As constantes alterações sociais acabam implicando alterações nos valores dominantes de um ordenamento jurídico e mesmo na mudança de função e significado de muitos institutos. Dentre os institutos que mais verificaram alteração de conteúdo, está a coisa julgada. Nessa linha, após a segunda grande guerra, verificaram-se profundas alterações sociais, jurídicas e culturais, de forma que novas demandas passaram a ser analisadas pelo Poder Judiciário. Em decorrência disso, ganhou especial destaque o controle de constitucionalidade das leis, capítulo adicional à história da limitação dos poderes, e o processo constitucional. Dessa forma, institutos tradicionais do direito processual com determinada função e estrutura, como a coisa julgada, necessitam ter sua compatibilidade analisada com outros novos, criados a partir das novas necessidades da sociedade. Assim, no presente trabalho, em um primeiro momento, buscou-se estabelecer a função e a estrutura da coisa julgada, levantando-se contradições existentes na doutrina. No segundo capítulo, aplicaram-se as premissas estabelecidas na primeira parte, ao controle de constitucionalidade por exceção e por meio de ação, sempre a partir de uma visão funcionalista dos mesmos. Enquanto no controle de constitucionalidade por via de exceção não se encontrou qualquer dificuldade de harmonia com a coisa julgada, pois a questão constitucional não é o tema central da análise do juiz, o mesmo não ocorreu com o controle por via de ação. Nessa modalidade de controle, dadas as suas características e funções, conclui-se pela inexistência da coisa julgada, sob pena de se colocar em risco o desenvolvimento constitucional da ordem brasileira, pois a certeza jurídica estabelecida pela coisa julgada torna muito difícil, senão impossível, a alteração de entendimento sobre determinada questão constitucional. / The continual social changes introduce changes into the chief values of a legal system and even modify the meaning and function of many institutes. Among the legal institutes that has suffered the most from such modifications is res iudicata. After the Second World War, deep social, legal and cultural changes were observed, so that new claims were examined by the courts. In consequence judicial review of legislation, an additional chapter to the history of the limitation of the powers, and the constitutional process have obtained great attention. Therefore, traditional institutes of procedural law with a particular function and structure, such as res judicata, must have their compatibility with other, new institutes, created by the new needs of society, analysed. Thus in this paper we first tried to determine the function and structure of res judicata, raising contradictions found in the work of legal scholars. In the second chapter, we applied the principles laid in the first part to the issue of judicial review by exception and by action from a functionalist perspective. While we did face any difficulty to harmonise res judicata with judicial review by exception, since in this case the constitutional issue is not the primary subject analysis by the court, the same did not occur with control by action. When it comes to this class of control, given its features and functions, we concluded that there was no place for res judicata, under penalty of endangering the constitutional Brazilian order development, because legal certainty established by res judicata makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to change the understanding of certain constitutional issue.

The thesis deals with prerogative powers and their role in the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. It explains the meaning of the prerogative, shows how British courts employed it in Miller I and Miller II decisions, and outlines their effects on it. The first part of the thesis explains the concept of prerogative. Firstly, it analyses concept's theoretical background in early modern constitutional thought and its conceptualization in the work of John Locke. Secondly, it explains the role of royal prerogative after the Glorious Revolution, as described by William Blackstone and Albert Venn Dicey, and its current position in the constitutional system of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, it introduces a general distinction between two conceptions of prerogative powers - the political (non-legal) one and the legal one - and outlines the relationship between the British royal prerogative, law, Parliament, and courts. The second part of the thesis deals with a case study of judicial decisions pertaining to the process of withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Specifically, the Miller I case, which addressed the existence of prerogative power to notify the intent to withdraw from the European Union (under Article 50 TEU), and the Miller II case concerning the...

