Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1975. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.) -- Central Connecticut State University, 2006. / Thesis advisor: Matthew Biskupski. "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History." Includes bibliographical references (leaves [73-74]). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität zu Köln, 1990. / Bibliogr. p. 351-363. Index.

Th.--Sci. polit.--Helsinki, 1964. / Résumé en allemand. Bibliogr. p. 304-306. Index.

Diss.--Geschichtswissenschaft--Würzburg, 1980. / Bibliogr. p. 813-829. Index.

Texte remanié de: Doct. th. / Glossaire. Bibliogr. p. 260-275. Index.

Texte remanié de: PhD. diss.--McGill university. / Bibliogr. p. 833-857. Index.

Afhandling--Roskilde--Institut for historie og samfundsforhold, 1993. / Bibliogr. p. 251-[260]. Résumé en anglais.

The purpose of this study is to discover what the newcomers from the Baltic countries consider to be some of the more important situations to which they have to adjust in becoming settled in Canada, their feelings and attitudes in this regard, and some of the ways in which the adjustment has been made. In this connection "newcomer" refers to displaced persons and refugees who arrived in Canada after World War II. In the course of this investigation various methods and techniques were tried. These included testing, the use of biograms, interviews, systematic field observations and a questionnaire. Sociometric methods, experiments and life histories were considered but not used due principally to the relatively small number of newcomers in the area under study and the need to maintain anonymity in order to establish rapport. These methods and techniques might be useful in studying the social adjustment of newcomers in larger areas having a larger newcomer population. Of the methods tried, interviews, systematic field observations and questionnaire replies proved most useful. No one method in itself was sufficient, but the combination seemed to yield adequate data for the study of the newcomers' problems. Interviews and field observations were carried out concurrently throughout the period of investigation. The questionnaire was used towards the end of the study, after rapport had been established, and was based on the data obtained through the use of interviews and field observations. It was administered to 62 newcomers from the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The replies were useful in determining the relative significance of problems which had been discovered through the use of the other methods. Some of the tension-situations to which the newcomers had to adjust arose out of difficulties encountered in understanding the Canadian culture and difficulties in connection with interpreting their own culture to Canadians. Since assimilation is a two-way process, the solving of the problem of interpreting their culture to Canadians encouraged the newcomers to endeavor to understand Canadian culture better. Out of 57 newcomers who replied to the question about wanting to interpret their culture to Canadians, 52 replied in the affirmative. However, when asked what opportunities they had, the replies were, "none", or "very little". Due to this study being made, the newcomers came to the attention of the Canadian Folk Society and were invited to take part in the Folk Festival, thus relieving in part the tension in this regard. Participation in the planning and program of the Festival resulted in greater interest, on the part of the newcomers, in Canadian citizenship. The two problems which seemed most formidable, however, were those arising out of the Russian occupation of their homeland, which resulted in the deportation of friends and relatives; and the separation of families due to the preference given to single adults under the Canadian immigration policy and its administration. Before any general conclusions can be drawn, however, concerning the social adjustment of the newcomers, it would be necessary to conduct the study on a much larger scale than that used in the present investigation. Further, it would be necessary to consider the viewpoint of Canadians as well as the newcomers before a final evaluation can be made. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

During the Second World War, the Canadian government could claim only moderate success for its information operations. To begin with, the government had difficulty in 1939 establishing its first-ever, full-scale wartime information agency, the Bureau of Public Information, and providing it with an effective organization and policy. Various outside interests, particularly Canadian newspapers and social scientists, pressed the government to adopt a policy which reflected their particular views on the role of wartime information in a liberal democratic system. After trying out an information policy that rested on facilitating newspaper coverage, the minister of National War Services with responsibility for public information allowed the director of Public Information to expand his activities in an ad hoc manner and to adopt newspaper or social scientific techniques if he saw fit. This approach satisfied no one and led to a complete reorganization of information work in 1942 and the formation of the Wartime Information Board, the Bureau's replacement, which finally emerged with a policy in 1943. The chief architect of the new approach, John Grierson, wanted to use the social sciences in an integrated media approach that explained how democracy fit into an increasingly complex, technological society. But this was difficult. The WIB could not avoid involvement in conflicting currents of midwar opinion. Orthodox free-enterprisers asserted the primacy of private business while anyone with opinions to the left of them urged varying degrees of social change. The reformers themselves, however, could not agree on the desirable measures. After barely escaping the crossfire, Grierson resigned in 1944. The new general manager, A.D. Dunton, finally succeeded in setting up a smoothly-run operation that generally followed Grierson's direction. At the same time that the board was explaining democratic procedures to Canadians, however, political interference in its operations demonstrated that the new propaganda techniques could be manipulated for possibly undemocratic ends. The evolution of official wartime ideology more or less parallelled policy development. The Bureau began by trying to establish a concept of Canadian nationalism that encompassed a mixture of chauvinistic patriotism and a general realization of the outlines of Canadian nationhood. In the wartime context, this meant presenting a view of the enemy, of the allies and of wartime events that would mobilize Canadians to support the government's policies. It also involved trying to define a view of 'Canadianism' that would encompass the ethnic community as well as English and French Canadians. By the middle of the war, it was obvious that this approach had not proved satisfactory. The BPI's successor, the Wartime Information Board could not totally reorient all these operations but did manage to establish new programmes that took a different approach to Canadian nationhood. Basically, these programmes tried to awaken a sense of participation in alienated groups, to take individual needs into account and to provoke discussion about the direction of government policy. The propaganda operations, however, were not totally reoriented and retained some elements of chauvinistic patriotism. The new system, despite its success in heading off popular discontent, opened the door to manipulation of public opinion. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate