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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

二篇與公司財務相關之論文:資本結構與經理人薪酬 / Two essays on corporate finance: capital structure and executive compensation

林家帆 Unknown Date (has links)
本論文包含二篇與公司財務相關之文章,第一篇文章嘗試在考量總體經濟條件和公司生產力衝擊下,建構一個簡單結構式模型以探討公司之資本結構決策。特別的是,由該模型可得到公司最適負債比率與總體經濟條件衝擊之報酬波動性呈反向關係,惟公司最適負債比率與公司生產力衝擊之報酬波動性呈正向關係。第二篇文章係利用對稱寡占產業均衡模型,以探討產業內經理人薪酬決策之異質性。即使產業內所有公司皆為同質,在模型均衡下存在有些公司會採取激勵性薪酬,而其他公司則不採取激勵性薪酬。該模型預期當市場競爭性增加時,產業內公司經理人薪酬決策會更具異質性。此外,上述二篇文章皆分別以美國製造業資料進行實證,並且實證結果均符合其模型之預期。 / This dissertation proposes two essays about corporate finance. Essay one develops a simple structural model to investigate a firm’s capital structure choices in consideration of macroeconomic conditions and firm-level productivity shocks. The model particularly generates the implication that the optimal debt ratio is negatively correlated to the return volatility of macroeconomic conditions, but positively correlated to that of firm-level productivity. Essay two is contributed to explore the heterogeneity of the compensation decision within the industry by employing a symmetric oligopoly industry equilibrium model. Within the equilibrium some firms will adopt incentive pay while others will not, even though all firms are ex ante identical. The model predicts that there is more heterogeneity in the compensation decision as the intensity of market competition increases. Both of the two essays further provide empirical evidence of the US manufacturing industry to support the model implications.

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