Doctor of Philosophy / The main issue to be articulated in this thesis is the proposition that Leibniz’s mature philosophy is best, or preferably, presented as a double-aspect ontology. All the arguments to be furnished herein support this case; however, their intrinsic weight and extent far exceeds that of the principal contention, so that the whole of Leibniz’s natural philosophy and metaphysics will be seen to be involved and to undergo some measure of re-orientation away from more traditional interpretive concerns. Part I follows Leibniz in his emendation of Aristotelian-Scholastic notions as a result of his need for a “higher, metaphysical principle” to remedy the defects of the ‘modern’ account of motion. From this flowed his new conception of substance. The fundamental premise of Leibniz’s metaphysics is that spirit and body lie in series. The cosmos presents itself as aspects of an unbroken continuum. Ineluctably our conclusions as to the ‘whole’ is therefore an intellectual reconstruction of the perspectives delivered to us by these aspects. This emerges most clearly from the phenomenotaxis which has been collated in this part of the thesis – apparently the first such exercise in the scholarly literature. All this involves a separation of domains which require appropriate levels of description to explain their autonomous features. A double-aspect theory seems indispensable to account for the one world to which these levels nonetheless refer. In Part II we engage with Leibniz’s conception of substance as a unit of force. From this protean idea (aka monad) the whole material and spiritual cosmos is derived. The basis of this theory is that to act is to be. Accordingly we arrive at an ontology of agency. The nature of a monad is to exert Daseinstreben, the equivalent of individuation. Included in its definition is an absolute freedom to act. God’s “concession” of existence therefore refers to the autonomous collectivisation of monads into universes eligible for actualisation. Accordingly Leibniz arrives at a theory of a self-constructing universe. Post-Arnauld, Leibniz discarded the complete concept, having realised that contingency breaks open the system of determinism. Accordingly Leibniz replaced the ‘sum of predicates’ doctrine with the law of the series. In this conception monads collect the asymmetrical and irreversible information relevant to their internal states; for it transpires that freely executed choices guarantee avoidance of indiscernibles. The section therefore presents a schema of the ten main issues entangled in the conception of agency as well as an analytical chart of the structure of monads. In Part III, the “Labyrinth of the Continuum” resolves the perspectives on the world. Leibniz declares his colours unambiguously – realism concerns the world of facts, idealism the realm of foun-dations. The Principle of Continuity covers a vast range of indeterminate parts which serve as the foundations of real parts. We investigate some case studies, e.g. petites perceptions and especially the Pacidius, in which the conception of an agent-in-motion is studied in depth to reveal Leibniz’s extraordinary conclusions on change. We also consider Shapes, Limits and Boundaries which are relevant to the theory of the self-constructing universe (infolding and unfolding order); and finally his models of self-similarity and scale invariance. PART IV is concerned with grounding existents from the principle of sufficient reason. The virtue claimed here for the double-aspect theory is the possibility of penetrating into the thought of an exceptionally complex thinker through more than one portal. It yields a greater variety of facets, an inner coherence and a much richer texture of thought than the traditional insistence on just one primary aspect reveals.

Doctor of Philosophy / The main issue to be articulated in this thesis is the proposition that Leibniz’s mature philosophy is best, or preferably, presented as a double-aspect ontology. All the arguments to be furnished herein support this case; however, their intrinsic weight and extent far exceeds that of the principal contention, so that the whole of Leibniz’s natural philosophy and metaphysics will be seen to be involved and to undergo some measure of re-orientation away from more traditional interpretive concerns. Part I follows Leibniz in his emendation of Aristotelian-Scholastic notions as a result of his need for a “higher, metaphysical principle” to remedy the defects of the ‘modern’ account of motion. From this flowed his new conception of substance. The fundamental premise of Leibniz’s metaphysics is that spirit and body lie in series. The cosmos presents itself as aspects of an unbroken continuum. Ineluctably our conclusions as to the ‘whole’ is therefore an intellectual reconstruction of the perspectives delivered to us by these aspects. This emerges most clearly from the phenomenotaxis which has been collated in this part of the thesis – apparently the first such exercise in the scholarly literature. All this involves a separation of domains which require appropriate levels of description to explain their autonomous features. A double-aspect theory seems indispensable to account for the one world to which these levels nonetheless refer. In Part II we engage with Leibniz’s conception of substance as a unit of force. From this protean idea (aka monad) the whole material and spiritual cosmos is derived. The basis of this theory is that to act is to be. Accordingly we arrive at an ontology of agency. The nature of a monad is to exert Daseinstreben, the equivalent of individuation. Included in its definition is an absolute freedom to act. God’s “concession” of existence therefore refers to the autonomous collectivisation of monads into universes eligible for actualisation. Accordingly Leibniz arrives at a theory of a self-constructing universe. Post-Arnauld, Leibniz discarded the complete concept, having realised that contingency breaks open the system of determinism. Accordingly Leibniz replaced the ‘sum of predicates’ doctrine with the law of the series. In this conception monads collect the asymmetrical and irreversible information relevant to their internal states; for it transpires that freely executed choices guarantee avoidance of indiscernibles. The section therefore presents a schema of the ten main issues entangled in the conception of agency as well as an analytical chart of the structure of monads. In Part III, the “Labyrinth of the Continuum” resolves the perspectives on the world. Leibniz declares his colours unambiguously – realism concerns the world of facts, idealism the realm of foun-dations. The Principle of Continuity covers a vast range of indeterminate parts which serve as the foundations of real parts. We investigate some case studies, e.g. petites perceptions and especially the Pacidius, in which the conception of an agent-in-motion is studied in depth to reveal Leibniz’s extraordinary conclusions on change. We also consider Shapes, Limits and Boundaries which are relevant to the theory of the self-constructing universe (infolding and unfolding order); and finally his models of self-similarity and scale invariance. PART IV is concerned with grounding existents from the principle of sufficient reason. The virtue claimed here for the double-aspect theory is the possibility of penetrating into the thought of an exceptionally complex thinker through more than one portal. It yields a greater variety of facets, an inner coherence and a much richer texture of thought than the traditional insistence on just one primary aspect reveals.