Polen har sedan 2017 varit föremål för EU:s disciplinära förfaranden på grund av allvarliga brott mot rättsstatsprincipen. Detta är ett resultat av omfattande politiska reformer av rättsväsendet genomförda av det polska regeringspartiet Rätt och rättvisa (Prawo i sprawiedliwość, PiS). Ett av de första målen för PiS politiska attacker var lagprövning utförd av landets konstitutionella domstol (Konstitutionella Tribunalen, KT). Konstitutionella Tribunalen har sedan dess politiserats och dominerats av domare som är lojala mot det styrande partiet. KT, som tidigare var ett effektivt organ för konstitutionalitetskontroll, har förvandlats till makthavarnas allierade. Lagprövning som en demokratisk kontrollmekanism har satts ur spel. Utvecklingen i Polen väcker frågor om den svenska lagprövningen. Hur fungerar den? Uppfyller den sitt syfte? Kommer den att vara motståndskraftig mot liknande politiska attacker om en auktoritär majoritet får makten i Sverige? Kan Sverige lära sig av den polska erfarenheten och förbättra motståndskraften och effektiviteten i sin lagprövning? Denna uppsats diskuterar utvecklingen av lagprövning och dess roll i den svenska och den polska demokratiska ordningen. Likheter och skillnader mellan lagprövning i dessa två rättssystem fångas upp och förklaras genom att använda en komparativ metod med ett rättsgenetisk perspektiv. För att möjliggöra en fördjupad förståelse av lagprövningens funktion tillämpas dessutom en systematisk analys. Med dess hjälp delas rättsinstitutet upp i mindre beståndsdelar som sedan kan analyseras och jämföras på ett strukturerat sätt. Historiska faktorer och de senaste årens politiska utveckling inkluderas i analysen för att ge förklaringar till utvecklingen av lagprövning i båda länderna. Analysen i denna uppsats leder till slutsatsen att den polska lagprövningsmodellen har visat sig bristfällig i vissa avseenden, även om den var effektiv i andra. Redan före den nuvarande politiska utvecklingen kunde lagprövning i Polen kritiseras för det begränsade genomslag den gav till skyddet för de mänskliga rättigheterna. Men framför allt har dess motståndskraft inför en auktoritär parlamentarisk majoritet visat sig vara otillräcklig. Med den polska erfarenheten i åtanke kan det konstateras att den svenska lagprövningen har potential att bli mer motståndskraftig om ett auktoritärt parti tar makten. Det finns emellertid vissa aspekter av dess funktion som bör utvecklas och skyddas mot negativt politiskt inflytande. / Poland has since 2017 been subject to EU disciplinary procedures because of serious breaches of the rule of law. This is a result of extensive political reforms of the judiciary by the Poland’s ruling party Law and Justice (Prawo i sprawiedliwość, PiS). One of the first targets for PiS political attacks was judicial review performed by the country’s constitutional court (Constitutional Tribunal, CT). The Constitutional Tribunal has since been politicized and dominated by judges loyal to the ruling party. CT, which was previously an effective organ for constitutionality control, has been turned into a government enabler. Judicial review, one of the most important checks and balances in the Polish constitutional democracy, has been put out of action. The development in Poland raises questions about Swedish judicial review. How does it function? Does it fulfil its purpose? Will it be resistant to similar political attacks should an authoritarian majority seize power in Sweden? Can Sweden learn from the Polish experience and improve the resilience and effectivity of its judicial review? This paper discusses the development of judicial review and its role in the Swedish and Polish democratic orders. Similarities and difference between judicial review in these two legal systems are captured and explained by applying a comparative law method with a historical perspective. To enable an in-depth understanding of judicial review’s function, a systematic analysis is applied. With its help the institute of judicial review is broken down into smaller elements which can then be analysed and compared in a structured manner. Historical factors and recent years’ political development are factored into the analysis to provide explanations for the development of judicial review in both countries. The analysis in this paper concludes that the Polish model of judicial review has been proven lacking in some respects, although it was effective in others. Even before the current political development, judicial review in Poland could be criticized for the limited impact it gave to the human rights’ protection. But above all, its resilience in the face of an authoritarian parliamentary majority has proven to be insufficient. With the Polish experience in mind, it can be ascertained that the Swedish judicial review has a potential to be more resilient when faced with an authoritarian party seizing power. There are however some aspects of its function that should be developed and secured against negative political influence.

