This thesis explores the idea that value provides objective reasons for action. I argue in Chapter 1 that identifying reasons for action which are objective (defined in opposition to "perspectival"), and avoid narrow relativity to the interests of the agent, might contribute to a wider programme of establishing that there can be objectively right answers to live moral questions. Chapter 2 argues that there is good reason to pursue such a programme rather than embracing relativism or a more radical anti- objectivism. Chapter 3 argues that value, ofthe kind associated with making lives go well, generates reasons for action, and Chapter 4 assesses various candidate accounts of value. Chapter 5 proposes a subjective account which (unlike hedonism) allows states of the world as well as mental states to have value, but (unlike desire accounts) sees value as conferred by attitudes focused upon the present, not the future, arguing that a subjective account nevertheless allows us to regard value as objective in the required sense. Chapters 6 and 7 argue that, although value is essentially relative, talk about value- based reasons can avoid narrow relativity if we adopt an inclusive perspective. Where there are no conflicts of value, if something has value for someone, it has value "period". Chapter 8 argues that it should be possible in principle to resolve conflicts of value, and examines potential difficulties stemming from intemalism in the theory of motivation, concluding that these do not undermine my project. Chapter 9 concludes that my proposals establish that there is no fundamental reason to suppose that there cannot be objective answers to moral questions, and tell us something about what such answers should look like, whilst leaving further questions that would need to be addressed in seeking to fulfil the wider programme.

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The aim of the thesis is to undertake a criticism of Habermas' neo-Kantian theory of communicative rationality and his claim that it is able to provide a number of significant resolutions to a central problem of moral philosophy, the tension between the justification of theoretical reason and the application of practical reason (also conceived of as the fact-value distinction). Reference is made to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. Wittgenstein's philosophy, especially the issues surrounding the relevance of a 'linguistic idealism' in language, permit us to make a critique of communicative rationality because of the way it understands intersubjective truth. Wittgenstein can provide an account which allows normative standards of truth and objectivity to be established without having to rely on linguistically constituted first principles of abstract universality. Our account conceives of worldly facticity and ideal normativity as having a substantive juxtaposition to each other in language and does not conceive of them as irreparably divided. It conceives of the difference between them as a spectrum of rationality consisting of differing levels of intersubjective agreement, allowing for different levels of normative achievement. This can account for varying levels in the social and political achievement of counterfactual ideals. Politically, Habermas conceives the fact-value distinction as a difference between the Aristotelian concept of the polis, where ethical standards are derived from the substantive context of a way of life and the Kantian conception of a community of autonomous individuals determined by their own free will. The thesis contends that communicative rationality retains a principle of abstract universality which keeps it isolated from substantive content. A Wittgensteinian conception of communicative rationality can overcome this problem more successfully by simultaneously avoiding the rigourism of Habermas' abstract universalism at no loss to the justification of statements of justice and morality.

The thesis is an articulation and critique of one particular way of theorising rationality. The central question is whether ascriptions of propositional knowledge to rational agents in explanation of their rational capacities is problematic. My approach to the issue is to generalise the dispute between generalists and particularists in ethics: hence the question 'What is the nature of moral constraints, and what is it to be able to conform to them?' becomes 'What is the nature of rational constraints, and what is it to be able to conform to them?', Initially, a very strong version of the theory under critique is developed by articulating a series of claims, the conjunction of which constitutes a model of rationality. This model is characterised by two thoughts: that rational constraints are laws, and that grasp of rational constraints by rational agents is knowledge of a set of such laws. Most of the claims that constitute the model are very strong, and would not be endorsed by many, if any, contemporary philosophers. Claims of different strengths are distinguished. Claims that rational constraints are codifiable are relatively weak; whereas claims that rational constraints are laws are much stronger. And ascriptions of propositional knowledge come in two varieties, one weak and the other strong. Ascribing psychologically real propositional knowledge in explanation of how rational agents are able to think, speak and act rationally gives rise to pressing objections, and it seems unlikely that satisfactory replies are available. It is therefore a constraint on theories of rationality that they do not endorse such explanatory claims. However, ascriptions of propositional knowledge, be they weak or strong, do not invite the same objections because they only make epistemological claims, and not the strong psychological explanatory claims that I dispute. Intellectualism, thus constrained, survives. But psychological generalism is rejected.

It is commonly accepted that the instrumental principle is a fundamental principle of practical rationality. This principle, basically speaking, tells us that if one has an end. yet one does not do what one takes to be necessary to achieve that end, then one is being irrational. The central question in this thesis is why this is so: what it is about having an end that makes it the case that it is a mistake, rationally speaking, to fail to take the means to that end?

This thesis makes three original claims: two substantive and one methodological. It locates the thesis in the subject of philosophy of education and uses Richard Rorty’s metaphilosophical work to justify a claim to knowledge. This claim takes the form of a redescription of an established concept, judgement, to increase its usefulness in education. Usefulness is evaluated with regard to new developments in pragmatism that emphasise transitionalism and meliorism. To the best of the writer's knowledge Rorty has not been used in this way. The major substantive claim to knowledge is a redescription of judgement in the educational context of philosophy for children. This thesis argues that understanding judgement as a form of transition is educationally and philosophically useful. In order to make the argument it advances a minor substantive claim by offering a critique of Aristotle, Kant and Dewey that draws attention to a common factor in their philosophy, that of judgement being a property solely attributed to individuals. In outline the thesis consists of five chapters. First, it outlines why judgement might be regarded as a problematic concept before justifying my use of Rorty; second, it advances the major premise that judgement in the works of Aristotle, Kant and Dewey is a figurative account. Next it offers the minor premise that figurative accounts of judgement in philosophy of education are not always useful. In the penultimate chapter it concludes by offering an alternative account of judgement as transition and elaborate upon the emphasis on relationality made possible by the redescription. Finally it shows the implications of this redescription in the context of an educational movement: Philosophy for Children. It argues that Philosophy for Children as a pedagogical movement can exemplify education practices that draw upon my re-conceptualised understanding of judgement. In addition it offers a pathway for future development.