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This thesis examined decision making in the context of forced-choice situations, as characterised by high-risk consequences and time-limited conditions, within an experimental decision paradigm. By mapping onto basic decision-making stages relating to evaluation, deliberation and implementation of a choice, this research looks at how environmental conditions (emotion) and information (advice) affect cognitive processing in forced-choice or “do or don’t” scenarios. In order to identify these variations on a more fundamental level, a methodological framework was developed, which incorporates neurocognitive, behavioural and qualitative measures. Results identified the distinct sequence of cognitive processes as predicted from basic decision-making models. When individuals lacked any meaningful information to assist in solving the tasks, their responses varied based on the consequential conditions they faced, leading to an accelerated engagement with the decision and faster response, the riskier the outcome. On the other hand, when information was available during the task, differences in responses followed predictions about information processing and cognitive effort required for the different levels of clarity. Here, the consequential conditions did not affect performance, as individuals prioritised the information available. Further, when solving a task lacking any meaningful information on which to base their choice, individuals still engaged in redundant deliberation. Taken together, the research suggests that outcome uncertainty and task ambiguity have a demonstrable effect on the decision-making process. This research, incorporating neurocognitive measures, showed a robust framework to advance current understanding about the interplay of affecting factors and basic decision-making processes. Providing an additional reference, this approach contributes to a more in-depth picture of underlying processes.

Five experiments were performed to assess the emergence of regret in childhood and whether regret improves subsequent decision making. On Day 1 children chose between two boxes to ~in n a prize in both a regret and baseline trial. The unchosen box in the regret trial contained a better prize than chosen box while the boxes in the baseline trial contained the same prize, Children were asked to rate their feelings about their prize before and after they saw unchosen prize, Children who reported feeling sadder after seeing the unchosen prize in the regret trial but not in the baseline trial were categorised as experiencing regret. On Day 2, children were presented with the exact same decision making task. Adaptive decision making on Day 2 was defined as changing box choice in the regret trial only. Experiments 1•3 assessed the emergence of regret in 4•10 9-year.olds. The findings from these experiments found the experience of regret emerges from 6 years of age. Experiments 4•5 included 6•and 7•year-old children only. Results from binary logistic regressions found that verbal ability, but • not age, was a significant predictor of regret. Few children in Experiments 1-2 engaged in adaptive decision making and it was suggested that the task did not accurately measure adaptive decision making. Introducing a cost for swapping boxes on Day 2 gave a more accurate measure of adaptive decision making. In Experiment3the majority of 7- and 9-year-olds who experienced regret engaged in adaptive decision making. Findings from Experiments 4•5 suggest that regret was a significant predictor of adaptive decision making, while age and verbal l ability were not. These findings suggest that the experience of regret emerges from around 6 years of age. Further, they suggest a strong association between the experience of regret and subsequent decision making in childhood.