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There is a tension between an anti-biological phenomenology and a behaviouristic determinism in Lacan's thought. There are also numerous references to, on the one hand, Kant and Heidegger; and, on the other, Frege and Wittgenstein in his thought. Despite this, there has been little attempt to fully explore the relationship between continental and analytic thought in Lacan's work; and, there has been no attempt to investigate whether Lacan has a theory of consciousness even though Lacan refers to consciousness frequently in both his seminars and his writings. This thesis seeks to redress this gap in understanding. It is argued that the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious, in Lacan's pre-Second World War (phenomenological) thought, is one of extension rather than opposition. However, his early (post-Second World War) theory of the unconscious is seen to be underpinned by a materialism that we find in the analytic, as well as the continental, tradition where consciousness is surface epiphenomena and what lies beneath (for Lacan, the unconscious) is computational process. This materialism is taken to its hyperlogical extreme in Lacan' s later theory of the unconscious which, it is argued, is underpinned by a kind of digital materialism. The early and later Lacan might be in danger of advocating a view of materialism that supports, rather than negates, analytic thought on consciousness but his theory of the unconscious can also be seen to oppose analytic thought. This thesis suggests that one reading of later Lacanian thought emphasises the relation to Frege; and another emphasises the relation to Kant. However, in this late theory of the unconscious, the rejection of a Kantian framework and the adoption (under the guidance of JacquesAlain Miller) of a Fregean framework makes Lacan's theory of the unconscious compatible with analytic theories of consciousness.

The reificatory approach in philosophy of mind interprets psychological terms like "belief' and "desire" as referring to the hidden particulars which cause our observable behaviour. It is contrasted with the non-reificatory approach, which interprets such terms as being strongly associated with people's relational and djspsitional properties and as being meaningful without having to make reference to any subpersonal state, event, or process. The reificatory approach is comfortably the more popular one, and is often implicitly assumed rather than directly argued for. Thus, much discussion in philosophy of mind since the 19605 - when the reificatory approach, via functionalism, established its dominance - has been about how reconcile intentional realism with physicalism. Mental states, it is thought, must be in some way physical, or they must be non-existent. The reificatory approach to belief encounters a number of technical problems (such as the overdetermination problem) that the non-reificatory approach avoids. However, reification might be thought to be necessary for a number of reasons: a) the citing of beliefs as the causes of action, b) the widely held view that commonsense psychology is a theory about people's inner mental contents, and c) the fact that we seem to have first-person access to the "things” whose existence the non-reificatory approach denies. This thesis attempts to undermine these reasons, arguing in each case that the evidence would be consistent with a non-reificatory account. After this, a positive non-reificatory account is offered, suggesting that the non-reificatory approach is more faithful to our everyday concept of belief. Finally, an attempt is made to account for the continuing popularity of the reificatory approach, arguing that said popularity is primarily a result of the deep rooted conceptual metaphors that pervade our talk about the mind. Thus, it is concluded, the non-reificatory approach is the correct one.

This dissertation puts forward a solution to a long standing problem concerning the identity relation between phenomenal qualities. It seems that some indiscriminability relation should be materially equivalent to the identity relation for phenomenal qualities. That seems to be the case since phenomenal qualities are entirely experiential, so if there is any difference between two phenomenal qualities then it will be experienced and hence we should be able to discriminate between them on the basis of that difference. However, on the basis of experience it seems such indiscriminability relations are typically nontransitive. Supposing that the identity relation between phenomenal qualities is also non-transitive leads to contradiction. The resulting problem is what I term the identity problem of non-transitive phenomenal indiscriminability. Over the course of the first three chapters I introduce and analyse the nature of the problem, this includes: distinguishing it from the related but distinct phenomenal sorites problem; an examination of the problem's scope; and consideration of the notion of phenomenal indiscriminability. During these chapters I also assess five proposed solutions to the identity problem. In chapter four, I present a criticism of three recent accounts of the related problem of the speckled hen, followed by an analysis of the problem. I then draw on recent psychological research into numerosity perception to give a fuller account of speckles perception which leads to a solution to the speckled hen problem. This solution rests on a distinction between experience of phenomenal speckles and our awareness of their number. It serves to introduce the distinction between phenomenal experience and awareness of phenomenal experience that will be used to solve the identity problem. It is also, I believe, a significant contribution to knowledge in its own right. Chapter five assesses the possibility of constructing a solution to the identity problem based on inexact representation that would be analogous to the solution given to the speckled hen problem. The primary contribution to knowledge, and the thesis of this dissertation, is what I term the ignorance solution to the identity problem of non-transitive phenomenal indiscriminability, which I present in chapter six. The ignorance solution is based on the distinction between phenomenal experience and awareness of phenomenal experience. The central idea of the ignorance solution is that we can be unaware of differences between pairs of phenomenal qualities even though we experience, and are aware of, both phenomenal qualities. In support of this I then draw together various strands of philosophical and psychological research to present a case for the distinction between phenomenal experience and awareness of phenomenal experience of the type required by the ignorance solution. Finally in chapter seven I summarise the thesis of this dissertation, re-access some of the other proposed solutions to the identity problem and note some of the wider implications of the distinction between phenomenal experience and awareness of phenomenal experience that I have argued for.

