In the first part of the dissertations, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy'movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways.

We have made a comparative study of the ethical and moral teachings of two great thinkers - one British and the other Indian: Joseph Butler and Liadliusudana Sarasvati. They were selected because there is substantial agreement between them on the basis of virtue, the concept of duty, on the relation between ethics and religion and on the fundamental topics. In the first half of the thesis we have given an exposition of Butler's moral philosophy explaining the hierarchy of the different principles of action in human nature and Butler's refutation of Hobbes's psychological egoism. We have also tried to determine whether virtue, according to Butler, can be equated with self-love or benevolence and then to establish the nature of conscience according to him. The discussion has been concluded by showing that virtue, in his view, is its own end and is to be pursued for its own sake. In the second half we have first discussed Madliusudana' s ethics and then compared the two thinkers. In explaining Madliusadana' s ethics it has been shown that virtue according to him lies in doing the duties of the station to which one belongs in life. In other words it means doing one's caste- duties, which are determined by one's fundamental nature. Neither self-love nor benevolence are permissible motives for actions. An action is to be done because it ought to be done. Lastly it has been shown that according to Hadliusudana morality ultimately culminates in the realisation of God. 'Follow-nature' is the dictum of both thinkers. Virtue lies in acting according to nature and vice in deviation from it. Again they both advocate the cultivation of benevolence though with a difference in the psychological attitude. A comparison has also been drawn between Butler's conscience and Madhusudana's enlightened intellect (buddhi). Finally it has been shown that according to both the ultimate object of man's search is God Himself.

Abu'l-Barakat's philosophy is determined by his critical attitude against the Aristotelian philosophy on one hand and by his appeal to the immediate perceptions of the mind on the other. He was born at Balad nearby Bagdad in 465 A.H./1074 A.D. Having studied at Bagdad, towards the end of his life, he became a Muslim either out of wounded pride or out of fear. He classified sciences into the sciences of existing things which include Physics and Metaphysics; and the sciences of mentally related forms, i.e., Psychology; and the science of sciences, i.e. Logic. Space, according to him, is conceived in the mind prior to everything else as tridimensional, and as capable of being full or empty. The prime matter is identical with the corporeal body. In his theory of motion, his originality lies in his explanation of the motion in the void, accelerated motion, and the quies media. His revolutionary attitude is perhaps best exemplified in his Psychology. According to him, we have an immediate perception of our soul together with existence and time. Every theory which explains soul in terms of faculties or forces is repugnant to him in the Metaphysics, Abu'l-Barakat identifies universals with the mental form. The forms that exist in the mind of God are the causes of the things existing in external reality. God is the direct existentiating cause of everything. Existence, which forms one of our primary apperceptions, is superadded to the things that are existent. Existence, and existent are identified in God. His conception of God is determined by his human psychology. The difference between God and man is one of degree. He identifies celestial bodies with ' angels'. They are the preserver of the species, guides and instructors, Avicenna, having eliminated the difficulties inherent in time, held that time is a measure of motion with respect to prior and posterior. He stressed the continuous nature of time,. Time, eternal duration, and perpetuity belong to the different domains of the universe, Avicenna, by identifying time with the continuity itself, however, may have prepared the way for the identification of time with duration. I n Hellenistic philosophy, this trend started as a reaction against the Aristotelian view. In al-Kindl, we find the traces of Abu'1-Barakat's theory. According to him, the time of a corporeal body is the duration of its existence. Iranshahrl, and al-Razx, under the influence of Galenidentify time with duration, and divide it into absolute and limited. This trend culminates in Abu'l-BaraJcat's theory of time. He puts time, existence, and soul on the same plane in so far as our primary consciousness of them is concerned. Time, being inseparable from existence, must be defined as the measure or the dimension of existence rather than as that of motion. God, being the existence per se, cannot be beyond time. Time, duration, and perpetuity are all one and the same thing. By discarding these distinctions, he unifies the visible and spiritual worlds. The difference between them is only one of degree, otherwise they are closely related to each other.

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The aim of this thesis is to consider the relationship between philosophy and biography, and the bearing that this relationship has on debates concerning the nature and function of philosophy. There exists a certain tradition that conceives philosophy exclusively in terms of rational discourse and as such explicitly rejects the idea of any substantial relationship between philosophy and the way in which one lives. I shall argue that the claim that philosophy cannot have any impact upon biography is often based upon an implicit conception of philosophy as primarily rational discourse. In contrast to this I shall draw upon Socratic and Stoic philosophical resources in order to reconstruct an alternative conception of philosophy as an art concerned with one's way of life. Central to this conception will be the relationship between philosophical discourse or argument and philosophical training or exercise. I shall argue that the ancient claim that philosophy is primarily expressed in one's behaviour presupposes a conception of philosophy as an art that involves both rational discourse and training or exercise as two equally important components. I shall argue that by adopting this alternative conception of philosophy as a techne it will be possible to understand properly the relationship between philosophy and biography. In Part One I shall outline the ancient idea that philosophy is something expressed in one's life, the Socratic conception of philosophy as an art, the Stoic development of this conception into an art of living, and some ancient objections to this Stoic conception. In Part Two I shall examine the relationship between philosophical discourse and exercises in Stoic philosophy, focusing upon the neglected concept of philosophical askesis. Central to this will be the literary form of such exercises and so I shall focus upon two texts (by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius) concerned with philosophical exercises.

