This dissertation addresses methodological problems in causal inference in the presence of time-varying confounding, and provides methodological tools to handle the problems within the potential outcomes framework of causal inference. The time-varying confounding is common in longitudinal observational studies, in which the covariates and treatments are interacting and changing over time in response to the intermediate outcomes and changing circumstances. The existing approaches in causal inference are mostly focused on static single-shot decision-making settings, and have limitations in estimating the effects of long-term treatments on the chronic problems. In this dissertation, I attempt to conceptualize the causal inference in this situation as a sequential decision problem, using the conceptual tools developed in decision theory, dynamic treatment regimes, and machine learning. I also provide methodological tools useful for this situation, especially when the treatments are multi-level and changing over time, using inverse probability weights and $g$-estimation. Substantively, this dissertation examines transitional justice's effects on human rights and democracy in emerging democracies. Using transitional justice as an example to illustrate the proposed methods, I conceptualize the adoption of transitional justice by a new government as a sequential decision-making process, and empirically examine the comparative effectiveness of transitional justice measures --- independently or in combination with others --- on human rights and democracy. / text

How we respond to legacies of past violence cannot be separated from the narratives we hold about that violence. When the state fails, for whatever reason, to take the lead in dealing with past violence and the development of a public narrative about conflict, various groups may seek to fill that space based on different agendas. The way individuals and organisations outside the state interpret and engage with processes of dealing with the past is influenced by the narratives they hold and are exposed to, and this can have positive or negative implications for long-term peace. This thesis seeks to interrogate how civil society narratives of electoral violence have shaped the transitional justice agenda in Zimbabwe, as drawn from the way they report and depict understandings of this violence, through written texts as well as the way they speak about violence in various public forums. This investigation is done through a qualitative interpretivist approach to understand the kinds of narratives of violence espoused by four civil society organisations through a categorical content analysis of their reports and in-depth interviews with four key stakeholders. The thesis concludes that while the understandings of violence are key to how we deal with the violence, these understandings have to be drawn genuinely from the experiences of those that have lived the violence, and not from agendas that seek certain ends, whether political or economic. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Fellowship, with funds provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York SSRC and the University of Pretoria Postgraduate Research Support Grant. / Political Sciences / PhD / Unrestricted

Martha Minow argues that among the goals that a transitional justice system should pursue, reconciliation is equally as important as truth and justice. This is why in her view – and others who have argued similar lines – Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are not a “second best option” to trials. I argue that if we are to accept that reconciliation is a valuable goal, then the practical reality of pursuing reconciliation dictates a need to understand perpetrators in greater depth. This is because unlike truth and justice, reconciliation cannot be forced. Constructive participation is the only way that reconciliation can be achieved. In order to promote constructive participation, I argue that theorists need to do further research into what I call “perpetrator requirements”: the requirements that make perpetrators participate, and participate constructively. To do so, theorists should use an interdisciplinary approach, utilizing research from psychology, anthropology, political science, philosophy, and law. / Graduate

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<p>Drawing lessons from South Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia, the study seeks to contribute to the debate around reparations in a society where the likelihood of prosecutions against suspected perpetrators is limited.</p>

<p>Drawing lessons from South Africa, Chile, Peru and Colombia, the study seeks to contribute to the debate around reparations in a society where the likelihood of prosecutions against suspected perpetrators is limited.</p>

The purpose of this thesis is to explain how and why a sector of the Chilean population is indifferent to past human rights violations committed during the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-90), and also what the consequences of that indifference are in Chile today. An explanatory sequential and non-nested mixed methods design has been applied: the quantitative analysis is based on the 2013 National Bicentennial Survey (N=2,004), and the qualitative analysis is carried out from fifty-three in-depth and semi-structured interviews to indifferent and non-indifferent individuals. It is argued that indifference to past human rights violations is the result of various processes of socialization that influence the individual, being relevant life experiences and social interactions related to political issues. According to the survey, 16.02 percent of the sample is indifferent to past atrocities. Regarding the causes of indifference, binomial logistic regression highlights four variables: political orientation, socio-economic status, generational cohort, and perception of social conflict. The analysis of in-depth interviews shows that the three most common sets of variables that explain indifference to past human rights violations are: the predominant emphasis on search for family and personal well-being, discomfort with politics, and fear of a recurrence of the pre-coup d'état crisis and post-coup authoritarian experiences. Qualitative analysis shows that indifference is dynamic and visible. There are also different intensities in the spectrum of indifference. As the indifferent are a heterogeneous group, distinctions between disillusioned, submissive, depoliticized, and resigned indifferent are presented. It is also argued that the indifferent cynics are a problematic group for transitional justice, democratic consolidation, and the rule of law. Regarding the social consequences, the indifferent may actively promote social indifference in their interactions; indifference has become a socially accepted norm by other sectors, and indifference facilitates the persistence of the culture of impunity over time.

Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa

Magister Legum - LLM

What do we owe to each other in civil society? And what do we owe to each other specifically in the aftermath of a large-scale moral transgression that implicates or impacts a large portion of the population? This dissertation, which takes place at the intersection of political and moral philosophy, begins with this question. I argue that in order to make sense of our social and political obligations under the circumstances of so-called transitional justice, we must first interrogate the moral grounding of those obligations — an activity that is all too easy to overlook or engage in non-reflectively. I argue that while a consequentialist approach to ethical value underlies our intuitions in transitional justice as presently practiced, a contractualist approach offers a promising alternative. On my account, a contract-based approach is especially well-suited to transitional moments, not only because it conveys the collaborative nature of the transitional project, but because it reifies the agency and autonomy of previously victimized individuals. Chapter I draws out the distinction between transitional justice as an array of formal mechanisms and practices (‘formal transitional justice’) and transitional justice as a collection of intuitions about response to grievous wrongdoing (‘ideal transitional justice’). Our ideas about transitional justice influence and shape the form it ultimately takes on the world stage, and those ideas are informed in large part by our moral intuitions. To that end, I introduce the notion of ‘transitional ethics’ as a complement to transitional justice. In Chapter II, I make the case that a thorough exploration of transitional ethics requires us to investigate the suitability of various ethical approaches for the transitional moment. While virtue ethical and deontological approaches fail to resonate robustly with the unique demands of the transitional moment, consequentialist and contractualist approaches succeed. Indeed, the former is already implicitly present in most scholarly theorizing about transitional justice, but the latter deserves increased attention. It is with this consideration that the remainder of the dissertation is concerned. Chapter III considers the impact of a contractualist transitional ethic on victim experiences, and makes the case that the contractualist emphasis on relationships lends itself particularly well to the reification of their moral worth and dignity. Chapter IV turns towards perpetrators, particularly to cases of ‘complex’ perpetrators who themselves may also be victims in some sense or another. Chapter V engages with the final puzzle: how can we hold wrongdoers retributively accountable (if indeed such a thing is desirable) when we orient our approach to transitional justice around the recognition of personal dignity? I argue that the recognition of personal dignity, which contractualism emphasizes, is not incompatible with accountability. Rather, conceiving of perpetrators as signatories to the social contract protects their fundamental rights while emphasizing their civil responsibilities.