The Second Congo War (1998–2003) is widely considered the deadliest conflict since World War II, yet it has received little attention by International Relations theorists. A closer look reveals that both this war and its precursor, the First Congo War (1996–7), were neither simply intra-state nor just inter-state conflicts; their central feature were transnational alliances between neighboring governments and Congolese rebel groups. In fact, with one exception, every episode of internal war in sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2010 involved external support to the rebel side from at least one African government. In order to explain both the origins and the dynamics of transnational alliances, this dissertation develops a three-step theory. It explains why governments of weak states support foreign rebel groups, why they choose some groups from a specific country as alliance partners but not others, and why some of these allies subsequently behave uncooperatively towards their foreign sponsors, leading to the breakdown of alliances and the formation of new ones. The theory draws on both the rational choice literature and the realist school of thought. It also adapts insights from principal-agent theory. Overall, the three-step theory presents transnational alliances as the continuation of domestic politics by other means: both governments and rebel groups use them as an instrument in their own domestic struggle for power. Drawing on a wide range of sources, including over one hundred interviews – almost all of them conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda – the dissertation uses process tracing to apply the theory to seventeen transnational alliances from the Congo Wars and their aftermath. It also tests the theory’s first step more widely in a cross-case analysis of forty-two African weak state dyads. Together, this multi-method approach demonstrates both the internal and the external validity of the theory.

The thesis explores everyday resistance in post-conflict statebuilding. Despite the turn in peace and conflict studies to study everyday forms of resistance, the concept and the account of its practices remain limited. In addressing these limitations, the thesis develops an alternative account of both resistance and post-conflict statebuilding. Following the framework of James Scott, resistance is understood as the pattern of acts of individuals and collectives in a position of subordination against the everyday experience of domination. What is resisted is not an externally driven liberal intervention, but the coercive and extractive practices fostered by statebuilding. These dynamics are examined through the case of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, focusing on the provinces of North and South Kivu. Generally studied as a paradigmatic case of state-failure, the DRC provides an insight into post-conflict statebuilding as a plural, improvised and contradictory process. In the thesis, this is linked to historical and sociological practices of statebuilding more generally, and to the specificities of the African political space. Although statebuilding claims to be a strategy to restore state authority, peace, and democracy, the result has so far been a militarised environment, a pluralisation of state authority and a deterioration of living conditions. The thesis examines discursive, violent and survival practices that deny statebuilders the claim to legitimate authority and to the monopoly of violence, while enacting alternative channels of re-appropriation based on solidarity and reciprocity. Post-conflict statebuilding does not require a special framework of resistance. It requires a historicised account of practices, which grasps their heterogeneity and gradients, and which ultimately accounts for resistance as a prosaic presence in the relations of domination that sustain statebuilding.