Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2001. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-92). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users. Address: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3024508.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Texas at Arlington, 2009.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-55). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

The significance of stock options as a component of executive compensation has fluctuated dramatically over the past decade. The purpose of this study is to investigate determinants of the effectiveness of stock option grants. These option grants are considered to be effective if they accomplish their intended role of enhancing firm value by inducing risk-taking behavior. Using data from 2,349 firms that granted stock options to their Chief Executive Officer (CEO) between 1992 and 2001, the relationship between the options granted and subsequent firm value was examined. This study found no universal positive association between option grants and firm value. However, CEO incentive equilibrium, defined as stability in the CEO’s stock and option portfolio sensitivity to stock price, was found to influence the association between stock option grants and firm value. The positive association between grants and firm value was evidenced for the sub-sample of firms that demonstrate disequilibrium in CEO incentives. This was not the case, however, for the CEO incentive equilibrium sub-sample. This finding indicates that the positive valuation impact of stock option grants is highest for those firms that demonstrate a trend of increasing CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock price. High CEO portfolio sensitivity to equity risk was not found to interact with grant sensitivity to equity risk in a manner that reduces firm value. Thus, this study did not find support for the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, grants further reduce CEO diversification, and interact with portfolio sensitivity to reduce incentives for risk-taking. Consistent with Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991), however, a high level of uncorrelated wealth is found to interact with grant sensitivity to equity risk so as to increase the positive impact of grant sensitivity on firm value.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-80).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also from UMI Company.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, June 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

With the cost of Employee bonus in 2008, the performance of employee stock options with 39¡¦s bulletin is going to adopt fair market value to accept the expense. The purpose of sequenced policy is make the corporate finance transparently and able to connect with international business. However, with the performance of policy, it did gain the cost of encouragement especially high tech industry. Therefore, author is going to use simulated statements to observe the influence of the cost of encouragement in this project. By the case study, it is found that most of enterprises experience the limited impact in the short term and positive growth in the long term. Moreover, due to the performance of stock options, companies generally have three phenomenons that are increased cash flow, protected levy design and reduced EPS (Earnings per share). On the other hand, the censorable stock bonus policy, compared with previous one, is able to lower the situation of diluted stock and to reduce the concern of shareholders. The only huge issue which is ready to break through for firms nowadays is how to design a flexible system to encourage the employees who usually earn more than one million NT dollars by stock bonus policy.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Texas at Arlington, 2007.