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This thesis is an investigation into how successfully we can measure wellbeing through measuring happiness. We care about our well-being – how well our lives are going for us. And we often treat happiness as a proxy for well-being in our practical lives. It is no surprise, therefore, that there is a burgeoning field of social science that aims to measure well-being through measuring happiness. There is no consensus in this field, however, over what well-being and happiness are, and how successfully we can measure the former through measuring the latter. It is these issues that I aim to address in this thesis. I will argue in favour of the Indicator View, according to which we should treat happiness as an indicator of local changes in well-being. I will further argue that some of the local changes in well-being indicated by happiness constitute an important aspect of our well-being (what I will call our local well-being). The upshot is that we can measure an important aspect of well-being –namely changes in local well-being – through measuring happiness. This conclusion is directly relevant to the empirical study of well-being for two reasons. First, I will employ an account of happiness that is similar to one of the main constructs used by social scientists in the measurement of wellbeing. Second, my conclusion rests on an understanding of well-being that is consistent with all plausible substantive theories of well-being.

Transcendental contractualism is an attempt to explain the objectivity of reasons against wronging. Chapter one discusses Scanlon's Contractualism and Utilitarianism. I argue that Scanlon fails to establish the motivational and normative basis for right and wrong. In chapter two I explain Scanlon's revised account of motivation and defend it from Humean and anti-Humean alternatives. In chapter three I discuss the normativity of what we owe to each other. I use the structure of Williams's distinction between internal and external reasons. I describe the varieties of internalism and externalism about normative reasons, and describe Scanlon as a weak externalist who is also committed to the objectivity of normative reasons. I argue that the combination of weak externalism and objectivity regarding the nature of normative reasons is problematic. In chapter four I endorse the general approach of the buck-passing argument, but criticise Scanlon's version. I develop an augmented buck-passing argument that is brought to bear in chapter five. I employ the augmented buck-passing argument to refute the charges of circularity and redundancy. In the second part of this chapter I describe the problems of normative scepticism, and explain that Scanlon cannot establish the objectivity and a priori nature of the reasons against wronging. In chapter six, I turn to the transcendental arguments of Strawson's Individuals, and argue that when combined with Scanlon's account of the nature of intentional action and the structure of right and wrong, they can refute the scepticism of the amoralist, and those who challenge the priority of what we owe to each other. I argue that the transcendental argument for practical personhood is able to show that original moral properties of contractualism are necessary, universal, and a priori. I conclude that the argument for transcendental contractualism is able to provide for the objectivity of normative reasons, and their necessary connection to motivation.

In this thesis a biocentric, consequentialist, cosmopolitan ethical theory is advanced as the best way of enhancing quality of life for those entities that possess moral standing and are morally considerable. It is maintained that quality of life revolves around the development and exercise of essential capacities. A notion of interests is used here which goes beyond consciousness and sentience to refer to the development and exercise of species-related essential capacities. Essential capacities are those facets of a species that enable it to flourish, that is, to lead a life worth living for that particular species. Any entity capable of flourishing is argued to have intrinsic value and will therefore be morally considerable. Clearly not all entities can have the same degree of moral standing the moral significance, or 'weight', of an entity depends on its capacity to bear intrinsic value more sophisticated essential capacities will denote greater capability for mtrinsic value. Various criticisms of consequentialism are considered and challenged. A normative theory of practice-consequentialism is advocated to address specific medical issues, including therapeutic and reproductive cloning. Related bioethical issues are also briefly examined, such as embryo research, 'designer' babies and xenotransplantation. Finally, the concept of sustainable development is discussed. It is maintained that a radical concept of sustainable development is the best way to tackle environmental degradation and global poverty, and is the best way of ensuring well-being for all bearers of moral standing, including future ones.

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This thesis takes up a rights-based perspective to discuss a number of issues related to the problem of permissible harm. It appeals to a person’s capacity to shape her life in accordance with her own ideas of the good to explain why (i) her death can be bad for her, and why (ii) each of us should have primary say over what may be done to her. The thesis begins with an investigation of the badness of death for the person who dies. If death is bad for us, this helps explain the wrongness of killing. The thesis defends the deprivation account—i.e. the idea that death is bad for us when and because it deprives us of good life—against two Epicurean challenges. It adds that death is also bad when and because it thwarts our agency. Next, the thesis deals with the logic of our moral rights to non-interference. It proposes a conception of rights according to which the stringency of our rights derives from and is justified by the rational aspect of our human nature. It argues that this conception of moral rights solves the paradox of deontology. While our rights to non-interference are stringent, they are not absolute. The thesis considers two possible exceptions to the general rule that it is impermissible to harm an innocent person against her consent. First, using an actual case from WWII, it investigates the circumstances under which a government may expose some parts of its population to an increased risk of harm in order to decrease the risk to others. Second, it considers the permissibility of self-defence against an innocent threat. It argues that the potential victim of an innocent threat has a justice-based reason to treat her own interests as on a par with those of the threat.

