Introduction Chapter 1 contains an outline of the main positions held by scholars in the debate about Spinoza's social contract theory. I spell out those which are commonly regarded as the main "anomalies" of Spinoza's contractarianism, and those which are regarded as the contractarian aspects of his theory. Ch 2: I present, and argue against Matheron's evolutionary theory, a noncontractarian reading of Spinoza's political works. Matheron claims that the fragile and problematic contract theory that Spinoza holds in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is deeply revised and substantially abandoned in Spinoza's last work, the Tractatus Politicus. He also shows that we can deduce the details of Spinoza's political position from his metaphysical determinism. I try to show the limitations of Matheron's reading of Spinoza's TP, especially in regard of the notions of individual advantage and social/political conflict. Ch 3: I give an exposition of the "conceptual model of natural law theory", which Bobbio offers in highlighting the similarities of different contract theorists. I discuss Bobbio's contractarian reading of Spinoza's work, with special regard to the issue of the natural law theory. Ch 4: I offer my own reading of Spinoza's text, by exploring how the fundamental notions of Spinoza's theory interplay in the construction of an accomplished social contract theory. Ch 5: I show how Spinoza accommodates the notions of social contract and political change, in this way solving some traditional problems of the contract theory, Ch 6: I briefly discuss the relation between the Tractatus Politicus and Spinoza's earlier works. Ch 7: I contrast Spinoza's social contract theory to that of Hobbes. Spinoza's criticism seems directed against some precise aspects of Hobbes's theory rather than against the contract theory in general. I also discuss certain implications of Spinoza's contractarian approach. Conclusion 2

Analytic ethics often neglects the exploration and appreciation of morality as it is actually practised on a day-to-day basis. But by looking at how, in a practical sense, we are able to interact with others in a morally appropriate way we can construct a compelling picture of what some of our most pervasive obligations are. This thesis takes such an approach through the concept of understanding – understanding essentially taken here to involve those processes involved in detecting and correctly responding to beings typically possessing inherent moral significance. In the first two chapters ‘understanding' and the understanding approach are themselves explicated, and placed in the context of several other related approaches in the English-speaking tradition – Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Nel Noddings' ethics of care and Richard Hare's preference utilitarianism. This approach is then used to provide us with an alternative idea about what our moral reasoning suggests to be of fundamental ethical significance, and of what kinds of activity morality recommends to us. The activity explored in most detail here is that of engaging with fiction – or more broadly, fictive imaginings. While understanding shows us that fictional characters and events themselves cannot have an inherent moral valence or significance, it also shows us when and how it is possible and appropriate to ethically assess fictive engagement, be it as creator or consumer. This is seen after exploring how and in what ways our moral understanding can be appropriately applied to and exercised by fictions at all, and why fiction should be of particular interest to the understanding agent, looking at the work of Martha Nussbaum, Jenefer Robinson, Peter Lamarque and others on aesthetic cognitivism. Ultimately this leads us to discern a minimal ethical constraint on our interpretation of fiction and art in general, further proving understanding's usefulness.