An essential and critical component of the orders German front-line formations received in the ideological war against the Soviet Union was the Commissar Order of 6 June 1941. This order, issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, required that front-line military formations, as well as SS and police units attached to the Army, immediately execute Soviet political commissars among prisoners of war. Soviet political commissars were attached to the Red Army at virtually every operational level, and were viewed by both Hitler and the High Command as the foremost leaders of the resistance against the Nazis because of their commitment to Bolshevik ideology. According to the Commissar Order, "Commissars will not be treated as soldiers. The protection afforded by international law to prisoners of war will not apply in their case. After they have been segregated they will be liquidated." / While there is no paucity of information on the existence and intent of the Commissar Order, this directive has only been investigated by scholars as a portion of a much greater ideological portrait, or subsumed in the larger context of overall Nazi criminal activities during "Operation Barbarossa." / Examining the extent to which front-line divisions carried out the charge to shoot all grades of political commissars is necessary if we are to understand the role and depth of involvement by front-line troops of the Wehrmacht in a murderous program of extermination during the German attack and occupation of the Soviet Union. Such an examination has simply not taken place to-date. My dissertation seeks to address this issue. The result is both a narrative on the genesis of the Commissar Order and its attendant decrees and agreements between the Army leadership and the SS ( SD) and Security Police, and a quantitative analysis of how many commissars were reported captured and shot by the front-line forces of the 17th Army over a seven month period.

Mechanization signaled the end of the cavalry but the renaissance of heavy cavalry doctrine. The tank heralded the return of breakthrough operations and maneuver warfare. Initially, the western cavalries refused doctrinal revision and chose instead to fight bitter rear guard actions against Fullerist zealots. / The Canadian Cavalry, prompted by Blitzkrieg's triumphs, effortlessly evolved into a tank force---virtually overnight. Canadian doctrine, however, was ersatz. Denied its own vast training areas, the RCAC was sandwiched into southern England and saddled with British warfighting techniques developed in the Western Desert. In Normandy, Canadian operational art was driven by Generals Simonds and Crerar, both gunners, who had neither the skill nor experience to conduct armoured warfare. Hampered by General Montgomery's inability to reproduce a strategic offensive comparable to that demonstrated on the Russian front, Allied armoured forces were squandered in mismanaged frontal attacks. / In the United States, the attempts to protect the horse forced a praetorian's revolt that ended with General Chaffee garroting the US Cavalry, eliminating it from future battlefields. The doctrinal dominance of the American Armored Force was subsequently threatened by a cabal under artillery General Leslie McNair who imposed the Tank Destroyer philosophy. Internecine squabbles and economic nationalism prevented America from producing a tank capable of meeting German panzers on even terms. Though failing technically, the US Armored force succeeded doctrinally via the Louisiana maneuvers and produced a balanced Armored Division. General Bradley's 12th Army Group arrived in France with a purposeful dogma that had been further refined at the Combat Command, Divisional, and Corps level in North Africa and Sicily. / American armour maneuvered during Operation Cobra but it did not fight massed panzers; this was soon redressed in Lorraine where American armoured doctrine reached tactical maturity. Canadian armour fought tank battles throughout Operations Spring, Totalize and Tractable, but it did not maneuver. American and Canadian armour's best opportunity for strategic victory occurred in Normandy. The Canadians, despite better tanks and favourable terrain, failed operationally and received no second chance.

A shortened version of the author's dissertation (doctoral)--University of South Africa, entitled: A heuristic study of the meaning of suffering among Holocaust survivors. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [287]-311) and indexes.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Göttingen, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 411-451) and indexes.

Thesis Univ. of Washington, 1996. / Originaltitel: Brave women and fair men, based on thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. [221]-226) and index.

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1983. / Errata slip and "Stellingen" (1 leaf) inserted. Includes bibliographical references (p. 282-292).

Thesis--Cologne. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 284-291).

Thesis (doctoral) - Universität, Augsburg, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 377-410) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

AFRIKAANS: Gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag op verskeie fronte aktief aan die oorlog deelgeneem. Afgesien van maritieme operasies langs die Afrikaanse kus en die vervoer van personeel en voorrade in Afrika en Europa, het die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag in drie oorlogsarenas in Oos-Afrika, Noord-Afrika en die Middellandse Seegebied opgetree. Die vraag ontstaan egter: in hoe ‘n mate het die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag hulle van hul taak gekwyt? Was die operasies wat hulle uitgevoer het effektief en in welke mate het hulle ‘n bydrae tot die uiteindellke onderwerping van die Spilmoondhede gelewer? Om ‘n antwoord op hierdie vrae te kry, is die optrede van die verskillende Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmageskaders onder die loep geneem. Operasionele krygsvlugte is ontleed en die bydrae van die lugmag in die oorlog is na waarde geskat. Dit is dus duidelik dat dit hier nie bloot om ‘n chronologiese beskrywing van die rol van die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag gedurende die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gaan nie, maar veel eerder om ‘n evaluering van hulle werkswyse, operasionele vernuf en doelmatigheid. Nadat die bydraes van die onderskeie Suid-Afrikaanse eskaders ontleed is, het die ondersoeker tot die volgende slotsom geraak. In die eerste plek het die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag gedurende die oorlog tot ‘n gedugte gevegsmag ontwikkel wat die vyand die stryd op alle terreine met moderne toerusting sou aansê. In die tweede plek het die Lugmag 'n substantiewe bydrae tot die vernietiging van die Spilmoondhede se magte gelewer. In Oos- en Noord-Afrika sowel as in die Middellandse Seegebied het die Suid-Afrikaanse eskaders uitgemunt in die ondersteuning van land- en seemagoperasies terwyl hulle ook instrumenteel in die verkryging van lugsuperioriteit was. Dit was egter nie alleen die eskaders wat aan die oorlogsfront suksesvol was nie. Eweneens het eskaders belas met maritieme verkenningsvlugte en die vervoer van voorrade ook met eer uit die stryd getree. In sy wese handel dit in die geskiedenis om die verhaal van die mens: sy stryd, sy prestasies, sy oorwinnings; ook sy teleurstellings en sy nederlae. Dit is ook waar ten opsigte van die geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Lugmag. Die tydperk onder bespreking gee egter meer blyke van prestasie as teleurstelling, meer blyke van oorwinning as nederlaag met betrekking tot werklike oor logsdeelname maar meer so betreffende persoonlike taakvervulling. Dit kan toegeskryf word aan individuele deursettingsvermoe, ywer, toewyding en idealisme-eienskappe wat dien tot herinnering maar ook tot besieling vir toekomstige geslagte. ENGLISH: The South African Air Force actively participated on different fronts during the Second World War. Apart from maritime operations along the African coast and the transport of personnel and material in Africa and Europe, they also operated in three theatres of war in East Africa, North Africa and the countries bordering the Central Mediterranean. However, the question now arises how effective these operations were and to which extent the South African Air Force contributed towards the ultimate destruction of the Axis Powers. To answer these questions the different operations of the Air Force Squadrons during the war were analized and evaluated. The researcher arrived at the following conclusions: In the course of the war the South African Air Force played a substantial role in the subjugation of the Axis Powers. In Eastern and Northern Africa, as well as in the Mediterranean area, the South African Squadrons excelled in assisting land and sea force operations while they were also instrumental in the attainment of air superiority. At the same time squadrons involved in maritime reconnaissance and transportation also took honours for their efforts. This magnificent record was achieved through supreme courage, fortitude and idealism on the part of the men and women involved. South Africa could therefore be justly proud of the more than 44 000 men who volunteered for service in the South African Air Force during the war. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Jurisprudence / unrestricted