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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.

On the relationship between philosophy and sociology

Campion, M. G. 1979 (has links)
No description available.

Aristotle and Augustine on voluntary action and freedom and weakness of the will

Chappell, T. D. J. 1992 (has links)
Aristotle's remarks on free will suggest, not so much an argument for the existence of free will, as an account of its nature. This account depends on his making no hard distinction between what we call 'free action' and 'voluntary action'. For him, these would be interchangeable terms. The Aristotelian can, then, point out that, if we give up our belief in free will, we must give up many other natural beliefs too. In particular, we must stop believing in voluntary action. There are, in Aristotelian terms, three conditions (not two, as Aristotle himself evidently supposed), which any behaviour must satisfy to count as free/voluntary action. The behaviour (i) must not be compelled, but must be performed by the agent's own power and desire; (ii) must not be done in ignorance, but must be action on relevant knowledge; and (iii) must not be irrational but must result from the combination of the agent's own power and desire with the agents relevant knowledge. (i) leads me to discuss Aristotle's account of what he calls kinesis; (ii) leads me into epistemology; (iii) into an account of Aristotle's theory of proairesis and practical reasoning as the cause of voluntary action. One problem for Aristotle's account of the causation of voluntary action is posed by akrasia, deliberate choice of what I sincerely believe I should not choose. This seems to be voluntary action which is not caused as Aristotle says voluntary action should be. But the three conditions of voluntary action which I say Aristotle should be committed to can be used to show that the existing forms of akrasia make no counter example to Aristotle's theory, but rather an interesting adjunct to it. My study of Augustine's theory of freedom begins with a survey of a crucial text, the de Libero Arbitrio (Ch.5). I then apply an analogous schema to that found in Aristotle. Augustine too depends on the idea that to analyse free action is to analyse voluntary action; he also equates these two types with responsive action. He too believes (i) that ignorance usually makes for involuntariness, and (ii) that there can be no voluntary action which is compelled or which the agent could not have done otherwise. In his later works, these doctrines are often obscured by his interest in original sin and predestination (neither of which topics, be it noted, are focuses of this thesis). But they remain his doctrines.

An enquiry into the status of cognitive activity, and its relation to meaning and symbols, with special reference to the theories of Professors Ryle and Ayer

Broadie, F. 1952 (has links)
No description available.

Is linguistics a part of psychology?

Fitzgerald, G. 2009 (has links)
Noam Chomsky, the founding father of generative grammar and the instigator of some of its core research programs, claims that linguistics is a part of psychology, concerned with a class of cognitive structures employed in speaking and understanding. In a recent book, Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt has challenged certain core aspects of linguistics, as prominent practitioners of the science conceive of it. Among Devitt’s major conclusions is that linguistics is not a part of psychology. In this thesis I defend Chomsky’s psychological conception of grammatical theory. My case for the psychological conception involves defending a set of psychological goals for generative grammars, centring on conditions of descriptive and explanatory adequacy. I argue that generative grammar makes an explanatory commitment to a distinction between a psychological system of grammatical competence and the performance systems engaged in putting that competence to use. I then defend the view that this distinction can be investigated by probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions. Building on the psychological goals of generative grammar and its explanatory commitment to a psychological theory of grammatical competence, I argue that generative grammar neither targets nor presupposes non-psychological grammatical properties. The latter nonpsychological properties are dispensable to grammarians’ explanations because their explanatory goals can be met by the theory of grammatical competence to which they are committed. So generative grammars have psychological properties as their subject matter and linguistics is a part of psychology.

Francis Bacon's Natural Philosophy

Rees, Graham Charles 1970 (has links)
No description available.

Perception and inference in the Nyydasid-dhantamanjari : text, translation and notes

Gelblum, T. 1960 (has links)
No description available.

The morality of groups

Franklin, Donald Edwin 1999 (has links)
No description available.

On the alleged impossibility of understanding consciousness

Garvey, James Mackenzie 2000 (has links)
No description available.

Unlatching the gate : realising my scholarship of living inquiry

Mead, Geoffrey Douglas 2001 (has links)
No description available.

Foedus Naturale : The origins of federal theology in sixteenth century Reformation thought

Weir, D. A. 1984 (has links)
No description available.

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