Orientador: Marcio Orlando Seligmann-Silva / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-11T21:18:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fontanella_MarcoAntonioRassolin_D.pdf: 1011102 bytes, checksum: e6ae69edd0c4b03860c27f41c7fba517 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Doutorado / Historia e Historiografia Literaria / Doutor em Teoria e História Literária

This work largely concerns the roles of Matthew Locke and Henry Purcell in the history of English keyboard music as reflected in their keyboard suites. Both, as composers of the Restoration period, integrated the French style with the more traditional English techniques--especially, in the case of Purcell, the virginalist heritage-- in their keyboard music. Through a detailed examination of their suites, I reveal differences in their individual styles and set forth unique characteristics of each composer. Both composers used the then traditional almain-corant-saraband pattern as the basis of the suite, to which they added a variety of English country dances. At the same time they modified the traditional dances with a variety of French and Italian idioms, thereby making distinctive individual contributions to the genre.

The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold: one is to analyze the narratives of Acis and Galatea written by Ovid, and the two libretti by Handel's librettists including Nicola Giuvo (1708) and John Gay (1718) with John Hughes and Alexander Pope; the other is to correlate this textual analysis within the musical languages. A 1732 pastiche version is excluded because its bilingual texts are not suitable for the study of relationships between meaning and words. For this purpose, the study uses the structural theory- -mainly that of Gérard Genette--as a theoretical framework for the analysis of the texts. Narrative analysis of Acis and Galatea proves that the creative process of writing the libretto is a product of a conscious acknowledgement of its structure by composer and librettists. They put the major events of the story into recitative and ensemble. By examining the texts of both Handel's work, I explore several structural layers from the libretti: the change of the characterization to accommodate a specific occasion and the composer's response to contemporary English demand for pastoral drama with parodistic elements, alluding to the low and high class of society. Further, Polyphemus is examined in terms of relationships with culture corresponding to his recurrent pattern of appearance.

Este trabajo de tesis explica la influencia indirecta que el tribunal de la Inquisición ejerció en el proceso de beatificación de un personaje el cual, a fines del siglo XVII, despertó gran expectativa en el contexto social y religioso: el siervo de Dios, Nicolás de Ayllón. A través del análisis de la hagiografía que el jesuita Bernardo Sartolo escribió sobre este personaje, se conocerá la importancia que dicho género, y sus tópicos literarios, tuvieron dentro del proceso de consolidación de su fama de santidad. La trascendencia que tenía el corpus testimonial dentro del prestigio religioso alcanzado por Nicolás, será también objeto de estudio, en especial por la suspensión en la cual recayó el proceso de beatificación a raíz de dos acciones concretas: la censura que el Santo Oficio dictaminó sobre la obra de Sartolo; y la realización de un proceso inquisitorial en la cual se vio enfrascada una de los principales testigos y colaboradoras en el objetivo de elevarlo a los altares, como fue María Jacinta de Montoya, esposa de Nicolás de Ayllón.

This dissertation charts a lineage of nineteenth-century British literary interventions into the arena of science and philosophy jointly known as vitalism. Intended in part as a contribution to the history of science, Passive Life reconstructs the largely forgotten genealogy of a robust tradition of Victorian-era materialist vitalism, or vital materialism: the theory that a principle of life inheres in all physical matter. I connect this scientific trend to a concurrent surge of cultural engagement with the seventeenth-century philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, whose monist doctrine received renewed attention as experimental developments in biology, physics, physiology, and epidemiology increasingly supported a vital materialist account of the nature of life. Through readings of novels by Mary Shelley, Harriet Martineau, and George Eliot, I position these three women writers as key figures in vitalism’s cultural reception. By attending to the thematic resonances between their novels and materialist vitalism’s major principles and provocations, Passive Life traces the narrative arc of Victorian vitalism, deepening and expanding extant scholarly accounts of the rich interchange among literature and science in the nineteenth century. Moving beyond reception history, however, this dissertation argues that the novels of Shelley, Martineau, and Eliot worked to construct critical interpretations of vitalist theory with a shared emphasis on passivity as a fundamental feature of life. Through innovative techniques of description and characterization, their fiction locates the passivity of life at the level of the material body, in its inherent contingency, fluidity, and impressibility. The view of embodied subjectivity that thus emerges from these novels complicates the liberal humanist model that rose to predominance in Victorian culture and privileged an active, self-determining subject. Within the counter-tradition to which Shelley, Martineau, and Eliot belonged, the idea of “passive life” occasioned pressing ethical and political quandaries involving the relationships between self and other and between subject and environment. On the one hand, treating embodied life as passive pointed speculatively toward more liberated, open-ended, and mutually sustaining forms of communal being. On the other hand, “passive life” also suggested the vulnerability and precarity of bodies helplessly exposed to their material and affective surroundings, raising important questions regarding intention, obligation, and accountability. How do we live well in a world where so many other embodied lives impress upon our own? Can pain and harm be prevented in such a world? What habits of perception and practices of sociality might be evolved and adapted to the realities of passive life? In confronting these questions, nineteenth-century British fiction provides conceptual frameworks well suited to interrogating the political and ethical implications of the twenty-first-century new materialist turn.

