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Aims : This thesis sets out to investigate theoretical conceptualisations of the tripartite model of authenticity and its role within goal-directed behaviours and cognitions. Previous work has mainly been on a theoretical level and focused heavily on personality and counselling literature. The aim of this thesis is to advance the understanding of the tripartite model of authenticity which has previously been supported by both personality and counselling literature. In doing so, this thesis adopts a framework of goal-directed behaviour and cognitions within an individual differences approach, to apply a range of surveys and experimental measures which explore a number of goal-directed behaviours within the tripartite model of authenticity. Methods : Six studies are presented. Three of these studies assess data through self-report questionnaires in comparison the remaining three employ experimental tasks to measure goal-directed behaviours. Data was analysed using multiple regressions, correlations, t-tests and ANOVA’s. Results : The thesis presents novel research to explore goal-directed behaviours within the tripartite model of authenticity. Results indicate that: (1) the tripartite model of authenticity is distinct and unique from extant models of personality; (2) authenticity is related to inhibitory and reward seeking behaviours; (3) authenticity is related to reconfiguring mental resources; (4) authenticity does not reflect impulsive decision-making; (5) authenticity does however play a role in general, every day, decision-making strategies; (6) authenticity can predict aggressive responses in unfair situations; (7) authenticity can predict posttraumatic growth in the aftermath of trauma.

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This thesis has two clear aims. The first of these is to investigate whether a measure of the dispositional variable of impulsivity and a more general measure of non-deliberative processing would contribute to the prediction of behaviour over and above measures reflecting more deliberative processing as specified by the theory of planned behaviour (TPB). The second is to investigate whether the beneficial effects of implementation intention formation on goal attainment would be moderated by impulsivity.

The question of how affective state effects decision making has, in recent years, come to prominence in the field of decision research. The relationship between numeracy and choice, reasoning and judgement has also started to receive an increasing amount of attention. The series of studies reported here investigate the effect of numeracy and affect on the violation of rational choice principles. Preference reversal and violations of (transparent) dominance in decisions under risk are investigated in Study 1, using a lottery choice paradigm, while Study 2 examines the relationship between numeracy and these violations of rationality. Study 3 concerns the development and reliability and validity testing of a numeracy scale designed for use in decision research. Study 4 investigates the extent to which more and less numerate individuals attend to probabilistic and outcome value information, using a think aloud methodology. In Studies 5 and 6 the effect of endogenous and exogenous affect on choice and response time is examined, with Study 6 also investigating whether the effect of affect on dominance violation is mediated by numeracy or propensity to engage in cognitive reflection. Key contributions to theory made by this programme of research included the findings that: 1) probability neglect is a widespread phenomenon that can lead to violations of transparent dominance; 2) those lower in numeracy are more prone to probability neglect than those who are more numerate; 3) endogenous happiness promotes the utilisation of cognitively effortful System 2 processes and thus a reduced rate of probability neglect, while exogenous happiness does not; and 4) the relationship between endogenous happiness and process is not mediated by numeracy, thus indicating that those lower in numeracy can be motivated to expend greater cognitive effort on probabilistic tasks. Two key contributions to methodology are also made: 1) a numeracy scale; and 2) a procedure for eliciting task-endogenous changes in affective state.

Adolescents show a tendency to engage in risky activities, such as dangerous driving and unsafe sex. This has led to the suggestion that adolescents are poor decision-makers, and are risk-seeking in general. The first two chapters of this thesis describe studies investigating adolescent decision-making using probabilistic decision-making tasks. In Chapter 2, the tendency to seek risk, and the ability to integrate probability and reward information to make an optimal decision, is investigated in child, adolescent and adult participants. The emotional response to outcomes was also investigated. In Chapter 3, a computational approach is adopted to investigate the role of positive and negative performance feedback (wins and losses) in a probabilistic decision-making task in adolescents and in adults. The role of social-emotional factors in decision-making was also investigated. Adolescence is characterised by social and emotional development, as well as development in the functional brain correlates of social-emotional processing. Therefore, Chapters 4 to 6 focus on adolescent social-emotional processing using behavioural and functional neuroimaging methods. In Chapter 4, results are presented from a study of self-reported social and basic emotions across adolescence, where social emotions (e.g. embarrassment) are defined as emotions that require an awareness of others’ mental states (e.g. emotions, opinions, desires). In Chapter 5, the neural correlates of social and basic emotion processing are investigated in adolescents and in adults, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Finally, in Chapter 6, these fMRI data are reanalysed using a technique known as psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis, to look at age-associated changes in effective connectivity. Results are discussed in the context of social cognition and neuroanatomical development.

