How are we to think creation today when such an act is understood as the making of something out of nothing? Insisting that genuine creation happens ex nihilo brings us into direct confrontation with much of contemporary philosophical thought, be it critical or analytic, since the latter predominantly rules out the possibility of making reasonable statements about nothingness, or, indeed, about any kind of radical outside to what exists. This thesis attempts to formulate a speculative, rudimentary model of creation that proceeds from the consequences of affirming the possibility to not only think a radical outside, but to also instantiate ‘some’ of the latter in the form of genuine novelty. The terms for this model are developed from, and via a close examination of, Alain Badiou’s Being and Event and Logics of Worlds. Ultimately, however, it becomes necessary to take a critical distance to Badiou’s system on the basis of some foundational inconsistencies that arise from his unrelenting Platonism. In its place, this thesis proposes an alternative generic conception of creation, which, although following Badiou’s idea of subjective formalisms, transposes the latter onto a materialist foundation with the help of Quentin Meillassoux’s work in After Finitude and the late work of Michel Foucault. It is then demonstrated how this new model can itself be materially effective, or, more specifically, how its enactment in any particular world can be thought to work. The argument is also made, contra Badiou, that the event – that which establishes the possibility for radical difference – is something we can intentionally induce or work towards. In summary, the aim of this thesis is to reinvigorate the notion of radical novelty and the process of its instantiation through the act of creation. In doing so it proposes a rational basis for the belief that genuinely different worlds are indeed possible – and how such possibilities can be thought, occasioned and enacted.

Exposing the Event dissertation sets up the curatorial as an aesthetic investigative practice able to read the representations and manifestations of the ‘new’—and what they efface—in the expanded field of cultural activity. Through a curatorial approach the ‘new’ is examined as a constellation of aesthetic manifestations and exposures, only able to signify under an apparatus that renders them visible, sayable and thinkable (Rancière, 2004). Considering a historical event as a cultural manifestation of the new, the Portuguese Revolution (1974-1976) serves as the framework of this investigation. The three chapters draw on visual and aural material—documentary, essay and militant cinema—of the Portuguese Revolution, made during the PREC (Ongoing Revolutionary Process) and in the present. Chapter One introduces the film Torre Bela (Harlan, 1977) set in Portugal during the Carnation Revolution, in order to problematise the mechanisms of ‘event’ production as an unexpected manifestation of a historical new. Chapter Two explores the notion of the ‘return of the secret gaze’ (Kuster, 2007) in order to disclose a multiplicity of layers of representation in the exhibitionary space of Torre Bela. Chapter Three addresses the ‘right to narrate’ unmoving histories through Grada Kilomba’s intervention in the film Conakry (César, 2013) and the haunted memories of Ventura in Horse Money (Costa, 2014). The proposed readings aim to address the ‘non-revolted’ affects of the post-revolutionary present. A series of transcriptions, images and performative texts are woven into the dissertation. These materials include an interview with Pedro Costa (2015), and an array of stills from Torre Bela (1977). Their insertion aims to animate the curatorial as an investigative practice capable of intersecting different registers of material and set them in dialogue.

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The thesis is intended primarily as an essay in method. It is an attempt to determine the 'philosophical significance of the very varied data of Aesthetics, e.g. Metaphysical theories of the nature and status of Beauty, psychological analysis of experience, etc. This involves in the first place the discovery of the correct starting-point and leads to a discussion of the false simplification which may arise if the metaphysical question is introduced too soon. The theories of lascelles Abercrombie, Clive Bell Croce and Kant are criticised from this point of view. The possibility is next discussed of finding the correct starting-point in either the analysis of objects or of experience. An examination of theories such as those of the psycho-analysts, of S. Alexander and of W. McDougall leads to the conclusion that the correct starting-point lies in the analysis of a range of situations in which both objects and experiences are involved. These situations involve an Aesthetic Judgment of one kind or another and can best be understood through the analysis of the Judgment. The generally accepted form of the Judgment -"This is beautiful" - is taken and the conclusion is reached that it is far more important to understand the reference of the "This" than the meaning of the predicate. The relevant situations seem to be of four chief types. An attempt is made to determine what is common to all. The concept of Externalisation is suggested and its relation to such concepts as Bullough's "Psychical Distance" and Richards' "Equilibrium" is discussed. The remainder of the thesis is devoted to the discussion of how externalisation is involved in the four types of situation, i.e. those yielding only the Aesthetic Minimum; the artists' process of Inspiration and Externalisation in a medium; the nature of the work of art and of the recipient's appreciation of it; and the experience of natural beauty.

