Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement against intuitionism. As such, I attempt to show that the renewed argument is subject to an analogous objection as the old one; many cognitive biases of moral intuitions result from biases of non-moral judgments. Thus, the unreliability of moral intuitions due to biases (and the reason inferential justification was required) can be removed by clearing up the non-moral biases. Accordingly, biases of moral intuitions do not threaten a slightly qualified version intuitionism which posits non-inferential justification of intuitions when non-moral biases are not present. I also present an empirical study that lends initial support to my argument.

This thesis is an exploration of the shame that inheres in not being able to self-admire. I call this incapacity to admire oneself ontological shame, and I argue that it is the source of the masquerades, concealments and negative emotions that surround the pursuit and defence of a self-esteem founded on an impoverished form of pride. I argue that there is a radical asymmetry between our admiration and esteem for others and how we evaluate our own sense of self-worth. Where admiration at its highest pitch is the wonderful agape experience of apprehending preciousness in others, our own sense of self-worth is limited to experiences of pride and other forms of self-affirmation; none of which allow us the joy of seeing ourselves as wonders in the world. Because we can admire and want to be admired, not being able to self-admire amounts to a limitation of a sort which carries with it a primordial resentment against life itself. It is largely how we respond to our ontological limitation and to our resentment that determines the positive or negative manner in which we interact with others, and whether or not we are likely to have an envious or humble disposition. In the first three chapters I lay the groundwork for the main argument of the thesis by highlighting the difficulties self-esteem theorists have in agreeing upon the value of ‘high’ self-esteem, introduce the relation between self-esteem and shame, argue for a distinction between self-esteem and public esteem, and provide an account of the gift-exchange nature of admiration which explains why we cannot self-admire. In the central chapters I focus on shame; on acts of concealment that can be either appropriate covering for, or deceitful denial of our ontological limitation; how self-worth is created through a reconciliation to shame, and why the ‘self-act dissociation’ theories of guilt fail to capture the shame attached to ‘being guilty’ of a wrongdoing. In Chapters Seven and Eight I examine envy, first in how it can be disguised as moral resentment; how it differs to admiration in its role in emulation, and finally how as a disposition it stands in stark contrast to humility. It is in humility that we grasp the benefits associated with our own incapacity to self-admire through our need to interact and exchange gifts with others.

In the past, experiments on human morality have predominantly utilised theoretical moral dilemmas to shed light on the nature of moral judgment. However, little attention has been given to determining how these judgments might translate into moral actions. In this thesis, I utilised novel and state-of-the-art Virtual Reality environments and combined approaches from social psychology, experimental philosophy, computer science, robotics, and speculative design. Over the course of six experiments with more than 200 participants, simulated moral actions made in Virtual Reality were found to be dissociated from moral judgments made in conventional paradigms. The results suggest that moral judgment and action may be driven by distinct mechanisms. The association between personality traits and moral judgments versus actions, was also investigated. In two experiments, psychopathic and associated traits predicted moral actions and the power with which these were simulated, but failed to predict moral judgments. With research suggesting a mediating role for empathy in this relationship, two further experiments examined empathic and affective processing in moral judgment versus action. In the first of these, alcohol consumption successfully lowered affective empathy and arousal in virtual dilemmas, but moral judgment and action remained unaffected. In the second, an investigation of professionally trained paramedics and fire service incident commanders, revealed distinct differences in empathic and related personality traits, reduced emotional arousal, and less regret following moral action. Taken together, this research suggests that novel virtual technologies can provide insights into self-referent actions, which sit in contrast to judgments motivated by social norms. Ethically, incorporating Virtual Reality in investigations of morality of harm offers a balanced approach; protecting participant wellbeing while increasing the ecological validity of moral investigations. The roles of personality traits and associated emotional processes in moral judgment and action remain multifaceted and as such, I outline the necessity of considering both the characteristics of the decision-maker and the context in which the decision is undertaken, within an interactionist model of morality.

