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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.

Some criticisms of empiricism from a phenomeno-logical standpoint, with special reference to the work of Husserl and Sartre

Cowley, G. F. 1966 (has links)
No description available.

Rhetoric for philosophers : an examination of the place of rhetoric in philosophy

Goncalves Teixeira, Ligia Alexandra 2007 (has links)
The debate between rhetoricians and philosophers goes back to the origins of the understanding of what philosophy is, which we can trace to Plato and the immediate Platonic tradition. I suggest that this tradition was not a disinterested one. Its concern was to carve out and develop a particular kind of discourse (i.e., what it takes to be the philosophical enterprise) for its own purposes (i.e., to marginalise its competitors). It did this in a particularly successful way, to the extent that it is difficult for us even to consider what the alternatives might have been. However, there are residual problems in the way that it conceives of the philosophical project, and this question is related to the widespread tendency of contemporary thinkers to view rhetoric as pompous vacuousness or mere trickery. Despite the theoretical questions posed, this thesis focuses primarily on concrete works, especially those of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Renaissance thinkers, Hobbes, and Locke. I analyse the rhetorical discourse in some of rhetoric's staunchest opponents, and some of its most well-known advocates for a very specific purpose. First, I am trying to show that all these philosophers, whether pro or against the art of rhetoric, recognise the danger of 'sophistic tricks', and acknowledge (more or less reluctantly) that rhetoric potentially represents a dangerous threat to the moral basis of political life, but follow different paths. Next, and this is a fundamental part of my argument, that in the works of philosophers who are widely regarded as some of rhetoric's staunchest opponents, we can find clear evidence, not only of the use of rhetoric to fight rhetoric, but allusions to what they see as a 'true' or legitimate rhetoric. In other words, echoing Plato, two forms of persuasion are alluded to in their works: (i) a rhetoric that produces persuasion for belief in the absence of knowledge, and (ii) a genuine or 'true' art of rhetoric, the sort of that produces knowledge (episteme) in the privileged sense. So in the Phaedrus, Plato suggests that the philosopher is the true rhetorician; for Hobbes the only 'true' rhetorician is, of course, the sovereign; and for Locke, any truly free and rational individual can, at least in theory, be a good rhetorician. At a more general level, and this constitutes the underlying theme of the thesis, I hope to show that philosophy itself, like all discourses, does not exist in a linguistic vacuum. Philosophy, like rhetoric and history, is deeply implicated in the social and political order that produces it.

Computational externalism : the semantic picture of implementation

Boccardi, Emiliano 2008 (has links)
The property of being the realization of a computational structure has been argued to be observer-relative. After contrasting the problematic individuation of states in computational systems with the unproblematic individuation of states in dynamical systems, a general diagnosis of the problem is put forward. It is argued that the unwanted proliferation of models for the relation of implementation cannot be blocked unless the labelling scheme is restricted to semantically evaluated items. The instantiation of mathematical dynamical systems, by contrast, is showed to be immune to analogous skeptical arguments due to the virtuous role of measurements in grounding the relevant abstractions. Naturalized semantic properties are proposed to serve as a surrogate for measurements in grounding the relevant abstractions from the physical to the computational level of description, thus making implementations objective. It is argued that a view of implementation that abandons the pervasive internalist view in favor of a view of implementation according to which inputs and outputs are individuated by their broad semantic properties allows us to accept the validity of observer-relativity arguments while preserving the satisfaction of the desiderata of a theory of implementation, as well as the explanatory power of computational- ism as a theory of the mind. The general idea is that of incorporating teleological theories of intentionality within the foundational heart of the notion of computation. An important corollary is that computational properties must be understood as broadly instantiated by relational properties of the implementing system and of its environment. The proposed understanding of implementation is then tested against a number of recalcitrant problems of computationalism. It is argued to be immune to standard objections.

First-person reference

Taylor, Jennifer Elizabeth Vaughan 2007 (has links)
It is argued that reference in first-person thought is distinct from reference in other thoughts about objects. This difference is located in the lack of acquaintance required for first-person thought. In order to be in the position to think about and refer to other objects, a subject must be acquainted with them. It is this acquaintance relation which enables him to think about a particular object. In contrast, a subject can think about himself without being acquainted with himself because he is the subject of his thought. No acquaintance relation is required in order for him to be in a position to think about himself - he is in this position already. Part I of this thesis sets out the problem of first-person thought, and introduces a distinction between subjective and objective first-person thought. Part II explores singular thought, and what it is for a subject to have a thought about a particular object. It is argued that a subject's acquaintance with an object is necessary for him to be able to think about and refer to an independent object. This means that for a subject to think about an independent object that object must in some way be present to him. In Part III it is argued that for a subject to think first-personally the object - himself - need not be present to him. The subject has experiences from the first-person perspective, grounding his subjective first-person thoughts. Because he has such experiences he can refer reflexively. He is at the centre of his scheme of reference. And it is because he can refer in subjective first-person thoughts that he can refer in objective first- person thoughts.

