The purpose of this thesis is to compare a different conception of time in Kant's and Bergson's work and demonstrate the role of their conceptions within their philosophical projects. Time in Kant's work is both a pure a priori intuition represented as an infinite multitude of a priori successive moments and a form in which an empirical manifold appears. Manifold of pure intuition of time is united by an act of understanding and its objective unity makes synthetic a priori knowledge possible. Bergson, on the other hand, stood up against the idea of infinite divisibility of a time line. Homogenous time of mathematics considers only atemporal moments and it cannot conceive a temporal interval having time duration between two points. A pure duration therefore has to be a heterogeneous development of specific time matter, not a homogenous form in which empirical matter is quantitatively ordered as if it were without change and as an external part of change. Unity of time is therefore not quantitative but qualitative. Heterogeneous development is also on many levels permeated with homogeneity. This idea, at first sight contradictory, has to be explained by Bergson without retreating to the concept of homogenous time. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)