Legal aspects of macroprudential regulation in the EU Abstract Even though the term macroprudential regulation is regularly used in scientific literature, attempts to define this term are scarce. Clear delineation of macroprudential regulation enables the distinction of macroprudential tools from other policy tools, such as microprudential supervision tools or capital controls. Moreover, it allows the determination of essential macroprudential tools and their current application in light of the crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the transition towards the CRR2/CRD5 framework. As part of the EU legal order, macroprudential regulation interacts with the principles of internal market functioning. As a matter of principle, macroprudential measures should not contradict rules governing the internal market, even though some tensions with the free movement of capital may emerge. Uncertainties about the judicial review of macroprudential regulation may also exist. Macroprudential measures should subject to a less rigorous judicial review inspired by CJEU monetary policy case law. The rationale behind this lies in the highly complex economic decision-making process accompanying the adoption of macroprudential regulation. There is vast heterogeneity amongst EU member states concerning the application of...

In this thesis, I address two issues. First, I reject the supposed conflict between international law and constitutional democracy. And second, I explore the role of international law in domestic constitutional law, particularly in Canada. In order to address both of these issues, I draw an analogy between the “Incompatibilist” critiques of international law and constitutional democracy, and the arguments against judicial review made by “the Critics” that Waluchow responds to in his book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: the Living Tree. I argue that both the Incompatibilists and the Critics describe in-principle problems, structural problems, and decision-making problems in their respective critiques. The Incompatibilists are describing these problems in the context of the interaction between international law and constitutional democracies, while the Critics are focusing on constitutional judicial review, but I argue that the theory Waluchow presents as an answer to the Critics can also be directly applied to the Incompatibilists. Waluchow’s theory of common law judicial review and the community’s constitutional morality gives support and democratic legitimacy to judicial review in a domestic constitutional context. By applying his reasoning to cases involving international norms, I address problems in domestic courts’ application of international law and the democratic challenges they face. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Constitution as Promise contends that constitutions are sets of promises. As such, it argues that they must be interpreted in a living constitutionalist manner. Chapter One argues that constitutions meet the analytic criteria to be considered promises. It is argued that constitutions are expressions of the intention of a government to bind itself to a set of principles. Absent this expression, citizens lack assurance of the protection of their rights and legal recourse when their rights are violated. Chapter Two considers the use of promise in contract theory and investigates its viability in constitutional theory. Some theories of contract are skeptical of promise as a basis for contract. The chapter argues that while promise may be an inadequate moral underpinning for the law of contract, it is apt for the law of constitutions. Chapter Three notes that constitutions are sets of vague promises. Vague promises ought not be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of promisors or promisees. Traditional forms of originalism contend that constitutions should be interpreted according to the intentions of their framers. So, constitution as promise rules out traditional forms of originalism. Chapter Four considers the positive consequences of constitution as promise. It argues that vague promises ought to be interpreted through a negotiation process between promisor and promisee. This negotiation should consider what moral reasoning reveals about the promise’s terms, the context in which the promise was uttered, the capacities and competing obligations of the promisor, and the expectations of the promisee. To properly consider these factors, the chapter maintains that the negotiation must occur on a case-by-case basis, incrementally specifying the promise’s terms. The chapter then notes the similarities between this negotiation process and the interpretive suggestions of living constitutionalism. It concludes that living constitutionalism is entailed by the promissory nature of constitutions. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / Constitution as Promise investigates the interpretive consequences of conceptualizing constitutions as promises from governments to citizens. It first argues that constitutions satisfy the criteria to be considered promises. It then maintains that the morality of promising is apt for application to constitutional law. In the third and fourth chapters, it considers how one ought to interpret vague promises. Vague promises, it argues, should be interpreted incrementally, on a case-by-case basis. The promisor and the promisee must come to an agreement about what their vague promise requires, as new cases arise. When they cannot agree, promisor and promisee need an adjudicator. Since constitutions are sets of vague promises, they must also be interpreted incrementally, on a case-by-case basis and require adjudication where agreement is impossible. Constitution as Promise concludes that the only available interpretive theory that is sensitive to constitution’s nature as vague promise is living constitutionalism. As such, constitutions ought to be interpreted in a living constitutionalist manner.

No description available.

