The role of discretion in judicial reasoning m Joseph Raz's theory of legitimate political authority gives rise to certain puzzles. First, how is judicial reasoning constrained by the authority of statutory enactments? Second, on what basis can judges distinguish their decisions and the decisions of other judges from time to time? My thesis argues that the answers to these puzzles lie in a certain characterisation of value and in a certain theory of the good life. I have argued in this thesis for a communicative characterisation of value. The communicative characterisation of value is useful in portraying how the individual and the social aspects of a value come together. They come together in the idea of an individual communicating his understanding of a value to another individual(s). I argue that this idea culminates in a theory of human well-being that focuses on individuals successfully pursuing their goals. I have used my characterisation of value and the idea of communication that follows from it to argue for a certain interpretation of Raz's theory of value and, in particular, his theory of judicial reasoning. The main plank of my argument rests on a notion that Raz introduces in his discussion on well-being: goals. Raz introduces goals for two reasons. One, to show how any analysis of well-being is incomplete without an understanding of how individuals pursue their activities through a hierarchy of goals. Second, that these goals are intelligible primarily through social forms. In this thesis, I have taken this narrative of goals forward in a way that connects Raz's theory of well-being to his theory of value and, ultimately, to his theory of law and judicial reasoning.

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