Numerous authors have argued that the world needs wisdom, but after decades of scholarship the concept remains unclear. The research challenge is that wisdom is a premodern notion (folksy, religious) relying largely on the tools of modernity (definition, measurement) to find a place in the postmodern world (polymorphous, multi-vocal). This thesis is a personal attempt to honour each of these perspectives, and to make the idea of wisdom more tractable and relevant. In part one, my literature review indicates that the field places undue emphasis on defining wisdom, requires more inter-disciplinary inquiry, and pays insufficient attention to the connection between the descriptive and normative aspects of wisdom. I indicate why wisdom persistently eludes a canonical definition and argue that wisdom is better understood as a meme. My method is a form of bricolage based on reflexivity, semistructured interviews about selected wisdom-related stories, and a scientifically informed theoretical argument. In part two, I position wisdom in relation to academic structures, especially the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I outline a view of human nature that helps to illuminate the process of becoming wiser, informed by theories of adult development and enactive cognition. I analyse the distinct epistemological challenges posed by wisdom, and argue that these are best accommodated through a constructivist view of knowledge. In part three, wisdom emerges as a process and product of transformative learning, best understood with respect to the idea of self, and the task of coming to experience its groundlessness. In part four, I examine seven natural constraints on this process; biological division, naive realism, self-deception, self-serving bias, negativity bias, groupthink, and status anxiety. I argue that overcoming these constraints is the challenge that the concept of wisdom illuminates.

This thesis is a study of security policy change in Finland in the post-Cold War world. It will investigate what policies have changed in Finland and will explain why they have changed by looking at the politics of security from both within the country and from without. It relies on some of more recent theoretical approaches in the disciplines of Security Studies and International Relations (lR) and uses Finland as a case study to test that theorising. The chosen theoretical approaches come within the Constructivist tradition, and attempt to explain why and how states and their security policies change by looking at the international environment, the domestic political situation, and the actors involved and importantly how they are all mutually constitutive. In doing so, this approach aims firstly to provide a more sociologically and historically attuned account of the state and society in the international environment than given by the more positivist schools of International Relations that dominated western academia through the Cold War. The chosen approach attempts to illuminate the political processes, including both negotiation and conflict, that produces security policy. Secondly the chosen approach plays down the centrality of the divide between internal and external, or domestic and international, in its account of states. As Erikson and Rhinard note (2009) it is becoming increasingly common over the last decade for studies of security to come "to grips with a particularly new, and challenging, aspect of security: the problematic divide between 'the internal' and 'the external"'(ibid:24). The chosen approach for this thesis could be said to be more one of 'world politics' than of 'international relations' in its attempt to go beyond that divide. Thirdly this approach tests how different normative assumptions amongst different security actors produce conflicting worldviews - that loosely can be seen as Hobbesian perspectives of international competition and conflict against Kantian views of transnational cooperation and peace. It considers how a country's security policy results from the various actors attempting to balance such conflicting views, how this balance reflects their political power - and how this negotiation can create aspects of security policies that are contradictory or paradoxical. This chapter will first, ask the fundamental questions of 'why should we study Finnish security policy?', noting the seeming paradox of modem, globally integrated, export- led EU member-state but a state where its security policy seems to have changed little since the Cold War. Next it considers existing literature that attempts to study and explain Finnish security policy, in particular noting the prevalence of geopolitics in these explanations but noting the obvious weaknesses in this popular approach. Thirdly, the chapter considers alternative International Relations theory approaches, rejecting the rationalist accounts of realism and arguing for an approach to this study more in the tradition of constructivism. Fourthly, and following on from the overall theory discussion, this chapter introduces the three hypotheses that form the central questions of this thesis.

This thesis concerns a posteriori knowledge of particular, contingent moral propositions (particular moral knowledge). It assumes that moral scepticism is false. Chapter One explains and motivates this assumption. On an inferentialist moral epistemology, particular moral knowledge is acquired by inference from other known moral principles and non-moral facts. On another inferentialist moral epistemology, particular moral knowledge is the result of inference to the best explanation of our moral observations. Chapter Two argues against both these views. In the last two chapters, I argue that there is some non-inferential particular moral knowledge. In Chapter Three, I argue that we have some moral knowledge by perceiving moral facts, such as the fact that those boys are being cruel to that cat, and this knowledge does not inferentially rest on non-moral evidence in any way distinctive to its moral content. On some theories of perception, perception is a rich source of non- inferential a posteriori knowledge of particular, contingent facts about the external world. Given such theories, I argue, we have some particular moral knowledge by perception. On some other theories, perception is still a rich source of a posteriori knowledge of particular, contingent facts about the external world but most such knowledge is inferential. Given theories of the latter sort, I argue, we have some particular moral knowledge by perception which is not inferential in any way distinctive to its moral content, but is inferential only in any way generic to most perceptual knowledge of the external world. In Chapter Four I argue that we have non-inferential knowledge of some moral facts, such as that Hitler was evil, by testimony. On some theories of testimony, it is a rich source of non-inferential a posteriori knowledge. On these theories, I argue, we have some non- inferential particular moral knowledge by testimony. On other theories of testimony, it is a rich source only of inferential a posteriori knowledge. On theories of the latter sort, I argue, we have some particular moral knowledge by testimony that is not inferential in any way distinctive to its moral content, but is inferential only in any way generic to most knowledge by testimony.

