本文考察佛教瑜伽中觀派系統內之刹那滅。此考察主要以寂護（Śāntarakita）之《攝真實》(Tattvasagraha)第八章「恆常的存在物之考察」（sthirabhāva-parikā）為文本根據，並以花戒（Kamalaśīla）之《疏》(Tattvasagraha-pañjikā)為輔助。刹那滅主張存在物只在一刹那中存在，能持續存在至下刹那。實在者（realist）如正派（Nyāya）、勝派（Vaiśeika）等以共相、本體等恆常的存在物，視為其他事物存在背後的基礎。他們認為本體能持續存在至下刹那，能關係於下刹那的存在物，把其產生或滅。按此，存在物必須透過被原因「產生」的形式生起，其滅也必須由其自身以外的原因造成，否則它能一直存在。如取實在者對存在物的解，刹那滅被推翻。筆者認為刹那滅之所以成有三點（1）被產生的存在物皆以「滅」為本性、（2）存在物是以即時產生結果的形式存在、（3）前刹那與後刹那的存在物以必然伴隨的（necessary concomitant）關係互相依待，後刹那的果並非由前刹那的因「生出」。本文旨在分析及探討上述的證。筆者以支持寂護的場闡釋，嘗試以回應反對者的批評，證存在者只有「被產生的」和「刹那的」存在物，所謂能持續存在的存在物，實際上並存在。筆者並進一步澄清，瑜伽中觀派系統內的刹那的存在物並非獨存在，其必然伴隨的關係也違反佛教的緣起觀。此以因果關係為概建構的主張，也能與中觀的世俗諦同時成。 / The present study is an examination of the Buddhist Yogācāra-Madhyamaka argument for momentariness in the sthirabhāvaparīkā chapter of Śāntarakita’s Tattvasagraha with reference to Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasagraha-pañjikā. The theory of momentariness holds that produced things only exist within one moment; they do not exist before or after. Realists such as Nyāya and Vaiśeika, on the other hand, regard universal, substance, and permanent existents alike as the basis of the existence of things. Since these existents can persist in the next moment, things in the next moment are considered to be produced or destroyed by them through the means of relation. For this reason, the realists hold that things must exist through production. The destruction of these things must also be produced. As the cause of destruction exists apart from these things, the latter will persist if the former is not present. The theory of momentariness will be refuted if this realist conception of existence is accepted. / The present study seeks to argue for the theory of momentariness with the following: (1) whatever is produced takes “destruction as its nature; (2) whatever exists produces its effect immediately in the same moment; (3) existents in the former moment and those in the latter moment are related to each other through a relation of necessary concomitance; they are not related through a causal relation in which the effect is produced out from the cause. The conclusion of the argument of this study is that whatever exists must be produced and momentary; the non-produced or the non-momentary things, which are considered to be persistent by the opponents, in fact have no existence. This study also points out that momentary existents under the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka system do not exist independently. Their necessary concomitant relation does not violate the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. And as the theory of momentariness considers causal relation conceptually constructed, this theory is also compatible with Madhyamika’s conventional truth. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 方麗欣. / "2012年10月". / "2012 nian 10 yue". / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-99). / Abstract in Chinese and English. / Fang Lixin. / Chapter 第一章 --- 引言 --- p.7 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 基本問題 --- p.7 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 存在物與刹那 --- p.9 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 本文重點 --- p.13 / Chapter 第四部份 --- 研究方法 --- p.17 / Chapter 第二章 --- 「被產生的」存在物以「滅」為本性 --- p.18 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 正理派對「滅」的理解 --- p.19 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 以「滅」為本性 --- p.21 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 「被產生的」存在物之必然滅 --- p.23 / Chapter 第四部份 --- 「他因」不能產生「被產生的」存在物之滅 --- p.25 / Chapter 第一節 --- 滅為「非實非不實」 / Chapter 第二節 --- 滅的時間性 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「存在」即有「即時的因果效力」 --- p.39 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 反對者之存在的標準及其理論困難 --- p.41 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 以因果效力作為存在的標準 --- p.46 / Chapter 第一節 --- 因果效力之雙重意義 / Chapter 第二節 --- 因果效力與現量的關係 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 「不是被產生的」存在物沒有因果效力 --- p.55 / Chapter 第四章 --- 存在物間的關係 --- p.64 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 刹那的存在物與「變化」 --- p.66 / Chapter 第二部份 --- Yogasena的批評從中觀立場出發 --- p.70 / Chapter 第一節 --- 《中論》對刹那滅學說的批評 / Chapter 第二節 --- Yogasena的批評 / Chapter 第三節 --- Yogasena之批評的影響 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 回應 --- p.78 / Chapter 第一節 --- Yogasena對《攝》中刹那滅理論的誤解 / Chapter 第二節 --- 中觀並不否定存在物為刹那滅 / Chapter 第五章 --- 結論 --- p.89 / 略號及參考書目 --- p.94

