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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
31

Begründen und rechtfertigen eine Untersuchung zum Verhältnis zwischen rationalen Erfordernissen und prävalenten Handlungsgründen /

Pollok, Konstantin. January 1900 (has links)
Originally presented as the author's thesis (Habilitationsschrift)--Philipps-Universität, Marburg, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references and index.
32

Protologik Unters. zur formalen Pragmatik von Begründungsdiskursen /

Gethmann, Carl Friedrich, January 1979 (has links)
Habilitationsschrift--Constance. / Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 179-[186]).
33

Evidentialism in the Calvinist tradition

McKay, Don B. January 1987 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.T.S.)--Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56).
34

Making sense of the absurd the possibility for rationality in Kierkegaard's subjective truth /

Solderitsch, Jake. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.
35

A survey of Luther's understanding of the proper use of r̲a̲t̲i̲o̲ in theology as found in T̲h̲e̲ L̲e̲c̲t̲u̲r̲e̲s̲ o̲n̲ G̲a̲l̲a̲t̲i̲a̲n̲s̲ (1519), O̲n̲ t̲h̲e̲ b̲o̲n̲d̲a̲g̲e̲ o̲f̲ t̲h̲e̲ w̲i̲l̲l̲, and T̲h̲e̲ d̲i̲s̲p̲u̲t̲a̲t̲i̲o̲n̲ c̲o̲n̲c̲e̲r̲n̲i̲n̲g̲ m̲a̲n̲

Reese, Kerry David. January 1987 (has links)
Thesis (S.T.M.)--Concordia Seminary, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 168-174).
36

Evidentialism in the Calvinist tradition

McKay, Don B. January 1987 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.T.S.)--Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56).
37

The relationship of faith with reason in Soren Kierkegaard's writings a comparison between his pseudonymous and his signed works /

O'Day, Seth T. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-143).
38

The relation of faith and reason in Paul's defense of the gospel in Acts 17:16-34

Michener, Ronald T. January 1987 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1987. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-94).
39

Moral virtue and reasons for action /

Mason, Michelle Nicole. January 2001 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Philosophy, March, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.
40

Why should I be moral? : toward a defence of the categoricity and normative authority of moral considerations

Hurtig, Kent January 2004 (has links)
Can we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is consistent with common-sense morality. It also provides a way of showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is consistent with our best current understanding of what practical reason requires of us.

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