In this paper, I analyze Kit Fine's account of the logic and semantics of vagueness. The overall aim of Fine's project is to develop an account of the logic and semantics of vague language which accommodates distinctive characteristics of vagueness including penumbral connections and higher-order vagueness. I begin Chapter 1 with a discussion of what vagueness is and is not. Next, I trace the development of supervaluationism, and summarize Kit Fine's supervaluationism and specification space approach to vagueness. I also discuss the more salient features of vagueness and I discuss them in relation to specification space models. I close with a look at the logic of vagueness and the logic of higher-order vagueness. Chapter 2 deals with penumbrae and penumbral connections. I analyze Fine's account of penumbral connections before arguing that his characterization of penumbral connections is too broad. Fine mistakenly identifies logically valid formulae and their instances as though they exhibited penumbral connections. After arguing that Fine's misidentification of penumbral connections results in an analysis of penumbral connections which is built for too wide a notion of penumbral connections, I suggest a more refined characterization of penumbral connections. I take up higher-order vagueness in Chapter 3. I begin with an overview of some characterizations of higher-order vagueness. Next, I revisit Fine's accounts of the D operator and higher-order vagueness. Lastly, I argue that higher-order vagueness is not a distinct feature of the vagueness of natural language, but, rather, it is an artifact resulting from the analysis of the vagueness of natural language. / Master of Arts

Lam, Sin Yee Calista. / "November 2009." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-122). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iv / Table of Contents --- p.V / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter Chapter 1: --- Russell´ةs Argument Against Ontological Vagueness: Motivations “vagueness-in-the-world´ح --- p.9 / Chapter Chapter 2: --- A Modal Framework of Ontological Indeterminacy --- p.30 / Chapter Chapter 3: --- Explaining Away Ontological Vagueness via Supervenience --- p.43 / Chapter Chapter 4: --- Evans´ةs Argument Against Vague Identity --- p.66 / Chapter Chapter 5: --- The Challenge for Accounting for Vague Existence --- p.91 / Conclusion --- p.111 / Bibliography --- p.118

I propose a new theory of vagueness centered around the epistemology and normativity of vagueness. The theory is a version of epistemicism—the view that vagueness is a fundamentally epistemic phenomenon—that improves upon existing epistemicist accounts by accommodating both the alleged tolerance and open texture of vague predicates, while foregoing excessive metaphysical commitments. I offer a novel solution to the infamous Sorites paradox, one that outrivals alternative contextualist theories in their ability to explain the phenomenology of vagueness as well as its deontic consequences.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, June 2007.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Syracuse University, 2007. / "Publication number: AAT 3295548."

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, April 2008.

No description available.

This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment.

This paper develops an idea of saving ordinary uses of vague predicates from the Sorites by means of domain restriction. A tolerance level for a pred- icate, along a dimension, is a difference with respect to which the predicate is semantically insensitive. A central gap for the predicate+dimension in a domain is a segment of an associated scale, larger than this difference, where no object in the domain has a measure, and such that the extension of the predicate has measures on one side of the gap and the anti-extension on the other. The domain restriction imposes a central gap. / <p>Author count: 1;</p> / Vagueness and Context Factors

Moral vagueness is encountered when the alethic value of some moral statement containing a moral predicate is deemed to be vague. One such statement could be “abortion in week 22 is permissible”. Given the metaethical framework of moral realism, there are three standard approaches to understanding the ontology of such vagueness. The semantic approach states that the vagueness is due to our language not being able to adequately refer to the moral reality. The ontic approach states that the vagueness is an intrinsic feature of the moral reality, and as such it will always persist. The epistemic approach states that the vagueness is due to subjects not being able to know the moral reality. In effect, there are things about morality we cannot know, because of our epistemic disposition. In this thesis, I investigate arguments in favor of all three approaches and find that of the three, the epistemic approach – here named moral epistemicism – has the best chances of succeeding. / Moralisk vaghet uppstår när sanningsvärdet av ett moraliskt uttalande, innehållandes ett moraliskt predikat, anses vara vagt. Ett sådant uttalande kan vara "abort i vecka 22 är tillåtet". Givet moralisk realism som metaetiskt ramverk finns det tre vedertagna tillvägagångssätt för att förstå ontologin hos en sådan vaghet. Det semantiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten beror på att vårat språk inte kan referera till den moraliska verkligheten på ett adekvat sätt. Det ontiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten är en inneboende egenskap hos den moraliska verkligheten, det är verkligheten själv som är vag. Det epistemiska tillvägagångssättet hävdar att vagheten beror på att vi som subjekt inte kan veta allt om den moraliska verkligheten. Det finns moraliska sanningar som vi inte kan veta på grund av vår epistemiska disposition. I denna avhandling undersöker jag argument till förmån för alla tre tillvägagångssätt och finner att det epistemiska tillvägagångssättet – här benämnd moralisk epistemicism – har störst chans att lyckas.