本文研究的主題是後期印度佛教哲學中關於外部對象是否實在的爭論。主要依據妙護（Śubhagupta）的《成立外部對象論》（Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā)和寂護（Śāntarakita）及其弟子蓮華戒（Kamalaśīla）《攝真實論疏》第23品〈考察外部對象〉兩本文獻。 / 原子論和直接知覺論是妙護素樸實在論的兩大基石。原子是外部對象存在的實體要素，而直接知覺論則為如何認識外部對象提供知識論上的依據。原子是構成外部對象的不可見、不可再分的最小實體，當眾多同種類原子聚集在一起時，它們由於實體性的能力而凝聚成為可認知的「粗大」對象。另一方面，認識的本性是「識別」，就是主體（識）直接認知外部對象。認識本身並不具有對象的形象，只是當認識發生時，它就獲得了與外部對象一致的形象。妙護的知覺論蘊含了外部對象與認識之間確定的因果關係。他以為，對象（原因）與識（結果）必須是兩個不同的東西，結果不能以自身為原因而產生。所以，認識活動一定是以自己之外的其他對象作為原因，後者既是令識生起的條件，同時也給予了識自己的形象。妙護認為「效果作用的一致性」是判斷真知覺與幻覺的標準。所謂「一致性」是指認識通過形象獲得外部對象以及認識對象具有與外部對象一致的特定功能。 / 寂護從觀念論和懷疑論的角度批判妙護的理論並不能證成外部對象的存在。他說，妙護也同意感官體驗直接知覺到的不是原子，而是「粗大」的對象；但他又不能從理論上自洽地解釋單個、無部分的原子是如何過渡到成爲有部分（即空間性）的知覺對象。其次，妙護的直接知覺論也無法證明外部對象與認識之間具有必然的因果聯係。因爲，假如認識的形象原來就不存在，那麽外部對象其實是與認識完全分離的東西，形象既不是令識生起的實體，也不能夠對認識產生實際的作用。換句話說，對象與認識之間不曾發生實質性的關聯。寂護以為認識的本質就是自我意識，如同光的明照性一般，它不是主體（識）去認知對象的二元模式，也不依賴任何外部對象而存在；認識活動中效果作用的一致性則可以通過認識的自我相續來解釋。 / In the present thesis, I discuss a debate on the reality of external objects in late Indian Buddhist philosophy. I focus on two texts, one is "The Establishment of External Objects (Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā)" written by Śubhagupta, the other is a chapter named as "The Examination of The External Objects (Bahirarthaparīkā)" in "Commentary on The Summary of Truth (Tattvasagrahapañjikā)" written by Śāntarakita and his disciple Kamalaśīla. / Śubhagupta’s point of view can be regarded as the naive realism. He thinks that external objects are constituted by the aggregation of atoms which are the ontological substances. An individual atom is invisible and without parts. Thus, atoms cannot become the cognitive objects until they are aggregated together as a gross because of the power of substance. The gross arouses the form of blue etc. in cognition which is formless in nature. Although the form of blue is not real, it is based on the real substance and consistent with external objects. The characteristic of cognition is to grasp external objects directly. According to Śubhagupta, cognition cannot be produced by itself; it must be aroused by other things, just like sprouts cannot be produced by themselves but by the seeds in reality. External object served as a cause should be satisfied with two conditions: it is a real substance which has real capacity and a real perceivable object. Based on this theory, Śubhagupta believes that the existence of the external objects is a standard to distinguish the perception from the hallucination such as a dream, because the object of perception must be consistent with the external object. The consistency means that external object is acquired by the cognition and the cognitive object has the definite function according to a real object. / On the stand point of idealism and skepticism, Śāntarakita argues that the gross of atoms should not have shape as well, because the atoms are without parts in nature. Moreover, if the cognitive forms only come from external objects which are material substances, then cognition cannot recognize anything; because the matter and the cognition are totally different entities and cognition itself is formless in nature. Śāntarakita argues that if a form in cognition is not real at all, it will neither be a substance to arouse the cognition nor have the power to make effects on cognition. That is to say, the external objects cannot be the causes of cognition, because there is not causal relationship between them. Thus, the cognitive objects should not coincide with external objects which have not been established yet. The consistency of definite function of objects will be explained by the continuity of our own consciousness. Śāntarakita believes that the cognition in nature is self-cognizing, just like a light illuminates itself. The cognitive form and the cognition are definitely perceived together as one entity. They are not separated from each other. Thus, the cognition itself does not rely on any causality such as the relationship between the grasping and grasped aspects. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 茅宇凡. / Parallel title from added title page. / Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-157). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Mao Yufan.