In this thesis, I hope to make a small contribution to the study of of Chinese Buddhism. The preliminary discussion in the first and second chapters takes the form of a historiographical overview of some concepts that developed within the Three-Treatise tradition of Chinese Buddhism between the 5th and 6th centuries. This serves to illuminate the intellectual practices of this unique tradition of thought, which has been largely underrepresented in Western-language studies of Buddhism. In the subsequent chapter, I will clarify the exposition of these ideas within Master Jízàng’s commentary on the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikās《中論》, the Zhōngguānlùn-shū《中觀論疏》 (completed in 608 C.E.). The examination of this work and its immediate contexts promises to shed light upon the development of Mādhyamika thought in East Asia, especially with regards to the basic exegetical strategies of the Three Treatise tradition. The third and fourth chapters elucidates Jízàng’s interpretation and commentary upon two seminal chapters within Nāgārjuna’s Zhōnglùn, the “Contemplation of the Three Characteristics”〈觀三相品〉 and the “Contemplation of Time”〈觀時品〉. The content of these two chapters reflect the doctrinal and philosophical diversity of the intellectual terrain in early 7th-century China. Jízàng’s analysis in these chapters unfolds into a systematic refutation of the “false doctrines” of the Indian Ābhidharmika sects, which, in turn, illuminate the divergent intellectual currents of Jízàng’s milieu, as well as revealing the encyclopedic breadth of Jízàng’s Zhōngguānlùn-shū as well as other monumental commentarial works of the period. The examination of Jízàng’s refutation of the Sarvāstivādins in the fourth chapter – an as of yet unexplored facet of his considerable corpus – serves to enlarge our current comprehension of both Chinese intellectual culture during this critical juncture in Chinese history, and to enrich our understanding of the variegated exegetical and philosophical approaches of the great thinkers of 6th- and 7th-century China.

本篇論文主要是以藏傳佛教的格魯派所詮釋的中觀應成派思想，來反思Axel Honneth批判理論。雖然兩者都共同關懷如何解決現實的痛苦，都努力提出一個能夠具體解決當前人類不滿的實踐方案，但由於兩者所辨認的痛苦成因有所差異，因此提出了不同的解決之道。本篇論文站在中觀應成派「二諦」的角度，認為Honneth所提出的批判理論並沒有正確地辨認出痛苦的根源「自性執」，而僅僅提出了「世俗諦」層次的解決方案，因而無法真正地對症下藥，從根源之處解決痛苦。 本篇論文企圖論證以下兩個命題：第一，我們必須正確地掌握「作為痛苦的根源的自性執」，如果不透過這個步驟，就沒有辦法根本地解決痛苦。進一步我們應該要了解到，Honneth批判理論本身也是自性空的，否則一個企圖解決痛苦的理論資源，本身反而就是增加痛苦根源的一部份。第二，由於「黑格爾左翼的批判理論」所提倡的「具體地提出具有交互主體性的解決痛苦的實踐方案」這個訴求是作為中觀應成派與批判理論的共同關懷，因此，我也企圖說明從「二諦」的觀點出發，並不會與這個基本關懷相衝突，如此一來，就能夠說明以中觀應成派的二諦作為分析基礎，是具有社會實踐的潛力的。 為了論證這兩個命題，本文的章節安排如下。首先，第一章作為導論，說明全篇文章的論證架構。第二章則說明Honneth所定位的批判理論，即「黑格爾左翼」及其重要的概念「內在超越」的意涵。這樣的方法論特別強調了「對當前的痛苦提出具體的實踐性解決方案」的訴求。在第三章中，我把焦點放在Honneth所提出的「為承認而鬥爭」的批判理論模型，主要的目的是概要出承認理論的根本命題。在第四章中，我會討論中觀應成派的幾個主要概念，即「所破」和「二諦」，希望透過這三個概念能夠概要出格魯派思想的核心，並以此為基礎來形成反省Honneth批判理論的基礎架構。第五章則具體地說明「Honneth承認理論各個概念的空性」。我將從中觀應成派的思想中，提取較為相關的討論來進行說明，包括了「『人』無自性」、「『行動與行動者』無自性」、「『貪欲與貪者』無自性」以及「『苦』無自性」等等討論，這些都是對應於Honneth承認理論的核心概念而來。第六章為結論，以前五章的討論為基礎，重新說明上述的兩個命題。 / In this thesis, I want to reflect Axel Honneth's critical theory through Tibetan Buddhism dGe Lugs pa, founded by Tsongkhapa in the fourteen century, who followed and expounded the thought of prAsaGgika-mAdhyamika. Both Honneth and dGe Lugs pa are focusing how to comfort people's suffering realistically and practically. However, by means of the thought of dGe Lugs pa, especially the view of two-truths, we could point out that Honneth's approach would fail to solve the problem causing people's suffering completely, because he did not recognize the real cause of the suffering. In the view of dGe Lugs pa, our suffering is resulted from the innate ignorance in our consciousness which grasps everything as existing truly and inherently. I want to prove two propositions in this thesis: in the first place, I argue that we can't really comfort our suffering completely unless we recognize the true cause of the suffering, the ignorance of seeing things inherently existing, and transform it rightly by means of understand that everything is empty of inherent existence without exception. I will reflect Honneth's critical theory and find that all essential concepts of his theory of recognition are empty of inherent existence. Secondly, I argue that if we rightly understand dGe Lugs pa's thought, we would not abandon the goal of practically resolving the problems causing people's suffering, which is the common interest of Axel Honneth and dGe Lugs pa. In order to prove these two propositions, I arrange the thesis into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to the thesis's main arguments. The following two chapters focus on Honneth's critical theory: in chapter two I will illustrate the so called " left-Hegelianism", by this concept Honneth emphasis the critical theory which is directed to diagnosis the social pathology, and accordingly transform it practically through social praxis; the third chapter will elaborate the model of "struggle for recognition", which is founded by Honneth to revive the left-Hegelianism critical theory at the present time. In chapter four I will illustrate some essential concepts of dGe Lugs pa, including the concept of svabhAva, two-truths and bodhicitta. Through these illustrations I want to found the tool for pointing out the misrecognition of the cause of suffering in Honneth's critical theory, and explain the dGe Lugs pa's alternative solution to the problem causing people's suffering. In fifth chapter, some reasoning using for proving the emptiness of inherent existence will be expounded, the concepts which we want to show empty of inherent existence are: "I", persons, actor, act, suffering, the person who suffers, desirous one and the desire. These concepts are those essential for Honneth's critical theory. By means of understanding the emptiness of these concepts, we will understand those concepts Honneth used for constructing his theory are empty of inherent existence. In chapter six, the conclusion of this thesis, I will use the resources illustrated in above five chapters to restate the two propositions arguing in the introduction.