In this thesis, I focus on the relation between individuals’ awareness of their mortality and freedom from a phenomenological perspective, which is based on making sense of our temporality with the tools of narrative thinking. I argue that this perspective will shed light on the neglected question, of how the awareness of the fact that every individual will die would have a bearing upon an individual’s freedom. In the first chapter, I argue that a linear understanding of time paves the way for the grand narratives, which eclipse the meaning of death and individual freedom. In the second chapter, I argue that Heidegger’s primordial conception of time is the proper way to see death as a phenomenon. This view is based on the distinction, I offer, between conceiving death as an event and an eventuality. I argue that, whereas conceiving death as an event reveals the temporal finitude of one’s existence; conceiving death as an eventuality discloses the finitude of possibilities at one’s disposal. In the fourth chapter, after introducing Berlin’s two conceptions of freedom in the third, I apply the negative conception of freedom in analysing individuals’ freedom with respect to the event of death and the positive conception respectively to the eventuality of death. This, firstly, leads me to discussing whether an immortal life-span would be a freer one, in the light of the suggestion of the negative conception that indexes the range of one’s freedom to the absence of external constraints and, secondly, whether the anxiety caused by the presence of death as an (ever-present) eventuality constrains one’s freedom, in the light of the suggestion of the positive conception that indexes one’s freedom to the presence of mechanisms which enable individuals to exercise control over their life. In the last chapter, I conclude that anxiety caused by the eventuality of death might actually constrain one’s freedom to a larger extent. I demonstrate that narrative thinking would be helpful to alleviate the influence of anxiety into a lesser degree and it might actually transform this potential constraint on a motivating factor for one’s authenticity.

Viewing an upsetting mental image through our own eyes (first-person) or through the eyes of an observer (third-person) has previously been demonstrated to result in different emotional responses to the image. Different emotional outcomes may result from imagery as a consequence of visual perspective influencing whether the image is defined according to the abstract or concrete self (Libby & Eibach, 2011). The present research was interested in investigating this hypothesis to explore the impact of imagery perspective on emotional outcomes in young people. One hundred and fifty-six 16-18 year olds recalled a personal failure from either the first or third-person visual perspective in a between group experimental design. This study extends previous research by including self-views of selfcompassion, self-esteem and shame proneness. It was expected that these self-views would interact with the visual perspective to predict the level of state shame and negative affect experienced when recalling a failure image. Results revealed no such interaction effect, and emotional outcomes from imagery were dependent on individual's self-views regardless of perspective used. This is inconsistent with previous accounts of the role of visual imagery perspective and may suggest the need for a developmental account of the role of visual imagery perspective in emotion. Keywords: self; visual perspective; imagery; emotion.

Physicalism can be thought of as the view that the mental is “nothing over and above” the physical. I defend a formulation of this view based on supervenience. Physicalism may be supported in two ways: either by providing an explanatory account of the mind in physical terms, or by philosophical argument. Since we have only a rudimentary scientific understanding of the mind, physicalism needs argument. The most promising such argument is the causal argument, which may be summarised thus: (i) mental properties have physical effects; (ii) physics is causally complete (all physical effects have physical causes); (iii) effects are not generally overdetermined; so (iv) mental properties are physical. Of these premises, (i) relies on common-sense, (ii) relies on empirical support, and (iii) is a priori. I consider the merits of this argument by articulating two kinds of mental property emergence, ‘weak’ and ‘strong’, both of which are incompatible with physicalism. I show that the premises of the causal argument are compatible with weak emergence, and that the argument is therefore not deductively valid. The causal argument establishes that one of physicalism or weak emergence is true. However, weak emergence is problematic in ways that physicalism is not. If these problems are serious, then physicalism is to be preferred on other grounds, such as theoretical elegance and simplicity. However, I proceed to show that the soundness of the argument is questionable, as premise (ii) is unsupported by the available evidence. Strong emergence is inconsistent with (ii), so evidence for (ii) must (on reasonable assumption) be evidence against strong emergence. But all currently available evidence is consistent with strong emergence, and so this evidence does not support (ii). Future evidence might, but I argue that such evidence would need to involve the kind of scientific account of mind the lack of which motivates the causal argument in the first place. A well-supported causal argument, by the nature of the justification necessary for (ii), is otiose.

