Diss. (sammanfattning) Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2005. / Härtill 5 uppsatser.

[pt] O mercado de energia do Brasileiro foi decidido com base nas suas características físicas dos anos 90, predominantemente hídrico. Apesar de ainda dominado pela geração hidrelétrica, a participação dessa fonte foi reduzida significativamente, cedendo espaço principalmente para as fontes renováveis intermitentes. Sendo assim, há uma dissonância entre o atual sistema elétrico e aquele que embasou a atual regulação. As hipóteses e aproximações adotadas para a constituição da estrutura regulatória foram baseadas em um sistema com excesso de flexibilidade e alta previsibilidade no curto prazo. A maior participação das renováveis intermitentes, e sua projeção de crescimento nos próximos anos faz com essa estrutura se torne cada vez menos aderente e suas falhas intensificadas. A falta de adaptação pode enfraquecer os sinais econômicos e ameaçar a sustentabilidade e adequabilidade do sistema no longo prazo. A consulta pública CP 33 propôs uma agenda pragmática para auxiliar no processo de modernização do setor, se tornando um dos pilares principais de leis em tramitação no Congresso sobre esse assunto. Apesar do consenso a respeito da necessidade de modernização, principalmente na adoção de um mercado de curto prazo mais competitivo, ainda existem muitas preocupações e questionamentos a respeito dos mecanismos de mercados a serem adotados. A vasta literatura e as experiências internacionais podem auxiliar muito no processo de modernização nacional. Todavia, as particularidades de cada sistema, como matriz de geração e dimensões territoriais, desafiam qualquer tentativa simplista de compatibilizar o caso Brasileiro com experiências relatadas. Dessa maneira, esse trabalho tem como objetivo 1) definir uma nomenclatura e classificar as estruturas de mercado relevantes, 2) delinear um panorama sistematizado das características que influenciaram a escolha de diferentes mecanismos de mercado 3) comparar os mercados internacionais ao mercado Brasileiro utilizando as nomenclaturas e as características físicas definidas em 1) e 2). Mercados da América do Sul e do Norte, Europa e Nova Zelândia foram selecionados para apresentar as análises comparativas. Dessa maneira, nós contribuímos com um panorama atualizado e padronizado de alguns desenhos mercados internacionais e mecanismos relevantes. Além do mais, nós conscientizamos e discutimos lições relevantes aprendidas com a experiência internacional para apoiar e fomentar a agenda de modernização do mercado Brasileiro. / [en] The Brazilian power-market design features were decided based on the system s physical and economic characteristics observed in the 90s, when the system was remarkably hydro-dominated and the economy experienced large GDP growth rates. Nowadays, the power system s capacity is still hydrodominated, albeit with a significantly lower hydro participation (64 percent), has experienced a sharp growth in variable renewable energy integration, and has faced the impacts of different economic crises. Therefore, some of the approximations and assumptions adopted for the regulatory framework based on the original system s condition and economic reality are not valid anymore. Failing to adapt the regulatory framework to the current system and economic realities may provide poor market signals, possibly threatening the long-run system sustainability. Based on the continued flaws experienced in this country, the need for a market-design review is critical and urgent in Brazil. The public consultation named CP 33 proposed a handful agenda for the Brazilian power sector modernization, which is the backbone of some bills already in progress. Despite the consensus on the modernization agenda, especially on a more short-term-based market-oriented approach, there are still many concerns and questions on which market features should be adopted. The vast literature and international experience in the subject notwithstanding, each system s particularities, challenge any simplistic attempt to match the Brazilian case with previously reported experiences. Thus, this work aims to 1) define a general market design nomenclature and classify relevant market structures, 2) draw a systematized panorama of the physical characteristics that have influenced the selection of different market designs and mechanisms in other similar markets, and 3) compare the Brazilian market design, within a common language using 1) and 2), to the international experience. Markets from South and North America, Europe, and New Zealand were selected to present comparisons between them and Brazil. Based on that, we contribute with an updated and standardized panorama of a few relevant market designs and structures. Additionally, we raise awareness and discuss the relevant lessons learned from the international experience applicable to support and foster the Brazilian market modernization agenda.