Conforme a Lei n.º 9.307, de 23 de setembro de 1996, as sentenças arbitrais nacionais produzem os mesmos efeitos das sentenças judiciais, independentemente de homologação. A despeito disso, elas se encontram sujeitas ao controle do Poder Judiciário. A Lei de Arbitragem disciplina os limites e meios para a impugnação judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais basicamente em dois dispositivos, os arts. 32 e 33. Optou-se por um regramento bastante sucinto, mas que é suficiente para resolver as situações práticas que podem se verificar quando uma sentença arbitral é impugnada. Compreendido que a arbitragem é processo de origem convencional (privada) e que por força daquelas e outras regras, como os arts. 17, 18, 20, § 2º, e 31 ela se insere no círculo da teoria geral do processo (aplicando-se-lhe, por conseguinte, os respectivos princípios e conceitos) e se sujeita aos ditames essenciais do devido processo legal, torna-se possível, a partir das técnicas interpretativas existentes, chegar a soluções para as diversas questões envolvendo o controle judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais das quais a Lei n.º 9.307 não tratou expressamente ou de que tratou de forma imprecisa. / According to Law n.o 9.307, which came into effect in September 23rd, 1996, domestic arbitral awards have the same effect on the parties as a ruling by a State Court, without the need for judicial confirmation. The Brazilian Arbitration Act regulates the limits and means for the judicial challenge of domestic arbitral awards in, essentialy, two articles, art. 32 and 33. The Act opted for brief rules on the issue, but they are sufficient to resolve the practical situations that may arise when an arbitral award is challenged. Understanding that arbitration is a process of conventional origin (private) and that due to those as well as other rules, such as articles 17, 18, 20, paragraph 2, and 31 it is contained in the field of general procedural theory (so that, consequently, the same principles and concepts are applicable) and is subject to the essential dictates of due legal process, it becomes possible, due to existing techniques of interpretation, to develop solutions to the many issues involving the judicial control of domestic arbitral awards that Law n.o 9.307 either did not expressly regulate or regulated imprecisely.

Conforme a Lei n.º 9.307, de 23 de setembro de 1996, as sentenças arbitrais nacionais produzem os mesmos efeitos das sentenças judiciais, independentemente de homologação. A despeito disso, elas se encontram sujeitas ao controle do Poder Judiciário. A Lei de Arbitragem disciplina os limites e meios para a impugnação judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais basicamente em dois dispositivos, os arts. 32 e 33. Optou-se por um regramento bastante sucinto, mas que é suficiente para resolver as situações práticas que podem se verificar quando uma sentença arbitral é impugnada. Compreendido que a arbitragem é processo de origem convencional (privada) e que por força daquelas e outras regras, como os arts. 17, 18, 20, § 2º, e 31 ela se insere no círculo da teoria geral do processo (aplicando-se-lhe, por conseguinte, os respectivos princípios e conceitos) e se sujeita aos ditames essenciais do devido processo legal, torna-se possível, a partir das técnicas interpretativas existentes, chegar a soluções para as diversas questões envolvendo o controle judicial das sentenças arbitrais nacionais das quais a Lei n.º 9.307 não tratou expressamente ou de que tratou de forma imprecisa. / According to Law n.o 9.307, which came into effect in September 23rd, 1996, domestic arbitral awards have the same effect on the parties as a ruling by a State Court, without the need for judicial confirmation. The Brazilian Arbitration Act regulates the limits and means for the judicial challenge of domestic arbitral awards in, essentialy, two articles, art. 32 and 33. The Act opted for brief rules on the issue, but they are sufficient to resolve the practical situations that may arise when an arbitral award is challenged. Understanding that arbitration is a process of conventional origin (private) and that due to those as well as other rules, such as articles 17, 18, 20, paragraph 2, and 31 it is contained in the field of general procedural theory (so that, consequently, the same principles and concepts are applicable) and is subject to the essential dictates of due legal process, it becomes possible, due to existing techniques of interpretation, to develop solutions to the many issues involving the judicial control of domestic arbitral awards that Law n.o 9.307 either did not expressly regulate or regulated imprecisely.

No description available.