Procuramos neste trabalho investigar um modelo de uma sociedade em que agentes aprendem de seu vizinhos sociais. Buscando inspiração no paradigma de redes neurais, construímos uma analogia entre o modelo e o julgamento moral. Usando dados de questionários on-line obtidos alhures, apresentamos uma análise estatística de dados de sujeitos humanos. A partir destes dados estudamos o modelo, encontrando uma transição de fase entre um estado ordenado e um desordenado, dependente de um parâmetro análogo ao inverso da temperatura beta que denominamos peer pressure e de um parâmetro de controle delta associado ao comportamento dos agentes. Ao compararmos histogramas obtidos do modelo com histogramas dos dados de questionários observamos uma semelhança surpreendente entre os dois. Para determinar o diagrama de fases do modelo, usamos métodos de Monte Carlo e uma aproximação de campo médio usando métodos de máxima entropia. Estudamos também a suscetibilidade do sistema a perturbações no ambiente de discussão e encontramos um decaimento exponencial da distância entre o estado perturbado e o de equilíbrio, com um mínimo no tempo característico de adaptação para um certo valor de delta. / In this work we seek to investigate a model of a society in which agents learn from their social neighbours. Seeking inspiration in the neural network paradigm, we build an analogy between the model and moral judgement. Using data from online questionaries obtained elsewhere, we present a statistical analysis of human data. Starting from these we study the model, finding a phase transition between an ordered and a disordered state, dependent on a parameter akin to the inverse temperature beta that we denominate peer pressure and a control parameter delta associated to the agents\' behavior. Comparing the histograms obtained with the model and histograms obtained from the data we observed a surprising simlarity between the two. To determine the phase diagram of the model we use Monte Carlo methods and a mean-field approximation using maximum entropy methods. We also study the susceptibility of the system to perturbations in the environment and find an exponential decay in the distance between the perturbated and equilibrium states, with a minimum of the characteristic time of adaptation for a given value of delta.

Reactive attitudes are distinctively moral emotions that occur when a moral harm has occurred. Recent studies in moral psychology suggest that our reactive attitudes may be influenced by factors extraneous to moral evaluation, such as hunger, sleep deprivation, and negative moods. I argue that these influences lead us to sanction unfairly. Even though reactive attitudes may be a natural response to perceived moral wrongdoing, we cannot justifiably inflict undeserved harm. However, if we can learn to recognize and eliminate the effects of these irrelevant influences, then we can use our reactive attitudes productively in holding others morally accountable.

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Within the psychology of religion, research suggests that religious engagement influences self-regulation, i.e., a person’s ability to pursue goals. Theoretical explanations for this relationship tend to oversimplify both sides of the connection, construing religious engagement narrowly in terms of beliefs and interpreting self-regulation as a matter of self-interested restraint. These conceptual specifications are challenged by perspectives within religious studies that are committed to analyzing religions as ordinary social phenomena and by evidence from psychological studies of normative behavior. This dissertation employs these insights to broaden the theoretical scope of the study of self-regulation through a series of interdisciplinary reviews and an empirical study. To test the relationship between self-regulation and religious engagement, the dissertation presents a cross-sectional study of an online sample of 412 participants. Each participant completed five previously established psychological surveys and experiments that index: how conventional they consider their religiosity; the degree to which they are embedded in obligatory relationships, roughly called “social density”; their endorsement of what Moral Foundations Theory calls “binding” moral intuitions; emotional regulatory capacity; and delayed discounting rates, a common proxy for impulsivity. A series of hierarchical linear regressions showed that conventional religiosity was associated with both emotional regulation and delayed discounting. Delayed discounting and emotional regulation, however, were not associated. Statistical mediation analyses showed that the relationship between conventional religiosity and emotional regulation was fully mediated by social density, but the connection between conventional religiosity and delayed discounting was not influenced by any of the other variables. Collectively these results support the primary argument of this dissertation – that the theoretical focus within psychological research on religious engagement and self-regulation has become unduly narrow in its construal of both concepts. This dissertation concludes by reflecting on these results in light of what we know about formalized inquiries of this kind from the philosophy of science.

