In my thesis I criticise the most important Causal Theories that have been advanced, and put forward a Causal Theory of my own. In Chapter 1 I describe some of the theories that have been advanced, or criticised, as Causal Theories, and point out that they fall into several distinct types. In Chapter 2 I criticise the sort of Causal Theory that includes the thesis that our knowledge of the physical world is in some sense inferential. In Chapter 3 I argue against the sort of Causal Theory which involves the supposition that sense-data or their like are involved in perception. In Chapter 4 I argue in favour of the sort of Causal Theory which contains the view that the perception of a physical object is a matter of the perceiver's being caused by it to have a sense-experience. In Chapter 5 I argue that the experiential element in perception is not a matter of the perceiver's acquiring or tending to acquire a belief. In Chapter 6 I inquire whether perception must involve the having of a sense-experience which in some sense represents the perceived object, and specify the conditions which the perceptual experience must fulfil. I introduce the expression "have a good representation" in terms of one sense of "seem" and its cognates. In Chapter 7 I conclude that representation enters into perception insofar as the perceived object must bring about the perceiver's sense-experience in a way which I describe as "productive of good representations". I advance my own Causal Theory of Perception, to which this contention is central. In Chapter 8 I support my theory by considering the perception of certain sorts of physical objects that may appear problematical and have been unduly neglected by philosophers in the past.

This is an epistemological study, in which measure ment is taken as a paradigm of perceptual recognition---a notion in which perception is joined with judgment as a factor in understanding. Hence it has proved necessary to give an analysis of such recognition in general, with metric contexts as a special case. This has been done in terms of a very weak fundamental form of 'theory', as a form of basic comprehension, in which language (as part of the theories analysed) is not essentially involved, but treated as a special development. One type of theory is given thorough formal analysis: those 'recognitive theories' whose elements are taken, in the theory itself, to be recognized directly from perception, or extrapolated as in principle recognizable. Another type consists of 'substantive theories', seen as constructed to provide deeper understanding of the reality underlying recognized structures, but essentially involving elements not taken to be recognizable: this type receivesonly informal treatment, in terms of its associations with the first (especially in measurement). Special consideration is (unusually) given to attention and neglect,not in psychological terms, but as theory-guided selection from total experience. Neglect is seen not merely as negation of attention, but often a positive strategy (in measurement, strictly determined). Part I introduces the basic concepts, distinguishing the general approach from other relevant traditionsfoundational studies in measurement (Suppes et al.); linguistic analysis; some epistemologies (e.g., Goodman); philosophy of science. Part II sets up the formal analysis. Part III applies this analysis to contexts of measurement, with examples (only distance is fully treated others only in synopsis). Probability assessment is analysed as distinct from measurement. Part IV examines consequences for wider philosophical questions: language-based problems of knowledge and meaning; Wittgenstein's 'private language': and theory-based considerations of ontology; identity; truth, falsity and error; and observation in science.

No description available.

Biblical interpretation among Church of England laity was assessed by questionnaire. Eleven churches took part in the final survey: 1800 questionnaires were distributed and 404 returned. Subjects read the healing story in Mark 9: 14-29 and then responded to questions on the passage, their attitudes to the bible and healing prayer. Liken scales assessed attitudes to the bible, morality, religious exclusivity and supernatural healing. Personality was assessed according to the Myers-Briggs typology using the Keirsey Temperament Sorter. Subjects from Evangelical churches had more conservative attitudes than those in Anglo-catholic or Broad churches. Attitudes were related to education level and the perceiving personality function, and were clustered according to level of conservatism and charismatic belief. Literal interpretation of the passage declined with age. Literal interpretation of biblical events declined with education level, but not among Evangelicals. Respondents preferred interpretations that matched their preferred perceiving or judging personality functions. Those who preferred intuition and feeling were also most likely to identify with characters in the story. Perception of horizon separation was related to familiarity with the passage, and preference for interpretative horizon was related to attitudes, judging personality function and education level. There was little evidence of strong community effects on interpretation. Dependence on others for interpretation was greater among women, negatively correlated with education level and positively correlated with age and personality preferences for sensing and feeling. Findings are discussed in relation to the roles of the individual, the Holy Spirit and the community in shaping interpretation, and to problems of evaluating interpretations in the church. Factors external to the text are important in generating meaning, but are sometimes less valuable in deciding between interpretations. Church and academy are fundamentally different worlds of discourse that overlap: the difference needs to be recognized, accepted and respected.

This thesis compares truth relativism with non-indexical contextualism. These views are compared both as general approaches to account for the use of a linguistic expression in declarative sentences and as proposals about particular expressions such as personal taste, aesthetic and moral predicates, epistemic modals, knowledge ascriptions and future contingents. Four aims are set forth: (i) to show that truth relativism must be understood as an account of the assessment sensitivity of our ordinary monadic truth notion, (ii) to single out a problem this view faces to make sense of its non-monadic truth notion and identify the best strategy to solve it, (iii) to argue that, with the exception of future contingents, this strategy cannot be applied to the cases for which truth relativist accounts have been proposed, and (iv) to argue for non-indexical contextualist treatments of these cases. The thesis has two parts; (i) and (ii) are addressed in the first one, while (iii) and (iv) are addressed in the second one. In addressing (iv), we only question the evidence adduced for truth relativism that non-indexical contextualism is committed to reject. As it happens, this is the evidence that is necessary to challenge in order to accommodate the problem mentioned in point (ii).

