This dissertation addresses methodological problems in causal inference in the presence of time-varying confounding, and provides methodological tools to handle the problems within the potential outcomes framework of causal inference. The time-varying confounding is common in longitudinal observational studies, in which the covariates and treatments are interacting and changing over time in response to the intermediate outcomes and changing circumstances. The existing approaches in causal inference are mostly focused on static single-shot decision-making settings, and have limitations in estimating the effects of long-term treatments on the chronic problems. In this dissertation, I attempt to conceptualize the causal inference in this situation as a sequential decision problem, using the conceptual tools developed in decision theory, dynamic treatment regimes, and machine learning. I also provide methodological tools useful for this situation, especially when the treatments are multi-level and changing over time, using inverse probability weights and $g$-estimation. Substantively, this dissertation examines transitional justice's effects on human rights and democracy in emerging democracies. Using transitional justice as an example to illustrate the proposed methods, I conceptualize the adoption of transitional justice by a new government as a sequential decision-making process, and empirically examine the comparative effectiveness of transitional justice measures --- independently or in combination with others --- on human rights and democracy. / text

In the last two decades, many countries going through transitional justice have established truth commissions. Unlike conventional war tribunals, most truth commissions are established by the local government and local human rights groups. Truth commissions are still a nascent political choice, yet a sizable literature has developed around it, evaluating its potential as a new institution for dealing with the past and moving towards restorative justice. This work examines four major questions debated in the transitional justice literature over truth versus justice: 1) whether or not a truth commission is an valid alternative mechanism to seeking out retributive justice, 2) whether or not truth commissions are the product of political compromise which avoiding justice, 3) if truth commissions can be the agent of new national identity and national unity founded on the principles of universal human rights, and 4) if amnesty can be legitimized. This work aims to determine to what extent the idea itself of truth commissions has been actualized up to now and what lot it may expect in the future, despite incidental political restrictions and difficulties in the political transition. Despite the common assertion that the goals of truth commissions are to bring about official acknowledgment of the past, restore the dignity of the victims, and achieve reconciliation in divided society, this paper does not intend to evaluate the truth commissions in the past based on these criteria; nor does this work intend to argue what truth commissions can resolve in the transitional justice societies. Rather, this paper seeks to uncover what social reaction or human emotions truth commissions in the past have evoked in a divided society. To explore the question, this paper focuses on the distinctive activities and merits of truth commissions from the standpoint of retributive justice and looks into the important implication in the interaction between the victims and the perpetrators, as well as between the audience and those two parties. Roger Errera, a member of the French Conseil d’Etat, stated that “Memory is the ultimate form of justice.” Inspired by the statement, this work argues that justice can be found in the act of pursing truth, remembering it, and responding to those voices from the past.

In the last two decades, many countries going through transitional justice have established truth commissions. Unlike conventional war tribunals, most truth commissions are established by the local government and local human rights groups. Truth commissions are still a nascent political choice, yet a sizable literature has developed around it, evaluating its potential as a new institution for dealing with the past and moving towards restorative justice. This work examines four major questions debated in the transitional justice literature over truth versus justice: 1) whether or not a truth commission is an valid alternative mechanism to seeking out retributive justice, 2) whether or not truth commissions are the product of political compromise which avoiding justice, 3) if truth commissions can be the agent of new national identity and national unity founded on the principles of universal human rights, and 4) if amnesty can be legitimized. This work aims to determine to what extent the idea itself of truth commissions has been actualized up to now and what lot it may expect in the future, despite incidental political restrictions and difficulties in the political transition. Despite the common assertion that the goals of truth commissions are to bring about official acknowledgment of the past, restore the dignity of the victims, and achieve reconciliation in divided society, this paper does not intend to evaluate the truth commissions in the past based on these criteria; nor does this work intend to argue what truth commissions can resolve in the transitional justice societies. Rather, this paper seeks to uncover what social reaction or human emotions truth commissions in the past have evoked in a divided society. To explore the question, this paper focuses on the distinctive activities and merits of truth commissions from the standpoint of retributive justice and looks into the important implication in the interaction between the victims and the perpetrators, as well as between the audience and those two parties. Roger Errera, a member of the French Conseil d’Etat, stated that “Memory is the ultimate form of justice.” Inspired by the statement, this work argues that justice can be found in the act of pursing truth, remembering it, and responding to those voices from the past.

