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In this dissertation, I defend and develop an animalist view of human persons. There are two aspects of animalism. One is the ontological aspect. With respect to this aspect, animalists claim that each of us is a human organism. The other aspect of animalism concerns persistence. Most - but not all - animalists believe that if we are human organisms, psychological continuity is irrelevant to our persistence. Rather, they believe, biological continuity is both necessary and sufficient for us to persist. / This dissertation discusses both aspects of animalism. In Chapter One -- Three, I defend the idea that each of us is identical with a body and thus with a human organism in the sense of being identical with one. I argue for this idea by contrasting animalism with the constitution view. More precisely, I show that both theories face the too many thinkers problem, and animalists can solve it while constitionalists cannot. In Chapter Four, I argue that we do not have entirely biological persistence conditions. Animalism is, I argue, compatible with the idea that appropriate psychological continuity is sufficient (though not necessary) for our persistence. I conclude that we are human organisms but we are not human organisms essentially. / My dissertation is important for two reasons. First, not many animalists, surprisingly, discuss the too many thinkers problem as lodged against animalism, although it is the most serious objection to the theory. Some animalists attempt to solve this problem by eliminating brains from the animalist's ontology. This eliminativist ontology is the best solution to the too many thinkers problem in the existing literature. I criticize the eliminativist solution and offer my own. Moreover, no one has systematically defended the idea that our being human organisms does not imply our having entirely biological persistence conditions. If my argument is right, it will shed a new light on the animalist view of personal identity.