My thesis focuses upon the ad bellum criteria of just cause and, to a lesser extent, legitimate authority. I begin by developing an account of the individual right to self-defence, grounded upon the individual right to lead a flourishing life, drawing upon Jeff McMahan’s and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s rights-based accounts of defence, and developing a dual account of liability to attack. I then outline a broadly individualist account of just cause, based upon this account of the individual right to defence. I explain what kinds of just causes for war would exist, based upon the delegation of individual defensive rights to a collective entity. Following this, I develop an asymmetrical account of the rights of combatants, based upon the dual account of liability. I argue that most unjust combatants are weakly liable, and I propose a general presumption of weak liability for both just and unjust combatants. I suggest that unjust combatants may therefore possess at least some rights of individual defence, but that just combatants have additional war rights resulting from taking part in a wider act of defence. Finally, I expand upon my argument concerning the delegation of individual defensive rights, by explaining which types of collective entity may receive delegated defensive rights and how such rights are delegated, and I also argue that collective entities which have been delegated individual defensive rights are therefore legitimate authorities, based upon a definition of legitimate authority as moral authority. Overall, my thesis aims to develop an individualist account of just cause, grounded upon the delegation of individual defensive rights to a collective entity, and to use my account to develop an asymmetric account of combatants’ rights and a rights-based account of legitimate authority.

Through an analysis of the work of the poet, Pindar, the historian, Thucydides, and the philosopher, Aristotle, this thesis builds on the conception of man as a creature between god and beast in an attempt to develop a sense of the kinds of thought and language that are appropriate for political theorising. It discusses an understanding of political theory that is based on the human capacity for reasonable, creative action. In this, it opposes another model of political theorising, one that has been collapsed under a scientific model that judges itself successful only when it yields precise and definitive answers to dilemmas that grow out of a contingent and indeterminate world. I have argued that man's good, his potential to become a responsible and flourishing actor, is realised through attentive and reflective political experience. This experience is not 'raw', acquired alone by passively 'absorbing' whatever man perceives to be the case in pursuit of his individual whims. It is instead guided, shared, interpreted, evaluated, and demanding. The texts I have chosen serve to supplement direct political experience. Pindar's odes - their elliptical language and use of metaphor, their juxtaposition of seemingly mutually exclusive characteristics in men - demand effort on the part of an audience/reader to cultivate the capacity to derive meaning from culturally-situated complex ideas and images. Thucydides' description of the war through a 'fragmented' perspective, his examples of the kinds of reasoning that precede decisions, point to a perspective that seems to argue that agents should develop the kind of character that can creatively balance a general conception of what man is as a species with the relevant concrete details of a situation and proceed to act accordingly. That man is a species with a fixed good is one of Aristotle's fundamental assumptions, and leads to his conviction that ethics and politics are inherently imprecise. I discuss how he defends this position and its consequences as elaborated in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. I then attempt to show how what he has to say in the Poetics realises and supplements his ethical and political goals. The Poetics indicates that men must learn to extract sound generalisations by drawing inferences from disparate actions, to transform mistakes into valuable aspects of life, and be able to carve out the proper, dynamic, realm of responsibility. This generates a conception of man whose good goes beyond mere preference satisfaction but instead grows out of a reasonable (general) sense of what he is which can be used creatively in the specific (concrete) circumstances he confronts.