In the last two decades, many countries going through transitional justice have established truth commissions. Unlike conventional war tribunals, most truth commissions are established by the local government and local human rights groups. Truth commissions are still a nascent political choice, yet a sizable literature has developed around it, evaluating its potential as a new institution for dealing with the past and moving towards restorative justice. This work examines four major questions debated in the transitional justice literature over truth versus justice: 1) whether or not a truth commission is an valid alternative mechanism to seeking out retributive justice, 2) whether or not truth commissions are the product of political compromise which avoiding justice, 3) if truth commissions can be the agent of new national identity and national unity founded on the principles of universal human rights, and 4) if amnesty can be legitimized. This work aims to determine to what extent the idea itself of truth commissions has been actualized up to now and what lot it may expect in the future, despite incidental political restrictions and difficulties in the political transition. Despite the common assertion that the goals of truth commissions are to bring about official acknowledgment of the past, restore the dignity of the victims, and achieve reconciliation in divided society, this paper does not intend to evaluate the truth commissions in the past based on these criteria; nor does this work intend to argue what truth commissions can resolve in the transitional justice societies. Rather, this paper seeks to uncover what social reaction or human emotions truth commissions in the past have evoked in a divided society. To explore the question, this paper focuses on the distinctive activities and merits of truth commissions from the standpoint of retributive justice and looks into the important implication in the interaction between the victims and the perpetrators, as well as between the audience and those two parties. Roger Errera, a member of the French Conseil d’Etat, stated that “Memory is the ultimate form of justice.” Inspired by the statement, this work argues that justice can be found in the act of pursing truth, remembering it, and responding to those voices from the past. / Arts, Faculty of / Asian Research, Institute of / Graduate

How we respond to legacies of past violence cannot be separated from the narratives we hold about that violence. When the state fails, for whatever reason, to take the lead in dealing with past violence and the development of a public narrative about conflict, various groups may seek to fill that space based on different agendas. The way individuals and organisations outside the state interpret and engage with processes of dealing with the past is influenced by the narratives they hold and are exposed to, and this can have positive or negative implications for long-term peace. This thesis seeks to interrogate how civil society narratives of electoral violence have shaped the transitional justice agenda in Zimbabwe, as drawn from the way they report and depict understandings of this violence, through written texts as well as the way they speak about violence in various public forums. This investigation is done through a qualitative interpretivist approach to understand the kinds of narratives of violence espoused by four civil society organisations through a categorical content analysis of their reports and in-depth interviews with four key stakeholders. The thesis concludes that while the understandings of violence are key to how we deal with the violence, these understandings have to be drawn genuinely from the experiences of those that have lived the violence, and not from agendas that seek certain ends, whether political or economic. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Social Science Research Council’s Next Generation Social Sciences in Africa Fellowship, with funds provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York SSRC and the University of Pretoria Postgraduate Research Support Grant. / Political Sciences / PhD / Unrestricted

Quantitative research investigating the causes and subsequent impact of transitional justice practices has further developed thanks to the production of cross-national data on justice practices, namely by the Justice Data Project and the Transitional Justice Research Collaborative. Current work, however, does not consider the role of justice from a feminist perspective. For example, with respect to causes, we know little about whether and how justice processes are gender inclusive, and what the factors lead to gendered inclusion within justice practices. There is also a need for further inquiry to explain how gendered conflict violence, e.g., sexual violence directed at women, influences justice adoption, and if so, whether these justice processes are more likely to be inclusive of women and gendered issues. Regarding justice impact (its post-hoc effects), there is much to know about the implications gendered justice pose for post-violence societies. Moving away from essentialist notions that position men as protectors and women as inherently peaceful and mere victims of abuse, feminist scholars advocate for research to showcase women's agency as security providers in peacebuilding and peacemaking. I introduce a framework to explain how women and gendered issues become integrated into justice practices and evaluate implications that result from these processes. Such a research program is important, if not crucial, to understand the role of women as agents in the development of peace and security in countries with a history of violence and human rights abuse. In doing so, I respond to demands calling for gender perspectives on issues related to security and positive peace, a peace that includes social justice, that can only be achieved by dismantling the unequal power structures of gender, race, and class.

