本文延續Nielsen, Raimondos-M□ller and Schjelderup (2003)一文所設立的兩國模型，來探討在會計分割法 (separate accounting)與公式化分配法 (formula apportionment)等兩種會計制度下，跨國企業與地主國政府使用單邊預先訂價協議時，對移轉價格之訂定與其所產生的效果。由結果得知，不論是採用哪種訂價方法，在預先訂價協議之下，所得到的移轉價格均會受到「談判力效果」、「稅負誘發效果」與「策略性效果」的影響，其中「談判力效果」是預先訂價協議模型的特色，當「談判力效果」為正值，代表提高移轉價格將使地主國的社會福利增加，反之當「談判力效果」為負值，則提高移轉價格將使地主國的社會福利下降。 此外，跨國企業與地主國政府哪一方的談判力愈高，愈可以訂定對其有利的移轉價格。當地主國政府完全沒有談判能力時，跨國企業對於移轉價格有絕對的決定權，則利用預先訂價協議所決定的移轉價格會與Nielsen, Raimondos-M□ller and Schjelderup (2003)一文所得出的結論相同，亦即「談判力效果」為零。 而在預先訂價協議的應用上，跨國企業方面，因為跨國企業藉由犧牲部分利潤，以換取稅負的穩定，所以其利潤在使用預先訂價協議時會比較小。而地主國政府只要擁有部分的談判力，其社會福利在使用預先訂價協議時會比較大。由此可知「預先訂價協議」是一種對雙方都有利的談判。

我國於2004年底完成「營利事業所得稅不合營業常規移轉訂價查核準則」之發布作業，其中內容對於預先訂價協議亦有詳細的規範，其目的在減少移轉訂價事後查核所引發的爭議及所造成的行政負擔。鑑於我國預先訂價協議制度，與其他先進國家及中國大陸之制度有很大的不同，因此，本研究透過國內外文獻及先進國家與我國對預先訂價協議處理之比較分析來檢視我國預先訂價協議制度可能遭遇的困難及解決之道，並對與中國大陸簽署雙邊APA之可行性加以探討。 / 本研究發現我國預先訂價協議制度和國外相比較有很大不同，其中包括設定苛刻及高門檻的申請條件、裁量權極大的初審機制、而無供雙向溝通之預備會談機制、亦無專設之小組專門處理APA之申請案、雙邊或多邊APA申請程序付之闕如，以及不能追溯以前年度尚未核定之案件等。這些不同，都將是日後推廣簽訂單邊、雙邊或多邊APA之障礙。 / In the end of the year 2004, our country issued “Regulations Governing Assessment of Profit-seeking Enterprise Income Tax on Non-arm’s Length Transfer Pricing (TP Regulations).” For the purposes of reducing the disputes and administrative burden caused by the post audits relating to transfer pricing issues, there are some provisions grouped into a proper chapter for regulating an APA program in TP Regulations. In view of the big differentials of the APA programs between in Taiwan and in some other progressed countries and in Mainland China, this study is expected to view and test our APA program to see if any difficulties to be encountered and resolved through comparing and analyzing domestic and foreign publications and also studies the possibilities to conclude bilateral APA with Mainland China. / This study lists some big differentials while comparing APA program in Taiwan with that in foreign countries. Such differentials include setting some conditions severe and high threshold for application, initial examination device solely controlled by tax authorities but no prefiling conferences for developing two ways’ communications, neither proper APA teams in a tax authority nor special procedures for dealing with bilateral and multilateral APA, as well as no rollback of transfer pricing method and etc. Those big differentials will limit the future development of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral APA in Taiwan.

中國大陸移轉訂價法規起步較晚，但近年來中國積極防堵並加大查核力度，在大部分操作方式都被阻絕的情況下，台商僅剩「保留合理利潤」一途。如何在這個前提下達到利潤最大化並降低稅務風險，是本研究探討的問題。依本研究之結論，獲得以下之結論: 一、透過集團組織重組，建立集中化管理模式，依照各公司功能及風險考量，分配合理利潤。 二、在考量風險下，透過預先訂價協議及成本分攤協議以降低稅務風險。 三、建立符合各國法規之集團訂價策略，掌握各國稽核重點，制定集團統一的溝通及防禦策略，事先做好同期資料及相關文據以供備查。 / The development of regulations with respect to transfer pricing was started late in China, however, China took positive actions to avoid transfer pricing and enforced the rules more strictly in recent years. Therefore, the Taiwanese investors only have the way of “remaining the reasonable profit” in the event of that most of the operating models have been prohibited. How to obtain the maximun benefit and lower the tax risk in such situation are the objectives and questions of this study. According to this research, the conclusion is as below: 1. To allocate the reasonable profit by group restructuring and setting the centralized management mode in accordance with consideration in function and risk of each corporation. 2. To lower the tax risk through advance pricing agreements and cost sharing agreements in consideration of the risk. 3. To build the group pricing strategy which is accordance with the regulations of each filed, controlling the inspection focus of each countries, setting the group strategy for communication and defense, and preparing the same period information and other related documents for future reference.