A naturalistic or real essence conception of men and persons is developed and defended, and the inadequacies of alternative nominal essence conceptions, especially those which specify psychological or social criteria of personhood, are demonstrated. Part One of the thesis develops a version of Leibnizian essentialism. The attribution of de re necessary properties to objects is clarified and defended, and certain conceptual constraints on such attributions are argued for. The thesis that the origin of a material object confers essential properties on it is considered and rejected. Part Two uses the theoretical framework of natural-kind or substance based essentialism in considering such issues as personal identity, euthanasia, abortion, free will and moral obligation. The conceptions of personhood implicit in the works of Aristotle, Kant, Marx and others, and some conceptions of personal responsibility, are also considered in relation to this essentialism.

This dissertation examines and clarifies Heidegger's contribution to our understanding of the important issues of self-deception and inauthenticity in psychotherapy. After some preliminary remarks on the concepts of inauthenticity and self-deception the first part of the dissertation explores Heidegger's fundamental ontology as detailed in 'Being and Time'. Dasein's temporal nature and its relationship to death are considered in the context of the central concept of Care (Sorge) and its basic structures of thrownness (Geworfenheit), falling (verfallen) and existence (Existenz). This leads to a discussion of the existentials of disposition (Befindlichkeit), anxiety (Angst), understanding (verstehen) and discourse (Rede). After this preliminary exposition Heidegger's views on inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) are explored, with a central focus on fallenness (verfallen) and its manifestations of idle talk (Gerede), curiosity (Neugier), ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) and self-forgetting (selbstvergessen). Now the scene is set for an investigation of Heidegger's views on how inauthenticity is overcome and the notion of truth (Wahrheit), anxiety (Angst), call of conscience (6ewissenruf) and resoluteness (Entschluss) are studied in some detail. This leads to a description of authentic ways of being in a situation (Situation), being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode), the moment of vision (Augenblick) and repetition (Wiederholung). A full summary of Heidegger's ideas is given before a critique is formulated in light of Sartre's views, Fingarettes contribution and Heidegger's later work. It emerges that there is no place for a theory of self-deception in Heidegger. His descriptions of inauthenticity and forgetting show untruth to be a matter of alienation (Entfremdung) and closing off (verschliessen) rather than a matter of deceit. The thesis shows the significance of this alternative point of view. It is argued that Heidegger's objective for Dasein is to have vision, which means to be capable of both authentic, owned and engaged ways of existing as well as inauthentic, disowned and disengaged ways of existing. In final analysis the challenge of human existence for Heidegger is about being true to life rather than being true to self. Being true to life is inevitably about the equiprimordiality and equality of both inauthentic and authentic ways of being. To be loyal to existence therefore involves increasing transparency and openness to different modes of being. The thesis' orginal contribution is to show that this is a sound and new objective for existential psychotherapy. At the same time Sartres and Fingarette s perspectives on self-deception highlight Heidegger's failure to address the issue of self-deception directly. This is shown to be due mostly to Heidegger's lack of focus on ontic issues, his refusal to consider a moral and ethical dimension to his work and his replacement of a theory of self with a description of Daseins world relations. While this is in some ways a strength and an original position that allows us to view human existence from a new perspective, it leaves doubt about what Heidegger could have made of the ontic issues raised by applying his ideas in counselling and psychotherapy. The thesis takes Heidegger's ontological theory to a new, ontic dimension and a practical and concrete application. Heidegger himself suggested in the Zollikon seminars that his thought should be so applied and the final part of the thesis is constituted by my published work, which has been dedicated to this project. The three books in which this application is described are enclosed together with the philosophical part of the dissertation and they are each briefly discussed in light of the argument about inauthenticity and self-deception. It is shown how the ontic realities of psychotherapy place new demands on Heidegger's thinking whilst Heidegger's thinking at the same time provides a challenging basis for therapeutic clarity about human existence.