Moral theories and applied philosophy

Upton, H. R. 2000 (has links)
This thesis aims to make a critical inquiry into the concept of a moral theory in relation to the ideas of applied ethics and applied philosophy. It defends the general possibility of theories of morality and, in the course of the work, attempts to establish the conditions that such a theory must meet. Particular attention is focused on the ideas of explanation and the contribution of a theory to the criteria for right action. It argues that since moral theories are taken to concern how we should act, anything properly having that title should be determinate of right action. A detailed investigation of the (alleged) principal types of theory leads to the conclusion that, with one exception, these are not actually sources of moral theories at all. It is argued that there are good reasons for rejecting the exception on other grounds. The thesis concludes by looking at the implications of these claims for applied ethics, and tries to outline an account of this form of inquiry in the absence of moral theories. The account is one that may hope to assuage some common misgivings about the subject by exhibiting it as unified with applied philosophy, and philosophy in general.

The semantics of propositional attitudes

Watkins, G. V. 1976 (has links)
No description available.

Kant and pure sensible synthesis

Hems, Nigel Colin 2007 (has links)
This study offers a reconstructive account of the concept of pure synthesis as it occurs in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. In order to make sense of a pure sensible synthesis, it will be necessary to provide a detailed account of the transcendental processes that are derived from the subjective sources of the mind prior to any working account of the logical functions ofjudgment. Stated succinct.~y, our approach will deal with the concept of synthesis from a transcendental 'psycholo'gical perspective. I will argue that a metalevel of transcendental psychology can be uncovered that releases certain functions for concepts of comparison that is different to how Kant stipulates their use in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection section of the Critique. To supplement an account of pure sensible synthesis, I will argue that what I call a 'pure rule of apprehension' or a 'pure rule of synthesis' is constructed out of concepts of comparison and functions as a pure sensible schema. The 'pure rule of apprehension' is modelled on the fundamental action of Kant's Pure Synthesis of Apprehension as it appears in the A Version of the Transcendental Deduction. The rule of synthesis acts as an original schema that can be applied directly to the pl!re manifolds oftime and space prior to objects. It will be argued that the concept of pure sensible synthesis and its accompanying pure sensible schema carry out an ontological function as transcendental elements prior to the reflections carried out by the categories, and prior to the comparisons of empirical representations that first generate concepts of objects. The reconstruction of synthesis and a corresponding schema constitutes the first two main stages of the thesis in Chapters One and Two. This part of the thesis will relate to the area of Kant scholarship that pays particular attention to the subjective sources of the mind, especially the role of the transcendental synthesis of imagination and the determination of intuitions in the Critique. I will subject certain authors to a series of close readings in order to develop the concepts of pure sensible synthesis and a pure sensible schema. In the third and fourth stages of the thesis will move away from the concepts of synthesis and schematism. In Chapter Three I will develop a line of argument that sheds new light on the concept of an object prior to synthesis by examining Kant's Refutation ofIdealism. I will argue that it is possible to conceive of a pure transcendental 'place' or 'location' of a pure object of permanence not mentioned by Kant, by making use of concepts of comparison functioning as pure orientational concepts. In the Fourth Chapter I will round the study off by expounding the central conceptual processes that are at work in the project as a whole, which differ significantly from the way' that Kant employs I' concepts in the first Critique. I will argue that concepts of comparison exhibit functions that are not confined to discursive procedures involved in generating concepts of objects. This completes the thesis. The project starts by examining the concept of synthesis, before moving on to the related theme of schematism. I then deal with the concept of an object, finishing with an examination of the nature of conceptualitx that unifies the project as a whole.

Husserl on history

Hunt, Jonathan 2010 (has links)
No description available.

Philosophical artifice : An enquiry with relation to gilles deleuze's difference and repetition and the logic of sense

Farrell, Patricia 2011 (has links)
No description available.

Genealogy and its Shadows : Reading Nietzsche with Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida

Ward, Joseph 2007 (has links)
The concept ofgenealogy has come to be seen in continental Nietzsche studies as cen~al to Nietzsche's project, indeed as designating the philosophical approach ofthe mature Nietzsche. I explore how this state of affairs has come about by reading the texts ofthree French-language writers whom I take to have particularly influenced the way continental philosophy, and even to some extent analytic philosophy, has come to see Nietzsche. Gilles Deleuze was the first to make genealogy central to his view ofNietzsche, but Deleuze's tendency to misleading abstraction in reading Nietzsche can be seen to have far-reaching consequences for many aspects of his interpretation, including his famous reading ofeternal return. Michel Foucault reminds us ofthe properly historical aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy, but turns genealogy into a historicism based on presuppositions quite other than those ofNietzsche. And in Jacques Derrida's adoption ofNietzsche as a forebear genealogy becomes bound up with conceptions ofopposition and self-reference which are quite foreign to Nietzsche's way of thinking. In the process ofexploring these tensions I contend that 'genealogy' is for Nietzsche a particular word tied to a particular field, that field explored in the text ofNietzsche's which bears the word in its title, On the Genealogy ofMorals, and definitely not a word which designates his philosophy as a whole. The concept of''Nietzschean genealogy' is not a substantial and solid textual object offering itself to interpretations which could be construed as its 'shadows'; rather there is from the start something shadowy about the very idea of'genealogy'. In demonstrating this I hope to open the way for a reading of Nietzsche's philosophy in which 'genealogy' is seen as a single aspect ofa much broader philosophical project.

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