Bibliography: leaves 358-383 / v, 383 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1986

Submitted by Elizabete Silva (elizabete.silva@ufes.br) on 2014-10-08T20:16:07Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao.texto.Aline Eduardo.pdf: 1043111 bytes, checksum: 6b3b34538cd2c632064f01ab71e5d670 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Elizabete Silva (elizabete.silva@ufes.br) on 2014-11-24T18:53:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao.texto.Aline Eduardo.pdf: 1043111 bytes, checksum: 6b3b34538cd2c632064f01ab71e5d670 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-11-24T18:53:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao.texto.Aline Eduardo.pdf: 1043111 bytes, checksum: 6b3b34538cd2c632064f01ab71e5d670 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Realizamos uma análise da atividade da Consciência Infeliz (unglücklichesBewusstsein), tal como foi exposta por G.W.F. Hegel em sua obraFenomenologia do Espírito(PhänomenologiedesGeistes), de 1807.A Consciência Infeliz é uma denominação hegeliana referente a uma consciência religiosa que se cinde em duas; um destes seus lados, ela aliena de si e tem por sua essência que reside no além, o Imutável; ao outro lado, ela mesma, assevera como o Mutável, inessente, residente no aquém. Toda a sua atividade resume-se a unir isto que ela põe como o infinitamente desunido, a saber, ela e sua essência, pois a consciência ainda não é ciente de que esta essência absoluta que ela opôs a si mesma nada mais é do que ela mesma. Isto resulta num tender singular para seu objeto Universal absoluto e ao mesmo tempo não querer maculá-lo com esta sua singularidade; numa atividade que deve absolutamente ser e não-ser, busca de algo que não pode nem deve ser buscado. Enquanto herdeira do pensamento estóico e cético, a Consciência Infeliz aparece como consciência contraditória, curvada sobre si mesma e sempre dolorida, que além de efetivar um movimento de negação para com o mundo do aquém e tudo o que lhe diz respeito, busca se libertar da dor que é ser portadora desta contraditoriedade que surge justamente daquela sua atitude negativa. A fim de que possamos fundamentar esta atitude Infeliz, realizamos em nosso primeiro capítulo uma investigação acerca de suas características peculiares nas esferas anteriores ao seu aparecimento, a saber, a esfera do Entendimento (Verstand), a dialética do Senhor e do Escravo e do Estoicismo e Ceticismo. No segundo capítulo, discorremos acerca do conceito e da atividade da Consciência Infeliz, bem como procuramos investigar a necessidade de sua superação a partir de uma análise de sua suprassunção no momento da Razão (Vernunft). Por fim, em nosso terceiro e último capítulo, procuramos refletir sobre em que medida se poderia afirmar que as consciências contemporâneas continuam agindo de maneira infeliz, e para tanto, nos apoiamos em breves leituras de S. Freud, pensador do ―mal-estar‖ moderno e Z.Bauman, pensador do ―mal-estar‖ contemporâneo. / We carried out an analysis of the Unhappy Consciousness (unglücklichesBewusstsein), such expounded by G.W.F.Hegel in his 1807 publication Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes). Unhappy consciousness is a Hegelian term referring to religious consciousness that is divided into two: on one of its halves, it is alienated from itself, and its essence — the immutable — dwells beyond; the other half, itself, is asserted by the mutable, the ―un-essence‖, which dwells here.All its activity is summarized into uniting what is proposed as infinitely disunited to knowledge, and consciousness to its essence; because consciousness is not yet aware that this absolute essence it opposed to itself is nothing but itself. This results in a single trend towards the absolute universal object which, at the same time, does not aim at maculating it with its singularity; in an activity that should absolutely be and not to be, it searches for something that neither can nor should be sought. As heir of stoic and skeptical thought, unhappy consciousness appears as contradictory consciousness, bending over itself and constantly sore, which besides realizing a movement of denial towards the world of here and all it concerns, it seeks to get rid of the pain inherent to this inconsistency that emerges exactly from its negative attitude. In order to provide grounds for this unhappy attitude, our first chapter of investigations is carried out on peculiar characteristics of spheres prior to its rise, i.e. sphere of Understanding (Verstand), Master-Slave dialectic and Stoicism and Skepticism dialectic. In the second chapter, we discuss the concept and activity of unhappy consciousness, and also investigate the need of overcoming it based on analyses of its suppression at the moment of Reason (Vernunft).Finally, in our third chapter, we seek to reflect on to what extent it would be possible to say that contemporary consciousness continues to operate in an unhappy way. For this purpose, we find basis on short readings of S. Freud — the modern "illness" thinker, and Z. Bauman — contemporary ―illness‖ thinker.

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Frank M. Verzuh. / "March 8, 1949." / Bibliography: p. 10. / Army Signal Corps Contract No. W36-039-sc-32037 Project No. 102B Dept. of the Army Project No. 3-99-10-022