This thesis offers a naturalist revision of Alain Badiou’s philosophy. This goal is pursued through an encounter of Badiou’s mathematical ontology and theory of truth with contemporary trends in philosophy of mathematics (mathematical structuralism) and philosophy of science (ontic structural realism). I take issue with Badiou’s inability to elucidate the link between the empirical and the ontological, and his residual reliance on a Heideggerian project of fundamental ontology, which undermines his own immanentist principles. I will argue for both a bottom-up naturalisation of Badiou’s philosophical approach to mathematics (insisting on an account mindful of the socio-biological roots of our mathematical abilities and concepts – brains to universe) and a top-down naturalisation (arguing that our best physical theories seem to indicate a collapse of the distinction between the mathematical and the non-mathematical – universe to brains). Articulating my particular understanding of what realism and naturalism should commit us to, I propose a creative fusion of Badiou’s attention to metamathematical results with a structural-informational metaphysics, proposing a ‘matherialism’ uniting the more daring speculative insights of the former with the naturalist and empiricist commitments motivating the latter.

This thesis explores attempts to characterise the structure of reality. Three notions stand out: Lewisian naturalness, Sider’s ‘structure’, and grounding, where the latter has become the most popular way to characterise the structure of reality in the contemporary literature. I argue that none of these notions, as they are currently understood, are suited for limning the metaphysical structure of reality. In the first part of the thesis I argue that, by the lights of the relevant theories, both naturalness and structure fall short of the theoretical role carved out for those posits. In the second part of the thesis I present two challenges to the ‘orthodox’ conception of grounding. The first contests the standard assumption that grounding is asymmetric, both by citing what I take to be best described as symmetric instances of grounding, and by developing and arguing for a new theory of metaphysical structure – ‘metaphysical interdependence’ – which takes grounding to be nonsymmetric. The second challenge concerns the relationship between grounding and (metaphysical) explanation, and leads to a dilemma for the grounding theorist. My proposed resolution to the dilemma is to adopt an antirealist approach to grounding, which I further motivate and develop in the final chapter.

Physical object ontology is a sub-branch of ontology which is primarily concerned with three interrelated issues. These are the composition, material constitution, and manner of persistence for physical objects. Philosophers who take up positions on such issues often disagree over what objects they think the world contains – for example a mereological nihilist will argue that there are no composite objects, and thus would say that the ordinary objects that appear to be all around us do not actually exist. Such disputes are thought to be substantive and depend for their truth on what the world itself is actually like. Against this Eli Hirsch develops a meta-ontological argument which states that the debates in physical object ontology are merely verbal, and that what is going in these debates is that each side is simply speaking an alternate language in which their claims come out trivially true and the claims of their opponent come out trivially false. Thus there is no actual disagreement over the facts. This position of Hirsch’s I call semanticism. The purpose of this thesis is to articulate Hirsch’s position, demonstrating its Carnapian roots, but also showing how Hirsch, by making several key commitments, intends his position to be distinctive from a thoroughgoing Carnapianism and its potentially unattractive commitments to anti-realism and/or verificationism. However, in this thesis I develop a number of problems for Hirsch’s position, showing that his modified version of Carnapianism is untenable, and that he is forced between giving up his central contention or retreating into a more thoroughgoing Carnapianism.