本研究透過代理理論並考量內生性因素來探討高階主管薪酬結構與企業研發支出間之關聯性。實證結果指出權益型薪酬與股票紅利佔個人總薪酬之比率均對研發支出有正向影響，此顯示出高階主管為增加股票紅利的價值，故會重視研發支出所帶來的效益，也較不會有刪減研發費用等短視行為。在股票紅利方面，當經理人持股比率越高時，其利益會和股東越趨於一致，故企業可以不用透過股份基礎報酬來減少經理人的短視行為，此論點支持利益收斂假說，因此企業應該重視經理人薪酬制度，進而設計出一套合理的薪酬制度來增加高階主管之工作誘因，並增進經理人與股東間共同的利益目標，用以減少代理問題與監督成本。 最後，本研究亦探討在2008年實施員工分紅費用化後，台灣企業是否會因應員工分紅費用化，而改變高階主管薪酬之結構。經由實證結果可知在員工分紅費用化之後，企業會因認列較多的薪資費用而降低盈餘，致使股價下跌且亦讓每股盈餘大幅稀釋，故會減少公司股份的價值，因而發放給高階主管較少之員工認股權、股票紅利與權益型之股份基礎的報酬，轉而給予較多現金基礎的報酬。 / This paper examines the interaction between corporate executive compensation structure and R&D investment decisions during year 2005 to 2008. Considering the endogenesis between compensation and R&D expenditure, that I use two–stage limited method. The empirical results indicate that the percentage of equity-based compensation and stock bonuses to total executive compensation exhibits positive influences on R&D investments, which support the hypotheses that the executives are rewarded based on changes in the stock price to induce a long-term focus on R&D investments. Besides, in respect of the percentage of stock bonuses, the result demonstrates that managerial ownership helps to align manager’s interest with the interest with of stockholder; therefore, corporations decrease the use of equity-based compensation to curb the myopic investment behavior, which supports the convergence of interest hypothesis. This suggests that corporations should design their executive compensation policy appropriately to motivate managers, and improve the alignments between managements and stockholders. Finally, the empirical results also show that after the mandating expensing of employee bonus expense in 2008, corporations recognize that equity-based compensation reduces earnings and dilutes shares price and earnings per share; thus, corporations use more cash-based compensation than equity-based compensation, such as stock option and stock bonus.