本研究檢視以下兩項議題之研究：高管薪酬以及異常高管薪酬對職工工資的線性及非線性影響，以及所有權型態（國有企業與民營企業）對前述兩者關係之影響。而實證結果發現，高管薪酬及職工工資皆與公司績效呈正向相關，市場化程度高的地區亦會影響其薪酬水準。若以董事會獨立性與是否設立薪酬委員會做為公司治理良窳的指標則與高管薪酬的水準為正相關，但董事會獨立性與職工工資無關。另外與高管薪酬不同的是，機構投資人持股比率會提高職工工資的水準，但對高管薪酬的影響並不顯著。對所有權型態而言，在其他條件不變的情況下，國有企業的高管薪酬及職工工資皆大於非國有企業的高管薪酬。 最後，本研究對發現異常高管薪酬與職工工資的關係呈顯著正相關。而就任職於國有企業的職工與就職於民營企業的職工相比，若其服務企業的異常高管薪酬皆屬於每年前20%者，二組的職工工資並無顯著差異。但是，若其服務企業的異常高管薪酬皆屬於每年後20%者，則國有企業的職工工資會大於民營企業的職工工資。 / This study focuses on two issues: the effect of executive compensation and abnormal executive compensation on salary, and the effect of different ownership types on the relations of two types of compensation and salary. The empirical results show that executives and employees of companies with better performance enjoy higher compensation and salary. Moreover, the marketization level can affect the level of compensation and salary. The results also indicate that the independence level of boards of directors and the establishment of compensation committee both have a positive relationship with executive compensation. However, the independence level of the board of directors has no effect on salary. On the other hand, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors has a positive relationship with salary level, but has no effect on executive compensation. For all the ownership types, all other conditions remain constant, the executive compensation and salary of state-owned enterprises are higher than those of non-state enterprises. In conclusion, this study states that abnormal executive compensation has a positive relationship with salary level. There is no significant difference in salaries between state-owned enterprises and non-state enterprises if the abnormal executive compensation belongs to the top 20% of the sample each year. Conversely, if abnormal executive compensation belongs to the last 20% of the sample each year, the salary of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state enterprises.