In intertemporal choice, decision-makers must choose between options whose outcomes occur at different times in the future and are associated with different magnitudes of gain or loss. Previous neuropsychological research on this problem is dominated by a behavioural-economic model which proposes that choice outcome is solely determined by a process of devaluing rewards with time, termed temporal discounting. This thesis investigates the veracity of this assumption by developing a new mathematical model of choice which takes into account another fundamental feature of human preference, namely the non-linearity of the relationship between the utility and magnitude of gains. Using behavioural data, methodologies are developed to demonstrate that this model is superior to previous models in accounting for human intertemporal choices. Specifically, using existing terminologies ‘impulsive’ and ‘self-controlled’ to describe preference in choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later monetary rewards, it is shown that the discounting of increasing magnitudes implied by the law of diminishing marginal utility exerts a significant effect in determining choice outcome. In addition to high rates of temporal discounting, it is shown that impulsivity can be engendered by higher rates of diminishing marginal utility and vice-versa. A neuronal account of this model is delineated using neuroimaging techniques, revealing fundamental properties of the brain’s value systems. It is shown that sub-components of value relating to time and magnitude are evaluated by distinct systems and then integrated to furnish an overall metric of utility used to guide choice – in accordance with utility theory. Finally, the ability of the neurotransmitter dopamine to modulate these features of preference and neurobiological systems is investigated using pharmacological manipulation, where it is shown that enhancing dopamine activity engenders impulsivity. These behavioural and neural findings are shown to offer a compelling account of the pathological impulsivity observed as a feature of disorders associated with aberrant dopamine function.

Research on the psychology and neuroscience of simple, evidence-based choices has led to an impressive progress in capturing the underlying mental processes as optimal mechanisms that make the fastest decision for a specified accuracy. The idea that decision-making is an optimal process stands in contrast with findings in more complex, motivation-based decisions, focussed on multiple goals with trade-offs. Here, a number of paradoxical and puzzling choice behaviours have been revealed, posing a serious challenge to the development of a unified theory of choice. These choice anomalies have been traditionally attributed to oddities at the representation of values and little is known about the role of the process under which information is integrated towards a decision. In a series of experiments, by controlling the temporal distribution of the decision-relevant information (i.e., sensory evidence or value), I demonstrate that the characteristics of this process cause many puzzling choice paradoxes, such as temporal, risk and framing biases, as well as preference reversal. In Chapter 3, I show that information integration is characterized by temporal biases (Experimental Studies 1-2, Computational Studies 1-3). In Chapter 4, I examine the way the integration process is affected by the immediate decision context (Experimental Studies 3-4, Computational Study 4), demonstrating that prior to integration, the momentary ranking of a sample modifies its magnitude. This principle is further scrutinized in Chapter 5, where a rank-dependent accumulation model is developed (Computational Study 5). The rank-dependent model is shown to underlie preference reversal in multi-attribute choice problems and to predict that choice is sensitive, not only to the mean strength of the information, but also to its variance, favouring riskier options (Computational Study 6). This prediction is further confirmed in Chapter 6, in a number of experiments (Experimental Studies 5-7) while the direction of risk preferences is found to be modulated by the cognitive perspective induced by the task framing (Experimental Study 8). I conclude that choice arises from a deliberative process which gathers samples of decision-relevant information, weighs them according to their salience and subsequently accumulates them. The salience of a sample is determined by i) its temporal order and ii) its local ranking in the decision context, while the direction of the weighting is controlled by the task framing. The implications of this simple, microprocess model are discussed with respect to choice optimality while directions for future research, towards the development of a unified theory of choice, are suggested.