Martha Minow argues that among the goals that a transitional justice system should pursue, reconciliation is equally as important as truth and justice. This is why in her view – and others who have argued similar lines – Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are not a “second best option” to trials. I argue that if we are to accept that reconciliation is a valuable goal, then the practical reality of pursuing reconciliation dictates a need to understand perpetrators in greater depth. This is because unlike truth and justice, reconciliation cannot be forced. Constructive participation is the only way that reconciliation can be achieved. In order to promote constructive participation, I argue that theorists need to do further research into what I call “perpetrator requirements”: the requirements that make perpetrators participate, and participate constructively. To do so, theorists should use an interdisciplinary approach, utilizing research from psychology, anthropology, political science, philosophy, and law. / Graduate

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Human rights are a defining feature of how the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has been 'imagined and made' in its post-conflict society. This thesis marks the first attempt to make sense of how human rights are articulated, interpreted and applied by those intimately involved in Northern Irish policing. Based on extensive access to the PSNI, I marshal qualitative data collected from interviews with over one hundred police officers from various departments. I tour four sites of local policing to expose and examine the vernaculars and practices of human rights that lurk within each. The story I tell over the course of eight chapters is one of a police service trying to sustain human rights as a central narrative to explain its daily work and build its organisational identity in a divided society, to varying degrees of success. I argue that human rights are, in fact, a malleable, contested and conditional concept to 'imagine and make' a police service and regulate the decision-making of its officers; perhaps much more so than police reformers in Northern Ireland had realised or the PSNI wish to acknowledge. In the first half of the thesis, I identify and deconstruct how the PSNI's chief officers and local political parties seek to express and mobilise competing visions, values and agendas through human rights narratives. I then pay close attention to how human rights are interpreted and translated by junior officers performing two forms of routine policing in N.Ireland: the 'dirty work' of the Tactical Support Group and the 'community work' of Neighbourhood Policing Teams. I ask to what extent officers have internalised human rights as way of making sense of their daily work. In the second half of the thesis, I explore police officers as an important, but poorly understood, class of human rights practitioner. To better grasp how officers interpret and apply human rights standards, I closely analyse two sites of policing where distinct schemes of human rights-based regulation exist: public order policing and police custody. This thesis contributes to understandings of the concept of human rights, its interactions with law and politics and the condition of policing in contemporary Northern Ireland.

The overall purpose of the dissertation is to make a contribution to a political theory of democratic transformations by drawing attention to one of the less theorised dimensions of a polity’s public culture: public affect. More precisely, I deal with the role that institutions in general and courts in particular can play in the education of public moral sentiments within transitional justice processes. A cognitive constructivist approach to emotions provides the background for my attempt to show, first, the legitimacy of negative public emotions of resentment and indignation in the aftermath of violence, and second, their positive potential for the reproductive efforts of the democratic community. These affects are barometers of injustice and can act as signals of alarm for institutions to intervene correctively. As such, they bear normative weight and should be a proper object of concern for any society attempting to make the transition to democracy; however, left unfiltered and unmediated institutionally, they can either degenerate into political cynicism and apathy, or be expressed in ways that are incompatible with the democratic value of equal concern and respect for all citizens. I argue that courts dealing with transitional justice issues can recognise, engage constructively, and fructify negative moral emotions for democracy. The exemplarity of judicial reflective judgment—both in the context of constitutional review of transitional justice bills and of criminal trials—can inspire citizens to reflect on what they want to do in the name of their violated sense of justice and encourage them to internalise democratic norms of social interaction. A series of case studies from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries are used to illustrate how the judiciary has historically chosen to engage negative emotions in the aftermath of oppression and violence.