This dissertation focuses on the concept of authenticity and its implications for our projects of self-creation, particularly those involving the use of "enhancement technologies" (such as stimulant drugs, "mood brighteners", or brain stimulation). After an introduction to the concept of authenticity and the enhancement debate in the first part of the thesis, part 2 considers the main analyses of authenticity in the contemporary philosophical literature. It begins with those emphasizing self-creation, and shows that, despite their merits, such views cannot adequately deal with certain types of cases, which require a third option, “true self” accounts, emphasizing self-discovery. However, it is argued that in their existing versions, accounts of this third sort are also unsatisfactory. Part 3 of the thesis proposes a new account of the "true self" sort, intended to improve upon existing ones. Common problematic assumptions about the concept of the true self are critiqued, after which a new analysis of that concept is presented, based on seven different conditions. Two specific definitions of authenticity, respectively emphasizing self-expression and the preservation of one's true self, are provided, and its relation to various associated notions, such as integrity or sincerity, are examined. Finally, part 4 looks at the implications of the previous parts for the enhancement debate. In particular, it discusses the prospect of technologically enhancing our personality and mood dispositions. Do such interventions always threaten our authenticity, as some worry? A negative answer is provided to that question. Various potential pitfalls hinted at by the inauthenticity worry are discussed and acknowledged. It is, however, argued that such enhancements could still in principle be used in a fully authentic manner, and that they have the potential to bring about genuine improvements in our mood but also to our moral capacities and our affective rationality more generally.

This thesis looks at the failure of individual people living in affluent societies to do more to help those living in conditions of extreme poverty at the present moment. Affluent people have the capacity to assist, by contributing additional funds to aid and humanitarian organisations. Given an understanding of what is at stake, the fact that they fail to do so is both morally problematic and difficult to explain. Yet, without an understanding of the causes of inaction, it is difficult to know what measures may be taken to alleviate extreme suffering in the world today. The thesis draws upon different philosophical accounts of practical reason to argue that the conduct of the affluent can only be understood in one of three ways: these people may lack decisive reason to assist, they may be misinformed, or they may be rationally deficient in some regard. Considering each possibility in turn, it advances two central arguments. Firstly, the normative reasons claim is sound: affluent people, who do not incur minor costs by assisting, ought to do more. Secondly, these people tend to have false beliefs about the nature of poverty, to make substantive errors of judgement, and to follow flawed patterns of reasoning when they deliberate about what to do. Taken together, these factors explain their failure to act. Building upon this diagnosis, the thesis then considers how to respond to the problem of inaction, advancing a solution that is institutional in character. It argues for the construction of a division of labour between state and citizen, at the national level, which would see political institutions take on responsibility for poverty eradication, thereby leaving individuals freer to pursue their own personal goals and objectives. In order to perform this function effectively, wealthy nations would have to improve the quantity and quality of assistance that they provide to low-income countries. They would also have to cease partaking in practices that harm the global poor. This approach has a number of advantages over reliance on private philanthropy alone: it forms part of a fair and effective solution to the problem of motivating assistance, the arrangement it proposes is both stable and legitimate, and it is also something that could be achieved in practice. Therefore, it represents part of the best possible way in which to proceed.

The central argument of this dissertation is that virtue ethics is overly individualistic. In response, I develop and defend a more relational, ecological account - what I call extended virtues. First, following Andy Clark, Kim Sterelny, and others, I argue that cognition and emotion can be embedded in, scaffolded by, or even extended to include various environmental resources. These arguments undermine default internalism about cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show how recent work in social and personality psychology similarly undermines individualism about the bearers of these cognitive and affective processes. Taken together, these arguments have significant but heretofore underappreciated implications for virtue ethics. After reviewing the literature which attempts to spell out the ethical implications of embedded, scaffolded, and extended cognition, I conclude that a more substantive engagement with virtue ethics is needed. I then show how plausible, mainstream theories of virtue assume default internalism and individualism, and are thus subject to charges of empirical inadequacy. Finally, I formulate my account of extended virtues in response to these shortcomings. I begin by making three explicit arguments for why an account of extended virtues is needed. I then develop two further arguments - the process argument and the bearer argument - which yield the conclusion that the processes relevant to, and the bearers of, moral and intellectual virtues can be embedded, scaffolded, or extended. After providing examples and filling in details about the hypotheses of embedded, scaffolded, and extended virtue, I propose that virtues are less like dispositions and more like relations. I conclude by suggesting that ecological metaphors such as stewardship are more fitting than traditional views of morality as inner strength.