This thesis proposes a 5-fold theological theory that has the power to explain how the laypeople in the Kenya Assemblies of God local churches help one another. The theory was empirically generated and grounded. It explains why the laity engaged in various acts of mutual service, in the light of existing or emerging relationships. It evaluates how the laypeople were trained, as to the role which awareness of their gifting played in comparison to the kind of influence socio-cultural and ecological contexts exerted upon the quality and type of mutual service provided. The theory establishes the existence of a multiplicity of motivations for lay ministry and relationships, as influenced by diverse attitudes, lay training as largely disconnected from the kind of spiritual gifts present or known, socio-cultural contexts as largely negatively influencing the form of praxis provided and ecological contexts as mostly determining the types of needs present. A multi-method approach that applied the praxis model of doing theology, and that employed grounded theory methods, case study research designs, open-ended questions and qualitative interviews helped to generate the 5-fold theological theory. A multi-layered analysis of the KAG lay ministry praxis was made possible because diverse contexts, churches and circumstances were considered. The emergent theory takes significance from, claims relevance for, and communicates, or questions, the usefulness of various practices in the KAG denomination, as well as other local churches around the world. The theory, therefore, has potential for wider international, cross-contextual, theological and ecclesiological relevance, application and generalization. This is because the factors influencing lay mutual ministry dynamically interact with, and significantly stem from, existing congregational identities of any given local church and are influenced by commonly shared factors, such as surrounding cultures and leadership abilities.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer offers a vibrant, theological depiction of the self constituted by and for the other in responsibility. The thesis argues that the concept of orientation is crucial for understanding this self; the self is a being oriented to, or away from, the other. To grasp the distinctiveness of Bonhoeffer’s self this thesis aims to open up critical conversation with his historical contemporaries, Emmanuel Levinas and Simone Weil. Like Levinas, Bonhoeffer depicts the self as confronted by the other. Yet unlike Levinas, Bonhoeffer’s other does not render the self a ‘host-hostage’. An oriented self, grounded in Bonhoeffer’s theology, is neither dominating nor other-dominated. Bringing Bonhoeffer and Weil into critical dialogue with one another helps to describe the precise way in which the self is responsible for the other. Conversation with Weil refines Bonhoeffer’s account of responsibility by integrating her account of attention into his account of existing on behalf of another. It is also neither self-affirming nor self-negating. The first chapter outlines two recent conceptions of the self as oriented; but each, as will be demonstrated, does not recognise fully the ethical contours of the oriented self. The second chapter examines in detail Bonhoeffer’s contributions to a Christological account of the responsibly oriented self. Integral to this account are the images of ‘the heart turned in on itself’ (cor curvum in se) and Christ who is fundamentally ‘for’ the other. The third chapter converses with Emmanuel Levinas, both constructively and critically. Of help is Levinas’s reading of the other as a confrontation to the self. His rendering of the other as dominating, or holding hostage, the self is a serious issue. Such a construction resists positive elements of the self-other relation. The fourth chapter investigates what conversation with Simone Weil can offer to Bonhoeffer’s framework. Her concept of attention helps to articulate how the self becomes a self through engagement with another. The fifth chapter presents Adolph Eichmann, as portrayed by Hannah Arendt, as the supreme and pivotal opposite of attentive responsibility. In Eichmann’s irresponsibility and disunity [while doing his ‘duties’] one finds justification for a fundamental re-working of ethics in a Bonhoefferian vein. The image of the ethically blind cor curvum in se exposes Eichmann’s fundamental issue. In contrast, Bonhoeffer’s ethically oriented self both perceives the other and gives of itself as for that other.