The submitted publications address aspects of 'The Physicality of the Self from a psychoanalytic perspective and in so doing extend the remit of psychoanalytic thinking. Conscious and unconscious investment of personal meaning in physical exercise, body-oriented behaviour and physical dimensions of experience and communication is explored through presentation and discussion of clinical case examples and infant observation material. The embodied nature of our being is identified as an issue of key significance in psychoanalysis, where unconscious communication, much of which is non-verbal, is a central concern of both theory and practice. Ways of conceptualising psychosomatic disturbance are discussed, whether the disturbance emerges in physical symptoms without apparent organic underlay or in disturbed body-oriented behaviour such as eating disorders and self-injury. With regard to clinical practice, the central significance of receptivity to unconscious communication and capacity for containment (Bion 1962) is reaffirmed. The therapist's 'use of body' as part of the 'use of self Is discussed with particular reference to somatic communication in the transference - countertransference matrix. The primary context for the work is a contemporary object relations framework. The perspective on embodiment or'indwelling' developed by D. W. Winnicott and the post- Kleinian concept of 'psychic skin' are of particular Importance. The disciplines of philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and sociology constitute a secondary, broader, context and inform the discussion of changing perspectives on 'mind', 'body', 'health' and'illness'. A'continuum' model of self-care and self-harm is developed. The acronym 'cashas' is introduced to refer to 'culturally accepted self-harming acts/activities', behaviours which occupy a border area between good enough self-care and clinically relevant self-harm. Drawing on clinical material and research Involving practitioner discussion of clinical vignettes, arguments are advanced for the relevance and clinical usefulness of the 'continuum' model.

It is often supposed that we can make progress understanding singular thought about objects by claiming that thinkers use ‘mental files’. However, the proposal is rarely subject to sustained critical evaluation. This thesis aims to clarify and critique the claim that thinkers use mental files. In my introductory first chapter, I motivate my subsequent discussion by introducing the claim that thinkers deploy modes of presentation in their thought about objects, and lay out some of my assumptions and terminology. In the second chapter, I introduce mental files, responding to the somewhat fragmented files literature by setting out a core account of files, and outlining different ways of implementing the claim that thinkers use mental files. I highlight pressing questions about the synchronic and diachronic individuation conditions for files. In chapters three and four, I explore whether ‘de jure coreference’ can be used to give synchronic individuation conditions on mental files. I explore existing characterisations of de jure coreference before presenting my own, but conclude that de jure coreference does not give a useful account of the synchronic individuation conditions on files. In chapter five, I consider the proposal that thinkers must sometimes trade on the coreference of their mental representations, and argue that we can give synchronic individuation conditions on files in terms of trading on coreference. In chapter six, I bring together the account of files developed so far, compare it to the most developed theory of mental files published to date, and defend my account from the objection that it is circular. In chapter seven, I explore routes for giving diachronic individuation conditions on mental files. In my concluding chapter, I distinguish the core account of files from the idea that the file metaphor should be taken seriously. I suggest that my investigation of the consequences of the core account has shown that the file metaphor is unhelpful, and I outline reasons to exercise caution when using ‘files’ terminology.

The aim of the thesis is to explore Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Wilfrid Sellars’s views on intentionality. In the first chapter I discuss the account of intentionality and meaning the early Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I present his idea that sentences are pictures of states of affairs with which they share a ‘logical form’ and to which they stand in an internal ‘pictorial relationship’. I argue that Wittgenstein thought of this relationship as established by acts of thought consisting in the operation of mental signs corresponding to the signs of public languages. In the second and third chapters I discuss the later Wittgenstein’s criticism of ideas at the heart of the Tractarian account of intentionality, as well as his explanations of the phenomena that motivated it. In the second chapter I examine his rejection of the idea that thinking consists in the operation of mental signs and his criticism of the idea that meaning and understanding are mental processes accompanying the use of language. In the third chapter I turn to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that representations stand in an internal ‘pictorial relation’ to objects in the natural order that are their meaning. I illuminate his later views by discussing Sellars’s non-relational account of meaning, in particular his claim that specifications of meaning do not relate expressions to items that are their meaning, but rather specify their rule-governed role in language. I conclude with a discussion of the later Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between intentional phenomena and the objects at which they are directed. In the final fourth chapter I provide a detailed discussion of Sellars’s account of thinking. I conclude with some criticisms of Sellars’s views.

Since the advent of human consciousness all manner of theoreticians from mystics to philosophers, and linguists to scientists have considered why and how it is that an individuated self seems to occupy or indwell a physical body. There is a common experiential sense, in other words, in which personal consciousness and our bodies are felt to be two different things. Two broad areas of opinion attempting to explain this apparent bifurcation are defined for the purpose of addressing this problem: Essentialists who variously maintain that there are non-physical properties inherent to all forms and functions of physicality; and Physicalists who claim that the extant universe as a multiplicity of complex material processes is the only reality. The respective natures of body and mind and the ways in which they relate has yielded an extraordinary variety of hypotheses within and between these two broad categories. In this thesis the dilemma is called the Hard Problem and it focuses particularly on the relationship between consciousness and the brain. Recently, Ken Wilber has constructed an Integral Philosophy which attempts a synergistic gradation of all possible genres of experience and knowledge into one cohesive scheme representing the total Reality. The culminating point of Wilber’s theory claims resolution of the Hard Problem, indeed of all appearances of duality, in the realisation of consummate emptiness in mystical consciousness. Wilber’s proposal therefore tenders a version of Essentialism since it implies that an Absolute principle is inherent to all existence. The problem explored in this study considers whether the epistemological architecture of Wilber’s Philosophy is coherent and consistent. Following a critical appraisal of Wilber’s system it is proposed that epistemological coherence is more likely to be achieved by retaining the ontology of consciousness and matter to only one kind. In this way the scientific protocols which Wilber imports to validate his truth-claims are protected from ontological confusion. Whether this non-dual Physicalism is adequate as a means of explaining consciousness, and particularly mystical consciousness, is moot. Perhaps there remains an inalienable quality in mysticism which will always elude our ability to apprehend it. / Christian Sprituality, Church History & Missiology / D. Th. (Christian Spirituality)