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This thesis challenges the conventional wisdom that tends to conflate Arab foreign fighters with Islamist terrorists, and ‘martyrdom operations' with ‘suicide attacks.' Overlaps notwithstanding, it aims to draw distinctions between Arab foreign fighters engaged in defensive jihad defending co-religionists against a military foe, and Islamist terrorists engaged in terrorism that indiscriminately targets civilians and non-combatants. Critically, while disaggregating the two transnational cohorts, this thesis also illuminates the nexus between them. It draws on a thesis dataset of 3,010 Arab foreign fighters compiled using biographies, martyrdom eulogies, and postings on ‘jihadi' websites, in both English and Arabic. This dataset is then used to support three case studies involving the defensive jihads in 1980s Afghanistan, Iraq (post 2003), and Syria (post 2011). It leverages a theoretical framework based on the concept of radicalisation and the language of political Islam, whilst concurrently drawing on theories from psychology and historical military examples of combat, germane to defensive jihad and Islamist terrorism. The thesis concludes that Arab foreign fighters involved in defensive jihad employ martyrdom operations against military targets, through tactical necessity. Conversely, Islamist terrorists employ suicide attacks against civilians and non-combatants, through ideological necessity. The trajectory between the two transnational mobilisations appears to be broadly underpinned by facets of the Lucifer Effect – the situational factors encountered whilst participating in defensive jihad, including but not limited to, the experience of close combat in a war zone; being subjected to ideological indoctrination; and being exposed to charismatic authority and obedience to it. This suggests that subsequent involvement in Islamist terrorism by some Arab foreign fighters is primarily forged in the crucible of defensive jihad. Such findings should result in the crafting of more individualised de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes for returning foreign fighters, in both the West and the Arab world.

This qualitative study analytically compares State-madrasa and inter-madrasa relations in Hindu-majority West Bengal and Muslim-majority Bangladesh. It uses Migdal’s State-in-Society approach to explain the nature and bases of these interactions as expressed in three interrelated arenas: educational, organisational, and political. The central question addressed in the educational arena is why some madrasas (recognised madrasas) respond positively to State-initiated incentives for reform while others (unrecognised madrasas) reject the same. In resolving this puzzle, the study seeks also: 1) to classify madrasas in each setting according to their relative thresholds for engagement with the State; and, 2) to identify how, and to what extent, the State can extend the appeal of its reform scheme to unrecognised madrasas. In the organisational arena, the study focuses exclusively on those madrasas that reject State-initiated reform, asking how they organise independently of the State. A key objective here is to determine how inter-madrasa relations vary between Muslim-minority and –majority contexts, and which specific aspects of the State’s policies most encourage such variation. The study’s third empirical section examines State-madrasa relations as expressed through two phenomena in the political arena. The first phenomenon involves the politicisation of recognised madrasas by the State (represented by political parties and their student wings). The study explicates the mechanisms through which this politicisation occurs, identifies the factors facilitating/impeding such politicisation, and assesses the impact of this politicisation on the political allegiances of individual students. The second phenomenon sees representatives of unrecognised madrasas (attempting to) reach into the State complex by launching madrasa-based political parties. The study focuses on this phenomenon to gauge the relationship between a madrasa man’s careers in the educational, organisational, and political arenas: To what extent can madrasa-based political entrepreneurs leverage influence wielded in the educational and organisational arenas towards success in the political arena? And do those who succeed in entering the State complex use this opportunity to promote the societal interests they represent in the educational arena, or in pursuit of increased authority in the organisational realm?