The Great War was in many ways a conflict defined by technology. The rapid advancements in technology over the decades leading up to 1914 coupled with the outdated tactics employed by all sides created the stalemate of Trench Warfare. Improvements to the existing technology, the addition of new technology, as well as an evolution in tactics led to the breakout, and eventual Allied victory, of 1918. These changes in tactics and technology significantly affected the lives of frontline soldiers. This thesis asks if the tactical and technological changes, in the final two years of the war, were reflected in diaries and memoirs of Canadian soldiers serving at the front. The diaries and memoirs of the soldiers do reflect many of the changes found in the secondary sources. Surprisingly, however, the primary sources often provide more detail about how these weapons were employed by the Germans. Unless the soldier in question was directly involved in their use, or was witnessing a spectacular event, accounts of Canadian artillery, machine gun and poison gas use are often short and lacking in detail.

The First World War's 1916 Arab Revolt has become, in the West, a renowned episode in part because of the presence of one dominating character: T.E. Lawrence. However, "Lawrence of Arabia" is only the most prominent of the many Western agents sent to advise the Revolt. The narratives of these advisers have come to dominate the most Westerners popular conception of the Arab uprising. Most scholars have portrayed the British advisers to the Arab Revolt as "pro-Arab." The aim of this thesis is to challenge that portrayal through a careful analysis of the writings (published and unpublished) and actions of the four advisers: T.E. Lawrence, Sir Ronald Storrs, Major Sir Hubert Young, Lt Col. Sir Percy Joyce. / I argue for a more subtle, complex, heterogeneous version of the advisers Pro-Arab approach. By examining the advisers' published accounts and the available archival resources the contrast between the rhetoric surrounding their legends and the actual practice of their war experiences will be laid bare. The goal of the thesis is to use primary sources to demonstrate, in various areas of their relationships with Arabs, a discourse of superiority versus inferiority. This work has consequently attempted to present a less altruistic agenda emerging from the advisers' wartime conduct. In its place I have demonstrated numerous instances where they coerced and enforced their own interpretation of Arab desires and even an "Arab" identity onto the Revolt itself and furthermore, cemented these interpretations into Western popular culture.

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