The topic of the present thesis is the relationship between science and participatory, egalitarian democracy. The thesis is a defence of communitarian epistemology as one that could fulfill the role of an epistemology conducive to society which is truly democratic, and where scientists involved in policy are held in check from forming unelected and unaccountable elites. The thesis begins with an exploration of the two main themes, those of science and of democracy. Some perceptions and features of science are explored, as well as a model of participatory democracy, the latter emerging from a criticism of influential conceptions of democracy. I conclude that it is important that lay people have an accurate perception of science and scientists, in order for scientists to possess an optimal position in a democratic society. The second chapter explores lay perceptions of science and scientists, using as a platform Eurobarometer, Pew Research and Public Attitudes to Science studies conducted in the last ten years. I conclude that current attempts at mapping out lay perceptions and understanding of science are deeply flawed, and that furthermore popularised science books often promote a misguided and inaccurate image of science and scientists. The third chapter explores how education for citizenship and science education can reinforce each other in producing citizens well-enough informed to be able to adjudicate and exert control over technically-laden decisions. Furthermore, some philosophical implications of the epistemology that I advocate are presented and defended. The fourth chapter consists of a presentation and defence of the two main theses of communitarian epistemology, deriving from current and historical scientific practice. The aim of this chapter is to defend communitarian epistemology as accurately explaining the social nature of the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge. The fifth chapter consists of a long defence of meaning finitism, a key element of communitarian epistemology, as well as a brief presentation and defence of a strong community thesis in normativity. Finally, in the last chapter I give an example of a "communitarian" field of science, through the presentation of sustainability science.

The object of study in my thesis are modern formal theories of truth. Against the back- ground of a vast literature, I survey the landscape from a met a-theoretic perspective, to ask the questions: What are the norms underlying theories of truth? What is the relation between the formal desiderata underlying a theory of truth, and the account of our in- tuitions about truth offered by that same theory? Is there a correct, or recomrnendable, methodology for constructing a theory of truth? To address these and related issues, in the first chapter I outline a proposal of what kinds of principles we should look for, when we look for the norms underlying a given theory of truth. Subsequently, I survey some of the most important of today's theories of truth, seeking to uncover their underlying norms. This occupies the main body of the thesis. In the last chapter, I bring together the results of my investigation. All the norms uncovered so far are collected into a unique list, from which a number of sublists are extracted that satisfy the condition of being maximal consistent. Each sublist is assessed as a candidate theory of truth. The results of these analyses inform a more concrete answer to some of the initial philosophical and methodological questions.

This study considers the significance of understanding and interpretation from a mainly hermeneutical point of view. I distinguish between understanding and interpretation in order to retain understanding's ontological character as an Existenzial, whilst giving interpretation the critical character needed in order to claim validity. Understanding and interpretation are deemed to have a valid basis which is needed since they ultimately culminate in self understanding as the ethical dimension. This ethical dimension is twofold: it requires the reader to engage with his values and understanding of a good life, and it demands the possibility for critical discussions of literary texts' interpretations. The place for self understanding can be found in the engagement with literary texts, and the forum for discussing the justification of interpretations with a more specific ethical dimension can be found in literary studies.