This dissertation offers a new interpretation of the metaphysics of two seventeenth-century women philosophers – Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673) and Anne Conway (1631–1679) – and brings to light an unnoticed tradition in seventeenth-century philosophy. I argue that both Cavendish and Conway can be understood as panpsychist-materialist monists: despite their other differences, they agree that there is one kind of substance in nature or creation, and that the single sort of substance always displays material features and mental capacities. Further, I propose that Cavendish and Conway are joined by the physician Francis Glisson (1597–1677) and the poet John Milton (1608–1674) as examples of a distinct panpsychist-materialist tendency in early modern England. ‘Panpsychist-materialist monism’ may at first seem too clunky to serve as the moniker of a movement, but it earns its keep by accurately capturing three elements of the figures’ systems that, when studied together as a group of related commitments, reveal the philosophical significance of each person’s views. My reading therefore bears on the project of interpreting Cavendish and Conway on their own terms and changes the way their context should be understood. Moreover, to the extent that contemporary philosophers of mind draw on philosophers from history in the formulation of their current views, the work presented in this dissertation stands to make a difference in present-day philosophy as well.

En este trabajo, me propongo abordar, desde una óptica spinoziana reactualizada, algunos aspectos del problema del libre albedrío. Partiré de la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cuál es el tipo de libertad que rechaza y el tipo de libertad que defiende Spinoza? Para él, el libre albedrío no existe. El tipo de libertad que, desde su determinismo, defiende es el actuar en función del conocimiento de las causas de nuestros estados mentales. En efecto, Spinoza, por un lado, niega la existencia del libre albedrío porque lo considera como una ilusión. Según él, dado que somos conscientes de nuestros deseos y que podemos actuar en consecuencia, creemos tener libre albedrío; pero nuestros deseos tienen una serie de causas de las cuales no somos conscientes. Por otro lado, el tipo de libertad defendida por Spinoza está relacionada con el paso de ser pasivos a activos; esto es, tendemos a asociar, pre-reflexivamente, objetos exteriores con nuestras experiencias emocionales; pero si separamos el objeto de la emoción y, mediante un ejercicio reflexivo, conocemos las causas que generan tal emoción, estaríamos siendo agentes, pues esto nos permite actuar activamente en favor de nuestro conatus. He dividido este trabajo en tres capítulos. En el primero, deseo reconstruir, someramente, la crítica de Spinoza a la libertad como libre albedrío. En el segundo, voy a abordar la propuesta spinoziana de libertad. Finalmente, en el tercer capítulo, me voy a concentrar, a partir de una reactualización de la propuesta de Spinoza, en algunos aspectos de la discusión contemporánea sobre el problema de la libertad / In this investigation, I intend to address, from a spinozian perspective updated, some aspects of the problem of free will. I will start from the following question: What is the type of freedom that Spinoza rejects and the type of freedom that Spinoza defends? According to him, free will does not exist. The type of freedom that, from his deterministic position, he holds is to act based on the knowledge of the causes of our mental states. Indeed, Spinoza, on the one hand, denies the existence of free will because he regards it as an illusion. According to him, since we are aware of our desires and can act accordingly, we believe we have free will; but our desires have a series of causes of which we are not aware. On the other hand, the type of freedom defended by Spinoza is related to the passage from being passive to active; that is, we tend to associate, pre-reflectively, external objects with our emotional experiences; but if we separate the object from the emotion and, through a reflexive exercise, we know the causes that generate such emotion, we would be agents, since this allows us to act actively in favor of our conatus. I have divided this investigation into two chapters. In the first chapter, I briefly reconstruct Spinoza's critique of freedom as free will. In the second one, I am going to approach the spinozian proposal of freedom. Finally, in the third chapter, I am going to concentrate, based on a re-updating of Spinoza's proposal, on some aspects of the contemporary discussion on the problem of freedom.

Sir George Grey (1812-1898) served as Governor of South Australia, of New Zealand twice, and of the Cape Colony. This thesis explains his policy for the first time for a history of the political ideas of colonization. Grey introduced the policy of racial amalgamation to settler colonies after the 1837 Report of the Select Committee into Aboriginal Affairs, that had advised the policy of segregation as had been North American policy under Sir William Johnson. This thesis demonstrates that Grey was a Liberal Anglican who had adopted neo-Harringtonian thought, and who introduced Jeffersonian native policy into British native policy. He practised the strategic theory of Antoine-Henri Jomini, applying it to native policy. Grey captured the monarchical constitution of the empire for what had been a settler policy of dissent to the segregation of indigenes that dated back to Tudor Ireland and early Viginia. Grey's distinctive intellectual practices were ethnograpical research and speculation, for which he enjoyed an international reputation, and the constitutional design of settler colonies, an activity he came to totally identify with. The thesis concentrates on his first New Zealand governorship (1845-53) and upon the resumption of his second New Zealand governorship (1861-68) because it was in that colony he first fully practised his native policy and participated in constitutional design, and into which he brought about a crisis of indigenous amalgamation on the eve of the Waikato War in 1863, having introduced full responsible government.