當企業的經營面臨不確定的情況時，使用穩健原則固然是可靠的，但是公司如果過度的使用穩健原則來操縱財務報表，將使資產和盈餘嚴重低估和扭曲，因此反而會降低財務報表的可靠性以及攸關性。公司的財務報表是財務分析師預測的來源之一，故當公司的盈餘由於受到管理當局對會計保守程度之操縱而有較大波動幅度時，若分析師相信公司當期盈餘是對未來盈餘的無偏誤預測指標，則財務分析師將會被誤導。因此，公司的會計保守程度對分析師盈餘預測的誤差和不同分析師間對盈餘預測意見不一致之程度應該有重大的影響。 　　本文以民國90年至94年之上市公司為研究對象，經由迴歸模型來分析公司會計保守性與分析師盈餘預測誤差與盈餘預測分歧程度間之關係，以檢視財務分析師是否能察覺保守性會計對公司盈餘的影響而反映於其盈餘預測中。結果發現會計保守性對分析師盈餘預測屬性均有正向影響，表示財務分析師在預測公司未來盈餘時會對管理當局所選擇的會計保守程度加以評估，並考量管理當局利用會計保守性進行盈餘管理的情形，進而影響其對公司未來盈餘的預測。 / Management may overuse accounting conservatism to manage the financial statements and undervalue assets and earnings and reduce the reliability and relevance of financial statements though conservatism is an increasing trend in accounting practice. The conservative information may lead analysts to biased forecast when a company’s earning has high volatility. Consequently, the extent of accounting conservatism should have significant effect on the analysts’ earnings forecast errors and forecast dispersion. This study examines the relationship of accounting conservatism and analysts’ annual earnings forecast errors and forecast dispersion by using a sample of listed firms in Taiwan. The results show that accounting conservatism has a positive relationship with the analyst earnings forecast errors and forecast dispersion. It implies that financial analysts may evaluate the extent of accounting conservatism and make adjustment in earnings forecast.

本研究以中國2007年至2013年盈餘預測的A股上市公司為主體。探討管理當局發佈強制性盈餘預測的預測形態、預測誤差以及市場反應與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測管理當局能力是否影響到其對於強制性盈餘預告門檻的規避以及對於來年發佈自願性業績預測的意願。 實證的結果顯示管理當局能力越好其提供的強制性盈餘預測的形式越精準其預告資訊含量越多；再者，管理當局能力越好，其盈餘預測的誤差越低；實證結果也證明了市場對於能力較佳之管理當局所發佈的強制性盈餘預測的反應程度也較高。增額測試的結果顯示管理當局能力佳者盈餘品質較佳，具體表現為：相較於能力差的管理者，管理當局能力較好時不會通過盈餘管理去避免導因於產生增長50%或是下降50%而強制發佈盈餘預告的門檻。另外，管理當局能力越好，其在隔年度發佈自願性盈餘預測的幾率也越高。 關鍵詞：管理當局能力、強制性盈餘預測、預測形態、盈餘預測誤差、市場反應 / This thesis focuses on mandatory forecast issued from 2007 to 2013 in China and investigate whether managerial ability is related to mandatory forecasts types, forecast error and market reaction. Additionally, this thesis also examines whether managerial ability decrease the likelihood to avoid mandatory forecast thresholds. Finally, whether the managerial ability will increase the probability of issuing voluntary forecasts in the following year is an interesting but unsolved issue; I will fill the gap. Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to issue mandatory forecasts in the more precise type. As for the accuracy, the mandatory forecasts issued by better managers tend to have less error. I also find that managerial ability can promotes the informativeness of management earnings forecasts for the public. Additionally, high ability managers are less likely to avoid the thresholds of mandatory forecasts. Furthermore, better managers are more likely to issue voluntary forecasts in the following year of mandatory forecasts. Key Words: Managerial Ability, Mandatory Earnings Forecast, Forecast Format, Forecast Error, Market Reaction.