The present doctoral thesis consists in a study of the conditions of possibility of knowledge for a post-ecocidal age otherwise called Age of Re-Embodiments. The epistemological trajectory largely inaugurated by Socrates's equation of the beautiful with the intelligible is assumed as intrinsically ecocidcil. The figure of a transcendent God that reverts plurality back to one and becoming to being is taken as the operative metaphor that systematizes and provides coherence to the epistemological tradition. In assessing the official project of sustainable development as continuous with the latter, valuable cognitive artillery to proceed with our study is instead found in Nietzsche's work and that of part of his entourage -Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, Vattimo, Plotnitsky. Nietzsche's philosophy of the future and Derrida's set of undecidables are reworked as an anaiytics of transposition. The main remit of the transposition is that of reinscribing the solipsist positions -the conditions of possibility of knowledge-of eplsteme in the cultural matrix -the transposition or reconfigurative operator par excellence. Customarily, one finds positions hierarchizing their opposite poles -productivity/sustainable development, realism/constructivism, living organism/inert matter, theism/atheism, anthropocentrism/ecocentrism. Transpositions, subsequently renamed transposements, conform to the third figures of such dichotomous binary pairs. Each chapter revolves around one or a set of related transposements. Conjointly but irreducibly plural, the transposements at issue come to decentre and occupy the objectifying place of God. Within the epistemological trajectory, the project of the Enlightenment is portrayed as initiating an immanent turn further carried out by authors in the post-Kantian tradition. The majority of transposements herein proposed are geared at completing the immanent mobilization. It is claimed that a static immanent plane is a metaphysical farce. Rather, when the impetus of the immanent spatiality is fully released the latter indefectibly manifests itself in concrete degrees within the constrained-engaged immanent continuum.

As Carter points out (1995: 22), 'Context is a complex notion because it concerns not only features of the external, non-linguistic environment ... but also the internal, linguistic environment of the text itself.' The present thesis sheds light on a variety of perspectives on context, with a view to characterising the specifically textual features of context as British Contextualism. More concretely, Sinclair's idea of 'co-text', as framed in his Holistic Approach to vocabulary, is scrutinised, and also identified as a characteristic of British Contextualism. In particular, the thesis places strong emphasis on Sinclair's monist viewpoint, and makes an attempt to define it as the very nature of British Contextualism. Further, in detailing Sinclair's idea of a multi-word lexical item, the thesis raises further questions about the essence of collocation, and argues that 'appropriation' binds together collocates in a given co-text.

There is a way of talking about epistemic justification that involves the notion of our being subject to epistemic obligations the failure to comply with makes us blameworthy, called the deontological conception. In this thesis, I defend the deontological conception against criticisms first levied by William Alston that it (a) implies doxastic voluntarism which is false and thereby violates the principle that ought implies can, and (b) is in tension with what is distinctive about the epistemic domain, namely its connection with the goal of believing truths and avoiding falsehoods. I argue that the extent to which (a) is problematic depends on the extent to which (b) is problematic. Further, that (b) IS not problematic to the deontological conception if we view it not as a way to cash out epistemic justification, but as a way to understand normativity in general. I do this by making a distinction between merely evaluative and deontological levels of appraisal and that it is only in the latter that the notion of an obligation functions. I argue that it is nonsensical to use sortal terms at the level of obligations, (where obligations carry the notion of blameworthiness), i.e. that there cannot be obligations from an epistemic point of view anymore than there can be obligations from an ethical point of view. However, sortal terms can be used to distinguish between differing types of reasons (which, on their own, operate at the merely evaluative level)" but because obligations only emerge out of a network of differing sorts of reasons, it does not make any sense to talk about different sorts of obligation. I strengthen that last claim up by arguing, against the evidentialist, that there are such things as non-epistemic reasons for belief

Two approaches in epistemology are contrasted. The first, more usual, approach treats human knowledge as a system of subjective or psychological entities. Many of the distinctive problems of philosophy ar. shown to stem from this initially plausible approach to knowledge. According to the traditional conception of knowledge, it is a special sort of belief, proven or justified belief. This first approach to knowledge leads to subjective theories of truth and of logic, which ar. here criticized. It is argued that the truth or falsehood of a. piece of knowledge, end its logical relations with other pieces of knowledge, are objective, that is, they are independent of any psychological facts about any knower or believer of that piece of knowledge. Because of the objectivity of truth and of logic, it becomes possible to approach knowledge in a non-subjective way, and to treat it as a system of objective or non-psychological entities. Within this approach, knowledge is regarded a. consisting of objective contents, which ar. distinguished from psychological acts, such as believing or knowing, which are directed towards these contents. Several properties and relationships of objective knowledge are contrasted with psychological properties and relationships of subjective knowledge. Doctrines which rest upon the confusion of these two distinct realms are criticized. The traditional idea of knowledge as justified belief is shown to rest upon a conflation of problems concerning subjective aspects of knowing and problems concerning objective aspects of what is known. Finally, recognition of the objective aspect. of our knowledge is essential to the practice of mutual criticism in sciences it is argued that the objectivity of science consists in this critical debate about objective aspects of scientific knowledge, rather than in any special psychological objectivity or impartiality or detachment on the part of individual scientists.