Many philosophers argue for the Distinct Political Morality Thesis, which holds that private and political life are governed by different normative theories. I reject this claim, and must therefore find a theory that adequately encompasses both realms. I argue in Part I of this thesis that rule-consequentialism offers a defensible compromise. However, standard accounts of the theory are vulnerable to the 'collapse/incoherence dilemma'. Brad Hooker's version solves the collapse objection, but still faces difficulties associated with rule-worship and conflicts between rules. I attempt to resolve these with a modified version of rule-consequentialism. This introduces two new elements: practice-rules, which incorporate qualifications and exceptions, and general background principles that act as tie-breakers between practice-rules. The theory also takes account of agents' intentions. I additionally argue that a cognitivist metaethical theory is a precondition of intelligible political and moral discourse, and defend Onora O'Neill's version of Constructivism as the most persuasive non-Realist candidate. In Part III examine arguments offered in support of the Distinct Political Morality Thesis. I briefly survey attempts to detach ethics from politics, and demonstrate that there is a continuum, and no rigid distinction, between public and private. It might be held that politics is characterised by irreconcilable demands and hence true dilemmas, and that political decisions are luckily morally good in their consequences. I seek to show that moral 'dilemmas'; and moral 'luck' are both fictions. I next examine and reject the claim that 'dirty hands' cases show that political agents are not bound, and must sometimes commit acts forbidden, by everyday morality. 'Many hands' scenarios also raise particular problems, for unless we can attribute determinate collective responsibility and intentions to groups and institutions, the problem of luck recurs. Finally, I investigate the implications of large-scale policy decisions involving stochastic processes.

This thesis draws upon Michel Foucault’s understanding of the ethical subject as being at once both code-constituted (in conforming to code-oriented moralities) and creatively self-constituted (in relation to ethics-oriented moralities) to investigate ethical subjectivity in time of war, specifically within just war discourses. The thesis conducts a genealogical search to unravel this dual representation of the ethical subject of war, starting with the writings of Jean Bethke Elshtain and Michael Walzer which, in turn, prompt a re-reading of iconic figures of just war theorizing on whom they rely: Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel. In focusing on the formation of ethical subjectivity, this genealogical inquiry is not constrained by normative distinctions within just war – such as the ad bellum/in bello dichotomy that frames current debate. The genealogy reveals that contemporary use of historical discourses both includes and, importantly, excludes aspects of subjectivity that have emerged previously in the just war tradition.

This thesis presents a critical history of some recent philosophical efforts to clarify the political idea of freedom. These efforts have produced an increasingly complex and inward-looking important to step back and assess how much these analyses have achieved. This will pave the way for discussing how much can be achieved by their 'analytical' approach; an approach which entails analysing the political idea of freedom independently of a wider political theory. 'Analytical' accounts of freedom are usually presented as if they are careful and detached analyses of the concept of freedom that informs and underpins Western political thought and practice. Closer inspection, however, suggests that they are informed by a wider set of moral and metaphysical assumptions that are not always explicated and examined. As a result, these accounts turn out to be more limited and les rigorous than they first appear. In particular, they are often only relevant to a narrow set of concerns and preoccupations, and they frequently reflect the ideological preferences of the philosopher. This suggests that these accounts are far less philosophically interesting than is often supposed. This thesis executes a critique of these accounts in two ways. Firstly, it deploys a standard of philosophical adequacy to assess critically the argumentative rigour of these accounts and, secondly, it uses past conceptions of philosophy and politics to illuminate their conceptual limitations. We will find that these accounts fail to clarify a distinctively political kind of freedom because their proponents have not thought critically about the nature of their inquiry. This shortcoming will be illustrated by examining some of the most important and influential accounts of the post-war period.

In the past, claims have been made regarding the existence and value of a public service ethos and its associations with new public management, professional values and occupational commitment. The present research adopts a rare approach to investigating these constructs, directed towards finding a method to assess the strength of these values and beliefs held by professionals working in the public sector. This led to the development of scales to measure, specifically, professional values, public service ethos, and new public management ideology and to assess the nature and direction of relationships. Thirty-eight hypotheses were tested and these revealed both empirical evidence to confirm claims made in the literature and some unexpected findings. Two separate studies were designed and conducted to enable such evidence to be gathered; Study 1 (N = 205) is concerned with demonstrating the reliability of these measures through generating, testing and re-testing of items comprising the scales, and involved professionals employed in both the public and private sectors. Study 2 (N =433) focused on learning professionals delivering programmes in further and higher education colleges throughout England. Findings from both studies added to the development and validity of these scales and provide a base-line measure on which to compare in the future. Further, this empirical evidence answers a number of research questions making an original contribution to theory in the fields of Public Sector Management and Organisational Behaviour, and reveal potential areas for future research. In particular, three key findings emerge: i) Public service ethos predicts organisational citizenship behaviour whereas new public management is either unrelated or negatively related to such behaviour. ii) Levels of affective organisational commitment are higher for individuals who identify more strongly with new public management ideology than for any of the other independent variables measured in this research. iii) Perceived organisational support and job satisfaction mediate relationships between new public management ideology and organisational commitment.