The thesis draws from two contemporary theories of human motivation: self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000) and reversal theory (Apter, 1982) to enhance our understanding of the dynamics of motivation and its e ects on well-being. The thesis tests basic psychological needs theory (a sub theory of SDT) in which well-being and psychological growth are predicated by satisfaction of needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Optimum well-being is associated with a balanced satisfaction of these three needs (Sheldon & Niemiec, 2006), whilst thwarting of any need is associated with functional costs (Deci & Ryan, 2000). These relationships are examined in conjunction with the ideas of reversal theory. This posits that an individual's motivation moves dynamically through four mutually exclusive pairs of meta-motivational states, each characterised by a certain way of interpreting some aspect of one's own motivation and associated with their own range of emotions (Apter, 1989, 2001). To be considered \psychologically healthy" people should reverse between states on a regular and frequent basis, thus experiencing a broad range of felt emotions (Apter, 2001). Currently reversal theory literature presents three reversal inducing agents: frustration, satiation, and contingent events, however, literature surrounding the reversal process lacks depth and clarity, particularly in regard to frustration and satiation-induced reversals. Within the present thesis, I posit that examining the conceptual links between reversal the- ory and SDT might enhance our understanding of the dynamic nature of motivation: how people switch motivational foci, why and when this might occur, and examine ways of triggering motivational switches to enhance well-being. Speci cally, the thesis proposes that the active satiation and thwarting of basic psychological needs induces satiation and frustration based reversals. The movement between meta-motivational states is argued to help regulate balanced need satisfaction; although needs cannot all be satis ed at one time, they can be satis ed over time, the purpose of the reversal. Consisting of ve chapters: a general introduction including a theoretical integration of SDT and reversal theory, three experimental chapters, and a general discussion, the thesis had four main aims. First, to advocate a movement from working in theoretical silos to examining the meaningful concordance. The advantages of this are demonstrated through the interplay between SDT and reversal theory to better understand the dynamics of motivational focus. Second, to develop and validate an implicit measure of active meta-motivational state, enabling examination of acute changes in motivational focus. Third, to test a novel framework of the antecedents of meta-motivational state changes. Finally, to test the use of meta-motivational state reversals as a mechanism by which individuals may achieve balanced need satisfaction. Taken together the main ndings of the thesis were as follows: (1) that an implicit measure of meta-motivational state capable of assessing the full spectrum of states within 90s has utility; (2) evidence that need satisfying and thwarting environments trigger meta-motivational state reversals; (3) indications that people are motivated and able to correct acute imbalance in their need satisfaction as demonstrated through attempts to recoup deprived needs; (4) the proposition that contingent reversals, historically de ned as reversals induced by situational changes, might also be induced through cognitive changes; leading to a general conclusion that (5) examination of the meaningful concordance between SDT and reversal theory to understand dynamic motivation appears promising. The thesis has made a number of novel contributions to understanding of human behaviour. For the rst time the process of reversing between meta-motivational states has been empirically examined and a mechanism for inducing satiation and frustration reversals has been identi ed. Furthermore, an implicit measure of meta-motivational state has been developed and validated, which facilitates future research examining the reversal process (e.g., frequency, lability, and pur- pose). A framework for regulating balanced need satisfaction has been proposed and supported by initial self-report and behavioural data. From an applied perspective the ability to induce reversals and achieve a balance of need satisfaction may prevent maladaptive outcomes associated with both need thwarting and inhibited reversals.

The generation of decisions concerning responses to uncertain evidence is a significant source of errors in investigations. In an attempt to understand the basis of investigative decision-making and illuminate the basis of flawed decisions, this thesis investigated how individuals generate hypotheses to explain uncertain evidence. The hypotheses generated by novices and experienced investigators were explored, and subsequently those generated by dyads and triads. The theoretical framework of mental models theory was used to explore the effects of event type and event familiarity on the number and types of hypotheses generated for investigative scenarios where the evidence presented is open to question. In an attempt to improve hypothesis generation performance, training based upon analogical transfer and the use of visual support aids were also evaluated. Analysis of numbers and types of hypotheses generated showed that both laypeople and experienced investigators struggled to generate those hypothesis types identified by mental models theory as difficult to discover. In addition, all participants showed an evidential truth bias with familiar events. Whilst training based upon analogical reasoning increased the number of all kinds of hypothesis generated and removed biases associated with familiarity, training did not help all participant types to consistently generate all hypotheses types across all event types. These results show that multiple hypothesis generation, although crucial in investigative contexts, is difficult and intransigent. Contrasting effects of collaboration were found. Triads generated more hypotheses than individuals who in turn reported more hypotheses than dyads. Results show support for theories of inhibition based upon collaborative satisficing for dyads and facilitation for triads based upon falsification by a third party. The results are interpreted within a putative process model of investigative hypothesis generation. Initial hypotheses are based on the construction of a mental representation of evidence and implications guided by the operation of a principle of truth, with subsequent fleshing out to discover alternative hypotheses. Hypothesis generation is further moderated by inclusion of hypotheses made available from familiarity with scenarios, and by exclusion of hypotheses depending upon the goals of the reasoner. Collaborative performance further impacts on hypothesis generation ·1 by imposing either strategies of satisficing that limit search for alternative hypotheses or of falsification that enable the discovery of alternative hypotheses.