Philosophy / M.A.(Philosophy)

I offer a novel defence of radically externalist theories of perception, via a strikingly spare and broadly physicalist metaphysics. The core, motivating claim is what I call a natural view of perception, according to which perception involves direct awareness of our environment, such that the phenomenology of experience consists of the worldly things perceived, as they appear to the perspective of the subject. To underpin this natural view, I propose a simple metaphysical picture of perception, which identifies the perceptual experience with the relation of awareness holding between subject and object, a relation that can be described in familiar physical terms as a causal process involving the thing perceived and the perceiver. Distinctively, the simple metaphysical picture has no place for the notion of ‘experiences’ understood as distinctively ‘mental’ states or events internal or otherwise belonging to the subject. Although there is some limited precedent for the simple metaphysical picture of perception, I offer the first detailed argument for its role in underpinning the natural view. The thesis offers new and detailed arguments to show that the simple metaphysical picture can not only account for normal perceptual experiences, but can also accommodate and explain other forms of sensory experience that have widely been considered to undermine the natural view of perception. These ‘problem’ cases include perceptual illusion, hallucination, and the role of memory and beliefs in influencing how things appear perceptually. In all of these cases, the simple metaphysical picture accounts for the phenomenology of the experience purely in terms of awareness of worldly objects, albeit in some cases objects that are not currently present in the subject’s environment. The simple metaphysical picture thus promises to explain not just perceptual experience but phenomenal consciousness more generally. The natural view is explicitly a commitment of some varieties of naïve realism, but I argue that the two theses come apart. For one thing, the simple metaphysical picture offers a solution to hallucination and other ‘problem’ cases quite different to the (chiefly disjunctivist) solutions offered by naïve realists. However, the most striking and novel claim advanced here is that the natural view can be defended without a commitment to realism. In this regard, I cite evidence for the subject-relativity or experience-dependence of certain perceived qualities, notably colour, and show the simple metaphysical picture allows us to square this with the natural view that colours are ‘out there’ in the environment. I discuss the metaphysical implications of rejecting realism while adhering to the simple metaphysical picture, and outline a radical – and radically simple – metaphysics of the world in general that might preserve the natural view and accommodate the simple metaphysical picture of phenomenal consciousness more generally. This metaphysics takes the form of a process monism in which the governing metaphysical structuring principle is one of top-down determination, such that whole processes determine the nature of their constituent parts.

This essay is an exercise in philosophy. It asks, “what are the colors?”, and ultimately provides a primitivist answer. The essay has four parts. The first is entitled “Stage setting” and has two subparts. In 1.1, I provide an explanation of how we should understand the question of which this essay is concerned. The goal of 1.2 is to provide an adequate taxonomy of views. Part 2 is entitled “Dispositional views” and has three subparts. In 2.1, I argue against appearance dispositional views. In 2.2, I argue against reflectance dispositionalism. Finally in 2.3, I provide a general argument against the colors being dispositions. Part 3 is entitled “Categorical views” and has three subparts. In 3.1, I argue against micro-structuralism. In 3.2, I argue against Cohen’s relationalism. Finally in 3.3, I argue for and defend non-relational primitivism. In the last major section of this essay I look at whether we should give up on the colors actually being instantiated. This section has only one subpart, and in it I reject the argument that the best explanation of mass disagreement about the colors is that irrealism is true.

No description available.

This project examines the concept of decision in philosophical writing, in particular the question of whether subjectivity can be said to constitute a ‘locus’ of decision. The writing of Søren Kierkegaard is the main focus of discussion. Giorgio Agamben, Michel Henry and Jacques Derrida also provide important contributions. Although for Kierkegaard ‘all decisiveness is rooted in subjectivity’, subjective agency takes the form of an active surrendering to an external unknown authority (God). Kierkegaard uses the term ‘leap of faith’ to describe the moment of decision where subjective transformation occurs. For Derrida, any decision requires an undecidable leap beyond all reasoning made in preparation for that decision. He extends a reading of faith beyond the theistic by suggesting that Kierkegaard’s unknowable God could also be another name for the ‘structure of subjectivity.’ Giorgio Agamben’s writing on the concept of human life situated at the threshold of categories (socio-political, philosophical, physiological and so on), helps to further the exploration of subjectivity as the ‘locus’ of decision. Michel Henry’s work on The Essence of Manifestation provides a focus for a discussion on the ‘radical subjectivity’ that Kierkegaard proposes as the fulcrum of decision. The research project as a whole maintains a synergy between these philosophical concerns and the form of their explication. The thesis is made up of both written text and DVD documentation of live works. These instances of practice, whose form and mode of presentation were informed by a specific aspect of the research, are integrated into the thesis to constitute ‘chapters’. The practice can and does function independently in other contexts. However, what is presented in this research document constitutes the outcome of my practice-based PhD project and includes both the ‘theoretical’ and ‘practice’ elements.