Deleuze opposes ethics to Morality. He claims that an ethics develops immanent criteria to evaluate modes of existence, while a Morality imposes transcendent principles. This thesis explores the question of ethics, and I investigate the possibilities of an ethics of the pre-individual. Consequently this enterprise involves the development of an alternative ontology of becoming corresponding to a philosophy of difference. By taking this trajectory, I seek to show that an anti-human humanism is possible and demonstrate how this might work. Deleuze and Guattari always emphasise the practical and concrete nature of philosophy; therefore, in order to situate their concepts I begin the thesis with an examination of different theoretical approaches to the question of difference. However, I suggest that difference and heterogeneity cannot be simply affirmed in and of themselves since new forms of domination also affirm difference. My next chapter follows up on this idea by interrogating the allegation that philosophies of difference have made a political covenant with global capitalism. I draw on a distinction between power (potentia) and Power (Potestas) in order to explain how different modes of social organisation and domination can minimise the creative and transformational capacities of humans. By analysing a number of theoretical accounts of capitalism I demonstrate how and why it differs from other social formations. Nonetheless, I conclude that philosophy can indeed be distinguished from capitalism. Philosophy, as the art of inventing concepts, develops the conditions for real experimentation and new ways of thinking, being and existing. By turning to Spinoza's Ethics I propose that by thinking about the human differentially, as a part of nature, we can develop an immanent ethics. I explain how Spinoza's ontology operates especially in terms of its renovated conception of the human.In generating an ontology that is not centred on the individuated individual but grasps instead the individual as both relational and a degree of power, the pre-individual and transindividual dimensions of the human are emphasised and she is opened up to her non-human becomings. Simondon's account of metastable being explores this in greater detail. He argues that we have tended to extrapolate from the individuated individual in order to try to understand its conditions of existence. Alternatively, we have relied upon a principle of individuation that pre-exists the process of individuation. By intertwining his focus on the process of individuation with his idea that being is more than unity, more than identity and fundamentally incompatible with itself, I present Simondon's account of an ontology of becoming and his correlative conception of a pre-individual field. Residing at the core of his endeavour is a theory of difference and disparateness that understands identity to be emergent, partial, relative and derivative. Simondon's emphasis on disparateness recurs in Deleuze's work 'Difference and Repetition' mobilise this idea in order to distinguish between a created possible and a realisable possible, and to elucidate the ethico-political implications of this distinction. The concept of the 'image of thought' that rests on a series of non-philosophical pre-suppositions helps us to critique dominant modes of thinking and acting. In addition to critique, I seek to construct other ways of thinking and existing. Once again I focus upon the preindividual and transindividual dimensions of the human when in my concluding chapter I map the different conceptions of ethics and subjectivity, that emerge once we transform our understanding of ontology. An ethics of the pre-individual relies on immanent criteria for evaluating modes of existence, does not fetishise the human, and ultimately constructs the possibility, of things being otherwise.

The theory of choice receives formal treatment in decision theory, game theory and substantial parts of economics. However there is cause for concern that the formal treatment of the subject has advanced beyond the substantive grounds on which it relies. For, the formal theories fundamentally rely on a concept of preference, which is itself lacking a viable substantive interpretation. Indeed the challenges to the substantive interpretation of ‘preference’ threaten to undermine the standard arguments used to justify the completeness and transitivity conditions on which Preference Theories rely. This discussion will explore whether a conception of rationality, anchored in a larger conception of practical reasoning, can justify the completeness and transitivity conditions. Specifically, this dissertation will draw on recent developments in philosophy of law, action theory and ethics to enumerate a conception of practical reasoning that takes reasons to be the basic normative concept. It will then seek to offer an account of rationality that is distinct from, but complementary to, the role of reasons. And from this foundation develop an account of preferences that includes many of the characteristics of standard accounts, yet is situated within this broader context. From this vantage point, the discussion will explore possible justifications for the completeness and transitivity conditions. Ultimately, it will be argued that both can be justified – though with different force – in specified domains. While the discussion will primarily focus on the justification of the completeness and transitivity conditions, it is in part motivated by the goal of exploring the connections between the treatment of choice in the distinct fields associated with Preference Theories and action theory broadly defined. In so doing, the hope is to suggest that there is promise in drawing together formal and substantive treatments of choice which is deserving of greater attention.