Default inheritance reasoning is a propositional approach to non monotonic reasoning designed to model reasoning with natural language generics. Inheritance reasoners model sets of natural language generics as directed acyclicgraphs,and inference corresponds to the specification of paths through those networks. A proliferation of inheritance proof theories exist in the literature along with extensive debate about the most reasonable way to construct inferences, based on intuitions about interpretations of particular inheritance networks. There has not been an accepted semantics for inheritance which unifies the set of possible proof theories, which would help identify truly ill motivated proof theories. This thesis attempts to clarify the inheritance literature in the three ways indicated in the title: psychological plausibility, proof theory and semantics.

Thesis (M. Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-91).

Univ., Diss.--Freiburg, 2002. / Literaturverz. S. [243] - 247.

Thesis (M.A.)--Brigham Young University. Dept. of Mathematics Education, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 56-58).

Thesis (M.Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-91). Also available in print.

Thesis (D.A.)--Illinois State University, 1988. / Title from title page screen, viewed September 16, 2005. Dissertation Committee: Michael Plantholt (chair), John Dossey, Patricia Klass, Albert Otto, Charles Vanden Eynden. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 172-173) and abstract. Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, April 2010.

No description available.

In this thesis we examine the relationship between hypersequent and some types of labelled sequent calculi for a subset of intermediate logics—logics between intuitionistic (Int), and classical logics—that have geometric Kripke semantics, which we call Int∗/Geo. We introduce a novel calculus for a fragment of first-order classical logic, which we call partially-shielded formulae (or PSF for short), that is adequate for expressing the semantic validity of formulae in Int∗/Geo, and apply techniques from correspondence theory to provide translations of hypersequents, simply labelled sequents and relational sequents (simply labelled sequents with relational formulae) into PSF. Using these translations, we show that hypersequents and simply labelled sequents for calculi in Int∗/Geo share the same models. We also use these translations to justify various techniques that we introduce for translating simply labelled sequents into relational sequents and vice versa. In particular, we introduce a technique called "transitive unfolding" for translating relational sequents into simply labelled sequents (and by extension, hypersequents) which preserves linear models in Int∗/Geo. We introduce syntactic translations between hypersequent calculi and simply labelled sequent calculi. We apply these translations to a novel hypersequent framework HG3ipm∗ for some logics in Int∗/Geo to obtain a corresponding simply labelled sequent framework LG3ipm∗, and to an existing simply labelled calculus for Int from the literature to obtain a novel hypersequent calculus for Int. We introduce methods for translating a simply labelled sequent calculus into a cor- responding relational calculus, and apply these methods to LG3ipm∗ to obtain a novel relational framework RG3ipm∗ that bears similarities to existing calculi from the literature. We use transitive unfolding to translate proofs in RG3ipm∗ into proofs in LG3ipm∗ and HG3ipm∗ with the communication rule, which corresponds to the semantic restriction to linear models.

In contemporary formal theory of truth, model-theoretic and non-classical approaches have been dominant. I rather pursue the so-called classical axiomatic approaches toward truth and my dissertation begins by arguing for the classical axiomatic approach and against the others. The classical axiomatic approach inevitably leads to abandonment of the nave conception of truth and revision of the basic principles of truth derived from that nave conception such as the full T-schema. In the absence of the general guiding principles based on that nave conception, we need to conduct tedious but down-to-earth eld works' of various theories of truth by examining and comparing them from various points of view in searching for satisfactory theories of truth. As such attempt, I raise two new criteria for comparison of truth theories, make a proof-theoretic study of them in connection to the foundation of mathematics.