Les deux derniers siècles ont connu une révolution exceptionnelle dans l'organisation des marchés électriques dans le monde entier. Ainsi, traditionnellement organisé autour de monopoles verticalement intégrés et soumis à la régulation, le secteur électrique connait un processus de réforme et évolue vers une organisation décentralisée qui favorise les mécanismes du marché. Le passage des tarifs régulés à des prix du marché, compte tenu des structures concentrées et les caractéristiques particulières de l'industrie électrique, accroît la possibilité que certaines entreprises puissent manipuler les prix du marché en exerçant leur pouvoir de marché. Les questions de "pouvoir de marché" dans un secteur donné ont été abondamment étudiées dans la littérature de l'économie Industrielle depuis la fin des années 1970, mais des études théoriques et empiriques de "pouvoir de marché dans les marchés électriques" n'ont été développées que récemment. Dans cette thèse, nous essayons de mener une recherche approfondie autour des questions de pouvoir de marché sur les marchés de gros de l'électricité en Europe. Nous conduisons des études empiriques dans deux des plus grands marchés européens: la France (sur des données 2009-2012) et l'Allemagne (sur des données de 2011), en utilisant des méthodes économétriques et des modèles de simulation des marchés électriques. Le sujet semble pertinent dans la période de transition énergétique en Europe. / The two last centuries have witnessed an exceptional revolution in the organization of electric power markets worldwide. The industry's organization has changed from vertically integrated monopolies under regulation to unbundled structures that favor market mechanisms; known as reform process in Europe. The shift to reliance on market prices, given concentrated structures and particular characteristics of electricity industry, raises a possibility that some firms could influence the market prices by exercising their market power. The issues of "market power" in a given industry have been abundantly employed in the literatureof Industrial Organization since the late 1970s but theoretical and empirical studies of "market power in electricity markets" have only been developed recently. In this thesis, we attempt to carry out an insight research around market power questions in deregulated wholesale electricity markets in Europe, as regarding the way of defining and measuring it. We carry out empirical studies in two of the biggest liberalized electricity markets in Europe: France (2009-2012's data) and Germany (2011's data), using econometric regressions and electricity simulation models as main methodologies. The subject is particularly relevant inthe context of energy transition in Europe (transition energetique in France and Energiewende in Germany).

Since the late 1980s, the energy sector in Great Britain has undergone some core changes in its functionality; beginning with the early 1990s privatisation, followed by an increased green ambition, and commencing a transition towards a low-carbon economy. As the British energy sector prepares itself for another major overhaul, it also puts itself at risk for not being sufficiently prepared for the consequences this transition will have on the existing generating capacity, security of supply, and the national electricity market. Upon meeting existing targets, the government of the United Kingdom risks becoming complacent, putting energy regulation to the backseat and focusing on other regulatory tasks, while introducing cuts for thriving renewable and other low-carbon energy generating technologies. The government has implemented a variety of directives, initiatives, and policies that have sometimes been criticised due to their lack of clarity and potential overlap between energy and climate change directives. The government has introduced policies that aim to provide stable short-term solutions. However, a concrete way of resolving the energy trilemma and some of the long-term objectives and more importantly ways of achieving them are yet to be developed. This work builds on analysing each low-carbon technology individually by assessing its past and current state in the British energy mix. By accounting for the changes and progress the technology underwent in its journey towards becoming a part of the energy capacity in Great Britain, its impact on the future wholesale electricity prices is studied. Research covered in this thesis presents an assessment of the existing and incoming low-carbon technologies in Great Britain and their individual and combined impact on the future of British energy economics by studying their implications for the electricity market. The methodological framework presented here uses a cost-minimisation merit order model to provide useful insights for novel methods of electricity production and conventional thermal energy generation to aid with the aftermath of potential inadequate operational and fiscal flexibility. The thesis covers a variety of scenarios differing in renewable and thermal penetration and examines the impact of interconnection, energy storage, and demand side management on the British wholesale electricity prices. The implications of increasing low-carbon capacity in the British energy mix are examined and compared to similar developments across Europe. The analysis highlights that if the optimistic scenarios in terms of green energy installation are followed, there is sufficient energy supply, which results in renewable resources helping to keep the wholesale price of electricity down. However, if the desired capacity targets are not met, the lack of available supply could result in wholesale prices going up, especially in the case of a natural gas price increase. Although initially costly, the modernisation of the British grid leads to a long-term decrease in wholesale electricity prices and provides a greater degree of security of supply and flexibility for all market participants.

