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The doctrine of the Trinity says there's one God and three divine Persons. The doctrine of the Incarnation says one Person who has the divine Nature assumes a human Nature. I focus on the subject problems: how many subjects are there? If, in the I Trinity, there's one subject (i.e. God), how are'therethree'divine Persons? But if there are three subjects (i.e. fhe divine Persons), how's there one God? If, in the Incarnation, one subject (i.e. the Son) assumes a distinct human soul and body and so a distinct subject, how's there one Person? But if one subject doesn't assume a distinct subject, how are there two Natures?

This thesis equates <i>pure act</i>, Thomas Aquinas’ definition of God, with <i>self-representation</i>, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s definition of play.  It argues that God, as conceived in traditional, Western, Christian doctrine, can be thought of as playing.  Play, if defined as self-representation, can be seen to be what artists do when they create a work of art.  It is also what viewers do when they look at a picture.  It is also what players do in a game match, and consequently, what the spectators of that match do as they watch the game.  Representation, and thus self-representation, is thought of in primarily, thought not exclusively, visual terms.  Works of visual art, therefore, can be used as examples of play, and therefore of self-representation. The same principles that are seen to make play effective in pictures can also, with qualifications, be applied to the invisible being of God, to demonstrate that God plays, or represents the divine self, both within the divine self but also with, and in, and to creation.  Showing the relationship between theology and art, or between God and play, is an attempt to see an old doctrine, which has become outdated and unappealing in the minds of many, in a new light.  It is also an attempt to show how the strengths of some of the art of the past anticipate characteristics that may be needed and effective if they were applied in contemporary art.  Finally, it is an attempt to build analogies, much like those Aquinas articulated for the doctrine of God generally and the interdisciplinary analogies Augustine constructed for the Trinity.  Such analogies show that God’s way of being is simply ‘to be’, but also ‘to be at play’.

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I explicate the model of divine eternality developed by William Lane Craig— ‘accidental temporalism—and defend its plausibility. In chapter one I provide an overview of several foundational issues relevant to the development of my thesis (e.g., methodology, the relevant biblical data, and key definitions). In chapter two I trace the development within the Christian philosophical theological tradition of the two major views of God's relationship to time: atemporalism and temporalism. This survey draws out several concepts influential in the tradition—e.g., Neo-Platonism, divine simplicity, and the emerging importance of the metaphysical nature of time—as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the traditional views. This reveals the motivation for accidental temporalism. Having thus set the stage for accidental temporalism, in chapter three I offer an exposition of accidental temporalism. This involves a philosophical consideration of the metaphysical nature of time itself and the implications for Craig's affirmation of the dynamic theory of time. In chapter four I evaluate, on their own terms, several purely analytical philosophical objections which have been raised against accidental temporalism. I begin with two peremptory objections taken from the professional literature. I also develop two original objections, in response to which I consider possible responses. In chapter five I assume the plausibility of accidental temporalism and advance the discussion by arguing that accidental temporalism is not only internally consistent but possesses tremendous explanatory power and scope. I consider accidental temporalism's implications for familiar theological problems as well as challenges to the coherence of Christian theology. Chapter six concludes the thesis by offering a summary of the overall argument and drawing a few modest conclusions for the God and time discussion. I will also point out some possibilities for future research emerging from this project.