This thesis argues that a particular sort of injustice, ontic injustice, can be enacted through the construction of individuals as members of human social kinds. I argue that the nature of some human social kinds is such that anyone who is socially constructed as a member of that kind thereby suffers a wrong; this wrong is ontic injustice. In Chapter 1, I introduce and defend institutionalist realism, an account of the ontology of human social kinds according to which human social kinds are roles or positions within institutions. In Chapters 2 and 3, I apply institutionalist realism to race and to gender. I argue that race and gender categories are the products of institutionalized hierarchies in which those constructed as people of colour and those constructed as women are placed below those constructed as White and those constructed as men. I develop a version of institutionalist realism that enables me to argue that race and gender categories are aptly understood as the products of institutionalized hierarchy even though formal structures of oppression have for the most part been abolished. I then set out four desiderata for an account of the ontology of race and gender, and show how my institutionalist realist account meets each of them. In Chapter 4, I use the institutionalist realist account of the ontology of race and gender developed in the first three chapters to give a detailed account of ontic injustice. I argue that the wrong of ontic injustice consists of a failure of recognition respect, which is a recognition of the morally relevant properties of individuals together with a disposition to respond appropriately to them. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of ontic injustice by applying it to two cases, namely pornography, and the Black Lives Matter movement.

No description available.

The aim of this thesis is to defend an account of dirty hands theory and to establish it as a unique, but pervasive, species of inescapable wrongdoing. The thesis examines and attempts to solve a troubling practical implications associated with the problem of dirty hands and politics, namely, the issue of collective responsibility for politicians who dirty their hands. Includes bibliographical references.

Ce travail de thèse a pour objectif d’établir une solution pour la transformation du campus de l’Education City (Doha, Qatar) en une ville intelligente. Ce campus est construit sur 14 km2 avec près de 80 bâtiments. Il comporte des infrastructures pour le transport, l’eau et l’énergie. La première partie du travail de thèse a comporté une synthèse bibliographique des travaux réalisés sur la transformation des sites existants (quartier, campus,..) en ville intelligente. Ce travail a permis de déterminer la méthodologie à suivre et les éléments permettant la transformation en ville intelligente. La seconde partie a comporté la collecte des données sur le campus et leur intégration dans un SIG. L’analyse de ces données a permis d’identifier les besoins et les défis des infrastructures et de leur gestion. La troisième partie a porté sur la transformation des services d’eau (potable, irrigation, assainissement, protection contre le feu, système de refroidissement) en système intelligent. La 4ème partie a porté sur la transformation du système électrique en un système intelligent. / The aim of the thesis work is to establish a solution for the transformation of the Education City campus (Doha, Qatar) into a smart city. This campus is built on 14 km2with nearly 80 buildings. It includes infrastructures for transportation, water and energy. The first part of the thesis compiled a bibliographical summary of the work that done on the transformation of existing sites (neighborhood, campus, ..) into a smart city. This work allowed to determine the methodology to follow and the elements allowing the transformation into a smart city. The second part involved data collection about the Education City and integration in to a GIS system. Analysis of these data allowed to identify the needs and challenges of infrastructures and their management. The third part focused on the transformation of water services (drinking, irrigation, sanitation, fire protection, cooling system) into intelligent system. The last part concerned the transformation the electrical system into an intelligent system.