<p>In most electricity markets, producers submit supply functions to a procurement uniform-price auction under uncertainty before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer commits to the supply function that maximises his expected profit given the bids of competitors. </p><p>The presence of multiple equilibria is a basic weakness of the SFE framework. Essay I shows that with (i) symmetric producers, (ii) perfectly inelastic demand, (iii) a reservation price (price cap), and (iv) capacity constraints that bind with a positive probability, a unique symmetric SFE exists. The equilibrium price reaches the price cap exactly when capacity constraints bind.</p><p>Another weakness is difficulty finding a valid asymmetric SFE with non-decreasing supply functions. Essay II shows that for firms with asymmetric capacity constraints but identical constant marginal costs there exists a unique and valid SFE. Equilibrium supply functions exhibit kinks as well as vertical and horizontal segments. The price at which the capacity constraint of a firm binds is increasing in the firm’s share of market capacity. The capacity constraint of the second largest firm binds when the market price reaches the price cap. Thereafter, the largest firm supplies its remaining capacity with a perfectly elastic segment at the price cap. Essay III presents a numerical algorithm that calculates a similar SFE for asymmetric firms with increasing marginal costs. </p><p>Essay IV derives the SFE of a pay-as-bid auction such as the balancing market for electric power in Britain. A unique SFE always exists if the demand’s hazard rate is monotonically decreasing, as for a Pareto distribution of the second kind. Assuming this probability distribution, the pay-as-bid procurement auction is compared to the SFE of a uniform-price procurement auction. Two theorems in Essay V prove that the demand-weighted average price is (weakly) lower in the pay-as-bid procurement auction. </p>

In most electricity markets, producers submit supply functions to a procurement uniform-price auction under uncertainty before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer commits to the supply function that maximises his expected profit given the bids of competitors. The presence of multiple equilibria is a basic weakness of the SFE framework. Essay I shows that with (i) symmetric producers, (ii) perfectly inelastic demand, (iii) a reservation price (price cap), and (iv) capacity constraints that bind with a positive probability, a unique symmetric SFE exists. The equilibrium price reaches the price cap exactly when capacity constraints bind. Another weakness is difficulty finding a valid asymmetric SFE with non-decreasing supply functions. Essay II shows that for firms with asymmetric capacity constraints but identical constant marginal costs there exists a unique and valid SFE. Equilibrium supply functions exhibit kinks as well as vertical and horizontal segments. The price at which the capacity constraint of a firm binds is increasing in the firm’s share of market capacity. The capacity constraint of the second largest firm binds when the market price reaches the price cap. Thereafter, the largest firm supplies its remaining capacity with a perfectly elastic segment at the price cap. Essay III presents a numerical algorithm that calculates a similar SFE for asymmetric firms with increasing marginal costs. Essay IV derives the SFE of a pay-as-bid auction such as the balancing market for electric power in Britain. A unique SFE always exists if the demand’s hazard rate is monotonically decreasing, as for a Pareto distribution of the second kind. Assuming this probability distribution, the pay-as-bid procurement auction is compared to the SFE of a uniform-price procurement auction. Two theorems in Essay V prove that the demand-weighted average price is (weakly) lower in the pay-as-bid procurement auction.