked out in the earlier analysis. It is argued that the thesis advanced here explains and justifies the judicial reasoning used in that case (Griswold v. Connecticut).

O princípio democrático está inscrito nas Constituições contemporâneas como fundamental para o desenvolvimento do Estado Constitucional. Embora o conceito possa variar, é certo que existem alguns pressupostos e características que permitem avaliar o status democrático de uma sociedade, bem como a existência de efetividade aos direitos diretamente decorrentes da democracia, vale dizer, direitos voltados à instrumentação do princípio. O projeto constitucional se inscreve cotidianamente e passa a exigir o agir do Poder Público, em qualquer de suas funções, pois a efetivação da Constituição é dever de todos. Quando ausente a efetividade, passa-se a cogitar a transcrição dos direitos sobre a democracia pela veia constitucional. E ultrapassada a vertente meramente aplicadora da lei concepção liberal da separação de poderes -, o Judiciário erege como criador do Direito em um aspecto interpretacionista. Surge, então, a discussão acerca dos limites da interpretação e das técnicas de controle de constitucionalidade para efetivação da democracia. Isto é, a discussão acerca do liame que separa a interpretação criadora da criação interpretativa, assim como o modo técnico-racional utilizado pelo Judiciário para realizar o princípio democrático. De qualquer forma, torna-se imprescindível a análise circunstanciada do modo de interpretação, até mesmo para que nunca se perca de vista o dever de racionalidade que deve permear a decisão jurisdicional. O objetivo não é negar o evidente processo criativo do Judiciário, mas entender seu funcionamento, de modo que seu exercício não exceda a interpretação razoável dos preceitos constitucionais. / The democratic principle is present in the contemporary Constitutions as the central for the development of the constitutional State. Although the concept may vary, there are some assumptions and characteristics that allow the evaluation of a society´s democratic status, as well as the existence of effective directly democratic rights. In other words, rights capable of exercising the principle. The constitutional project is performed daily and it requires the action of government, in all of its functions, since the execution of the Constitution is an obligation of all. When the effectiveness is left beside, its common to cogitate the transcription of rights about democracy in the Constitution. And once the thought of the Judiciary only as a law enforcer liberal conception of the separation of powers is overcame, the Judiciary assumes a role of rights creator in an interpretationist aspect. That´s when the discussion about the limits of interpretation and judicial review techniques in the effectiviness of democracy comes to surface. In other words, the discussion that envolves the bond that separates creative interpretation from interpretative creation, as the technical-rational mode used by the Judiciary to accomplish the democractic principle. Either way, it becomes essential the detailed analysis of the form of interpretation adopted, as a way to never left aside the rationaily duty that should permeate judicial decision. The goal is not to deny the obvious creative process of Judiciary, but to understand its function so its exercise never exceeds the reasonable interpretation of fundamental precepts.

O princípio democrático está inscrito nas Constituições contemporâneas como fundamental para o desenvolvimento do Estado Constitucional. Embora o conceito possa variar, é certo que existem alguns pressupostos e características que permitem avaliar o status democrático de uma sociedade, bem como a existência de efetividade aos direitos diretamente decorrentes da democracia, vale dizer, direitos voltados à instrumentação do princípio. O projeto constitucional se inscreve cotidianamente e passa a exigir o agir do Poder Público, em qualquer de suas funções, pois a efetivação da Constituição é dever de todos. Quando ausente a efetividade, passa-se a cogitar a transcrição dos direitos sobre a democracia pela veia constitucional. E ultrapassada a vertente meramente aplicadora da lei concepção liberal da separação de poderes -, o Judiciário erege como criador do Direito em um aspecto interpretacionista. Surge, então, a discussão acerca dos limites da interpretação e das técnicas de controle de constitucionalidade para efetivação da democracia. Isto é, a discussão acerca do liame que separa a interpretação criadora da criação interpretativa, assim como o modo técnico-racional utilizado pelo Judiciário para realizar o princípio democrático. De qualquer forma, torna-se imprescindível a análise circunstanciada do modo de interpretação, até mesmo para que nunca se perca de vista o dever de racionalidade que deve permear a decisão jurisdicional. O objetivo não é negar o evidente processo criativo do Judiciário, mas entender seu funcionamento, de modo que seu exercício não exceda a interpretação razoável dos preceitos constitucionais. / The democratic principle is present in the contemporary Constitutions as the central for the development of the constitutional State. Although the concept may vary, there are some assumptions and characteristics that allow the evaluation of a society´s democratic status, as well as the existence of effective directly democratic rights. In other words, rights capable of exercising the principle. The constitutional project is performed daily and it requires the action of government, in all of its functions, since the execution of the Constitution is an obligation of all. When the effectiveness is left beside, its common to cogitate the transcription of rights about democracy in the Constitution. And once the thought of the Judiciary only as a law enforcer liberal conception of the separation of powers is overcame, the Judiciary assumes a role of rights creator in an interpretationist aspect. That´s when the discussion about the limits of interpretation and judicial review techniques in the effectiviness of democracy comes to surface. In other words, the discussion that envolves the bond that separates creative interpretation from interpretative creation, as the technical-rational mode used by the Judiciary to accomplish the democractic principle. Either way, it becomes essential the detailed analysis of the form of interpretation adopted, as a way to never left aside the rationaily duty that should permeate judicial decision. The goal is not to deny the obvious creative process of Judiciary, but to understand its function so its exercise never exceeds the reasonable interpretation of fundamental precepts.