Cette thèse a pour objectif de déterminer quelques aspects des figurations du sujet au XVIIe siècle à travers une lecture conjointe des romans à la première personne et des textes philosophiques de cette période. Partant de questionnements proches, ces deux genres discursifs construisent une figure du sujet savant et itinérant : être animé d'un désir de connaissance et amené à repenser les conditions d'énonciation de son expérience particulière. Pour les auteurs du corpus, la vérité se découvre au fil d'expériences singulières si bien que dire le monde avec exactitude revient à l'énoncer à la première personne, à en rendre une perception d'abord subjective. Se pose alors le problème de la légitimation de l'énonciation personnelle, légitimation qui permet d'articuler la première personne à une altérité tout en conservant la singularité du sujet. Cette singularité se double toujours d'une dispersion des identités du sujet et des référents de la première personne. Mais narration, fiction et usages du corps figurent cette identité en constellation. Les deux premières exposent la diversité des visages du « je », leurs concordances ou leurs discordances, à la fois être passé et présent, homme réel et personnage imaginaire, narrateur et auteur. Dans les usages liés aux peines et aux plaisirs du corps se dessine une autre forme de rencontre possible entre la particularité du sujet et l'autre : celui qu'il désire, avec lequel il souffre, avec lequel il jouit, qui vit en lui. Par tous ces aspects, énonciatif, narratif, fictionnel, physique, la subjectivité construite par les textes est toujours et essentiellement une relation : récit raconté pour rejoindre autrui. / The objective of this thesis is to set out several aspects of the figuration of the subject in the 17th Century, through a joint reading of first person novels and philosophical texts from this period. Beginning with similar questions, these two discursive genres construct a figure of a knowing and itinerant subject, a subject animated by the desire to know and thus guided to rethink the conditions that articulate his particular experience. For the authors of these works, the truth is discovered through a series of singular experiences and experiments; the world more clearly announces itself in the first person, rendering a principally singular perception. This poses the problem of the legitimation of personal pronouncement, legitimation which allows for the articulation of the first person with an alterity, while conserving the singularity of the subject. This singularity always doubles as a dispersion of the identities and referents of the first person. Still, narration, fiction and corporal practice show this identity as constellation. The first two expose the diverse faces of the ‘I’, their agreements and disagreements, their being at the same time past and present, real persons and imaginary characters, narrator and author. From the practices tied to the pain and pleasure of the body is drawn another form of possible encounter between the particularity of a subject and an other: the one he desires, with whom he suffers and plays, the one who lives in him. Through all these aspects, enunciative, narrative, fictional, physical, the subjectivity that is inscribed in and described by these texts is always primarily relational: an account recounted to encounter the other.

This thesis demonstrates the importance of scholastic philosophy and natural law to the theory of religious uniformity and toleration in Seventeenth-Century England. Some of the most influential apologetic tracts produced by the Church of England, including Richard Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Robert Sanderson's Ten lectures on humane conscience and Samuel Parker A discourse of ecclesiastical politie are examined and are shown to belong to a common Anglican tradition which emphasized aspects of scholastic natural law theory in order to refute pleas for ceremonial diversity and liberty of conscience. The relationship of these ideas to those of Hobbes and Locke are also explored. Studies of Seventeenth-Century ideas about conformity and toleration have often stressed the reverence people showed the individual conscience, and the weight they attributed to the examples of the magistrates of Israel and Judah. Yet arguments for and against uniformity and toleration might instead resolve themselves into disputes about the role of natural law within society, or the power of human laws over the conscience. In this the debate about religious uniformity could acquire a very philosophical and sometimes theological tone. Important but technical questions about moral obligation, metaphysics and theology are demonstrated to have played an important role in shaping perceptions of magisterial power over religion. These ideas are traced back to their roots in scholastic philosophy and the Summa of Aquinas. Scholastic theories about conscience, law, the virtues, human action and the distinction between nature and grace are shown to have animated certain of the Church's more influential apologists and their dissenting opponents. The kind of discourse surrounding toleration and liberty of conscience is thus shown to be very different than sometimes supposed. Perceptions of civil and ecclesiastical power were governed by a set of ideas and concerns that have hitherto not featured prominently in the literature about the development of religious toleration.

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The main goal of this thesis is to describe the evolution of the concept of a world soul in the thought of Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614-1687). However, this topic is discussed within the broader context of early modern philosophy and the birth of modern science. The philosophy of Henry More presents a very interesting confrontation between Renaissance Neo-Platonism and Cartesianism, early modern mechanicism and the newest scientific discoveries of his age, the notion of a world soul being exactly the point where all these thought currents meet. The classical conception of a platonic world soul in More's early thought later becomes the Spirit of Nature, a principle complimentary to mechanicism (and at the same time acting as its metaphysical foundation). Yet in order for the regularity of such phenomena as gravitation to be guaranteed, the Spirit of Nature has to be rid of any conscience and will of its own. However, besides this tendency to "strip" the world soul of its personal aspects, leading ultimately to the notion of a completely impersonal natural law, a deeper analysis of certain aspects of More's philosophical system shows also a determination to preserve the broader connections that tie the classical notion of a world soul to a specific world picture that does not necessarily fit...

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