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A supposed logical connection between an unimpeded desire and action, which might be thought to preclude a causal connection, is criticised (chapter 1). The thesis that if a desire is to explain an action as a reason for that action, then the desire must match that action in a certain way is accepted, but it is argued that this is not an objection to a causal theory of action (chapter 2). It is maintained that (i) explanations of action are explanations in terms of the agent's reasons (ii) there may be reasons for acting other than desires but these motivate in a way to be likened to the way in which desires motivate (iii) a causal force must be given to the "because" implied in the statement of the reason why someone acted (chapter 3). An attempt is made to distinguish actions motivated by desire or fear from bodily reactions characteristic thereof. Certain actions for which one has no reason are considered (chapter 4). An attempt is made to analyse intentions to do something in the future in terms of desire and belief, but this seems reductive (chapter 5). However, this does not vitiate the previous analysis of action (chapter 6). The subject of mental action is broached. It is suggested that the most fruitful approach involves considering the limitations of mental action: the only clear cases uncovered involve the direction of one's attention (chapter 7). One's understanding of another's action is considered. It is maintained that an explanation in terms of his reasons has its own kind of completeness, but such a complete explanation would not be deemed adequate for all purposes. The attitudes one takes up to another because of his actions are discussed and while it is admitted that such attitudes could not simply be abandoned, there remain problems about the justification of them and actions motivated by them (chapter 8).

The aim of the thesis is to defend the view that mental entities like wants, desires etc., can be the causes of actions. In the introduction the problem of causal explanation of action is introduced, together with the main outline of the views of different philosophers who are opponents of the causal theory of action. It includes a short introduction to the arguments produced by the opponents of the causal theory of action, and an outline of the project of the thesis. Chapter I is concerned with the question as to whether causal explanation is synonymous with mechanical explanation. In this connection R.S. Peters' view is discussed Chapter II is concerned with the traditional theory of volition as a causal explanation of action. In part I, the question of whether all actions are preceded by an act of will is discussed in the context of G. Ryle's criticism of the concept of volition. In part II, the question of the empirical identifiability of an act of will is discussed, together with the views of W. James, G.N.A. Vesey and R.A. Imlay on the matter. Chapter III consists of the defence of the view that wants, desires etc., can be the causes of actions. In Chapter IV the question of the indescribability of desires, wants etc., without reference to actions is discussed with special reference to A.I. Melden. Chapters V and VI sure concerned respectively with the Humean contention that a cause must be an event, and that a causal explanation needs a generalisation. Chapter VII concentrates on the question whether reason-action statements are incorrigible and therefore not causal. In conclusion, I have given a short summary of the outcome of the various arguments discussed in the thesis.

This thesis argues that a particular version of equal opportunity for welfare is the best way of meeting the joint demands of three liberal egalitarian ideals: distributional equality, responsibility, and respect for individuals' differing reasonable judgements of their own good. It also examines which social choice rules best represent these demands. Finally, it defends the view that achieving equal opportunity for welfare should not only be a goal of formal public institutions, but that just citizens should also sometimes be guided by it in their everyday life. The version of equal opportunity for welfare it defends differs from some well-known contemporary versions in the following ways. First, it rejects a definition of welfare as the degree of satisfaction of a person's preferences, because, it argues, this conception of welfare cannot adequately deal with preference change. Instead, it suggests that we should adopt a conception of welfare based on a list of goods and conditions that are recognised as valuable from the perspective of a variety of different conceptions of the good. Second, it argues that individuals' prima facie claim to an equally valuable share of the world's resources-a claim which is based on their equal moral worth-is limited to situations in which giving one person a more valuable share means that someone else ends up with a less valuable share. It also argues that in situations where we can improve at least one person's situation without worsening anyone else's, we generally do not fail to respect each person's equal moral worth by doing so, even if this leads to inequalities. Third, it defends a distinct view of responsibility, which justifies social arrangements that give people certain options with reference to the value that individuals can achieve (but don't necessarily achieve) through their choices from these options.

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This thesis examines the development of Plato's thought on the subject of the soul-body relation. I will not attempt to cover everything that Plato says about the soul - for example I will discuss 'proofs' of immorality only in so far as they have a bearing on the interpretation of soul and body. In this life at least human beings have both a soul and a body; as a result, the soul by necessity interacts with the body. This interaction, though, is not simply an interrelation between two completely different and separate entities; rather the relation between soul and body is far more complicated. The purpose of the introduction is to present a preliminary view of the soul, in that way we could better understand the background that Plato had to take under consideration. Within the introduction the Apology is used so as to show the importance of the idea of the soul in Socratic ethics, and to indicate that the Socratic idea that we should care for the soul rather than the body, becomes crucial within Plato's philosophy. The dialogues that follow, the Gorgias and the Meno, provide early indications of the complex relation required between soul and body, for Plato's moral, metaphysical and epistemological concerns. Thus, although Plato, in these dialogues, does not give us a clear definition of the soul's nature and its relation to the body, the perplexity and ambiguity concerning the soul's nature leads to the more detailed analysis of it in later dialogues. The Phaedo appears to offer a view of the soul as a simple immaterial entity wholly distinct from the body. Even within this dialogue, though, there are signs that this simple view of the soul is not adequate for Plato's moral and metaphysical concerns, this becomes evident as well in the Symposium.