This thesis is an internal organisational history of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt between 1973 and 2013. Based on memoires of Brotherhood leaders, as well as oral history interviews conducted in 2012 and 2013 with different rank-and-file members and dissidents, the thesis situates the life trajectories and personal experiences of these individuals within a larger national and international context. The purpose is to provide a historical account that is able to explain the reasons for the Brotherhood's cataclysmic failure of the summer of 2013. In accounting for the fall, my key argument centres on the internal rivalry between two political factions representing different "schools of thought", or visions, about the kind of organisation the Brotherhood was supposed to be. Representatives of the respective coalitions competed against each other over hegemony and organisational resources, basing their claims on contrasting intellectual traditions, political cultures and organisational values that had co-existed, sometimes uncomfortably, within the ranks of the Society since the times of Hasan al-Banna. The adherents of the "Qutbist" school of thought put forward the idea of a closed, pyramid-shaped and exclusive organisation, while those closer to 'Omar al-Tilmisani's model aspired to a reformed Society that was open to outsiders, and where internal progression was based on meritocracy, transparency and some form of democracy. I argue that it is through the holistic analysis of the complex dynamics between internal organisational politics, the use of ideology, and the personal experiences of key organisational members, that we are best able to grasp the Brotherhood's failed experience in governance in 2013.

This study, using contemporary history and empirical research, updates traditional rentier state theory, which largely fails to account for the existence of opposition movements, by demonstrating the political capital held by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This study thus also fills a critical gap in existing literature on political Islam by examining previously unstudied movements in the smaller Gulf states that do not require Brotherhood organisations to provide services, to form social networks, or to contest elections (aside from in Kuwait). Through a divergent case study, we demonstrate the degree to which and the means through which the Ikhwan shapes domestic politics in the some of the world’s wealthiest oil states, the super-rentiers. This research helps to break the causal link established by rentier state theory between oil rents and lack of politically relevant Islamist organizations. As will be shown, Muslim Brotherhood organizations in the Gulf are politically influential entities. It is important to note, however, that these groups shape cultural and social ideas as readily as political notions. The division between these sectors is often blurred in the atmosphere of the socially conservative super-rentiers, as politics is often displaced to the social sphere in restricted political systems. We therefore elucidate a new model for understanding how Muslim Brotherhood movements influence government policies, in addition to cultural and social policies, in the wealthiest rentier states of the Gulf, which we call rentier Islamism.