在公平價值會計下，對於一般投資人而言，評價品質是投資人關注的重要面向，但由於投資人無法取得評價的細部資料，因此若能由公開的評價資訊，推估公司應有的價值，當有助於對該公司作出適當的投資決策。 本文利用理論推導以及英國上市地產公司實際的評價資料，主要探討三個研究議題：一是針對實務上有些公司委由外部評價人員評價，而有些卻由內部評價人員自行評價，本文希望能以理論推導的方式，分別探討投資人能夠區分評價品質的分離均衡，以及投資人不能區分評價品質的混同均衡，並發展實證模型來驗證理論模型的預測。二是相對於外部評價人員，由內部評價人員評價涉及盈餘管理的可能性較高。因此，本文探討在此種情境下，公司管理當局如何選擇評價人員、決定盈餘管理數額，查核會計師如何選擇查核努力程度，並分析可能影響盈餘管理程度的因素。三是延伸Ross (1977)的資本結構信號傳遞理論，探討除了負債比例外，評價品質是否有助於投資人正確推估公司價值。 主要的研究發現有四點：一是投資人能夠區分評價品質，除了與評價成本有關外，聲譽也是重要的考量。二是選擇由外部評價人員評價的公司，通常具有風險相對較小的企業特性，其受評資產價值變異程度較大而且外部評價人員評價相對較為精準。三為理論與實證上都支持由內部評價人員評價時，內部評價人員評估誤差變異程度相對資產價值變異程度愈小，則懲處成本對盈餘管理的負向影響愈小。而當公司內部人持股價值愈大時，其盈餘管理動機雖可能愈強烈，但一旦遭受懲處，懲罰成本對其影響將會愈大。當然，此結論有其政策意涵，具體作法除了可以加重盈餘管理的懲處外，更重要的是在政策上落實評價制度，讓評價資訊更為透明，才是根本解決盈餘管理問題之道。最後，本文實證發現評價品質可能才是傳遞公司價值的有效工具，評價品質應是有助於釐清投資人對公司價值的判斷。 / Fair values are used to measure some assets and liabilities more pervasively in recent years, but appraisal reports are not open to investors. Fundamentally, we view accounting information as having the potential to tell us about the valuation of the reporting firm’s common stock. This paper investigates whether appraisal quality is useful information to investors. The first purpose of this paper is to examine whether the market possesses full information about the activities of firms through appraisal quality. The second purpose of this paper is to analyze how management choose appraiser, propose earnings management and how auditors select audit effort to deter earnings management. In addition, we investigate the determinants of earnings management. By extending the incentive-signalling approach, the third purpose of this paper is to examine whether the investors can infer firm value from financial structure and appraisal quality. Our analytical and empirical results find that investors can discriminate high appraisal quality from low by estimation error volatility and firm’s reputation considerations. As to appraiser choice, we find that external appraisers are more likely to be hired by low-risk firms when the inherent volatility of investment property is larger and the relative estimation error volatility of external appraisers is smaller than that of internal ones. In addition to punishment cost, transparent appraisal information is essential to increase the reliability of appraisal estimate. By and large, appraisal quality is useful information to investors.