The aim of this dissertation is to propose an eco-feminist model of the Divine for the contemporary Korean Protestant Church, where sexism and eco-antipathy are problematic. For this purpose, the dissertation explores native Korean spiritual traditions with respect to their inherent eco-feminist sensitivity, with a view to making points of contact with traditional Christian conceptions of the Trinity. The dissertation proposes a model called ‘God of Land’ that brings eco-feminist Christian theology together with Feng Shui perspectives on finding an alternative divine model in a Korean context. The model is grounded deeply in both Christian confession of the Trinity and East Asian IChing cosmology. More specifically, the ‘God of Land’ model reinterprets Christian theological language of the Divine using non-Trinitarian symbols derived from Feng Shui in Asian cosmology, which is a symbolic thinking process fundamental to Koreans. This reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity in an Asian context represents a new hermeneutical approach to Christian theology that calls for a contextualizing method of reflection, praxis, and cultural mediation. From an eco-feministic standpoint, the proposed ‘God of Land’ model identifies women and nature as victims of a male-centered mindset that is well blended with native traditional patriarchy. The realities of women’s multi-layered oppressions that are rampant in the contemporary Korean Protestant Church follow from this patriarchy. This dissertation criticizes how the Korean Protestant Church has for many years institutionalized the patriarchy that has led to the current ecological crisis, and women’s oppression. Mindful of this patriarchy, this dissertation offers a new model of the Divine, presented as ‘God of Land’, that combines an eco-feminist theological perspective and an Asian perspective in the hope that this way of thinking with Christian tradition and native Korean spirituality can be healing and restorative to both women and nature in Korea. Furthermore, the proposed model attempts to reveal rich images of a Triune God, which have been veiled behind institutionalized Christianity but that can be rekindled in dialogue with yin and yang symbolic thinking taken from Feng Shui cosmology. The claim is that the proposed interaction between Christian theology and Feng Shui cosmology, inspired by yin and yang, Chi, and the ChunJiIn idea in Asian cosmology, will contribute to a more explicitly cosmological understanding of the Trinity, as informed by the traditional doctrine of perichoresis. Christian Trinitarian thinking about perichoresis will be brought into dialogue with Feng Shui cosmology around the concepts of balance and equilibrium — again with a view towards restoring the current reality of subjugated positions of women and nature in the contemporary Korean Protestant Church. In this way, the ‘God of Land’ model - informed by Christian Trinitarian theology and reinterpreted from an Asian perspective - is emancipatory, eco-feminist sensitive, and perichoretic; this bespeaks equal, respectful, and nurturing relationship among the persons of the Trinity, which is rich and embracive.

Ever since the Latin term omnipotentia announced that God could do everything, the inevitable question was raised about the things God could not do. Manuscript, Vat. Lat. 1086 contains the reportationes of student Prosper taken from a disputatio in which his accomplished teacher, Meister Eckhart, considers whether the potentia of God should be considered as ordinata or absoluta. Through his astute mind and efficient administrative skills, Eckhart was re-appointed to the Dominican Chair of theology at the University of Paris circa 1312, and following his Commentary on Exodus and Latin Sermon XXVIII, this was the third occasion, that we know of, to expand his thoughts on how God actualises power, and the perceived power distinction. This previously unexplored treatment is in the middle of a series of questions which present a developing image of the thinking of this Meister who stretched notions of God beyond any boundaries. The first part of this thesis issue reviews how the question of a power distinction reached Eckhart. The all-powerfulness of the one God had seen anthropomorphic Hebrew roots adapted to incorporate Greek aspects of a more abstract, sustaining and emanating oneness. The 13th Century, saw turbulent times in Paris with disputes between the university, its students, the church, and not only between mendicant orders but also within them, meanwhile, with scholarly advances, the terms of the distinction were refined to become a sharp issue for debate in the classroom and an available tool for refining the increasingly powerful canon law. The second part reviews the codex with a new transcription and English translation. From this, a commentary of the text presents how the Meister considers earlier treatments on the power of God by notables such as Augustine and Thomas, and challenges them with a striking modification to the conception of the potentia absoluta. Through these notes which are substantiated by his other works, Eckhart forwards his own radical view, that God does not just perform actions distinctly in power, but is one, total, continuous, active, power.

The dissertation examines the two most important criticisms offered in the literature, both ancient and contemporary, against theological determinism: that it excludes moral responsibility, and that it improperly involves God in evil. With respect to the former—the ‘incompatibilist’ claim that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism—the dissertation surveys numerous formulations of the charge: that determinism excludes free choice, that determined humans are analogous to pets or puppets, that determinism involves or is analogous to coercion, manipulation, or mental illness. In each case, defeaters are offered to maintain the coherence of compatibilism. The ‘Consequence Argument’ is then shown, in each of its formulations, to fail to refute compatibilism, as it presupposes an incompatibilist version of the ‘principle of alternate possibilities’. This principle is properly analysed and refuted in detail by two independent arguments. It is found on the one hand to be incompatible with divine praiseworthiness and impeccability, and on the other hand to be untenable for one who rejects Pelagianism and universalism. Given the failure of the principle of alternate possibilities, a positive argument is offered to establish compatibilism. As to the second grand argument—the claim that determinism improperly involves God in evil—a variety of related worries are examined: that determinism makes God the author of sin, or responsible for sin, or a sinner Himself, or the cause of sin, or a culpable manipulator of sin. Each of these worries is shown to be unwarranted, and considerations are offered to maintain divine righteousness in the face of evil and determinism. Lastly, the issues of God ‘willing’ or ‘permitting’ evil are investigated, showing that determinism does not commit one to any untenable position with respect to God’s will and providence. Putting these together, determinism is found to be compatible with both moral responsibility and divine righteousness.

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